← BonkDAO Treasury Governance Attack (July 2026)1 decision on this page
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Every state-changing event for BonkDAO Treasury Governance Attack (July 2026): moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-08-02 17:17:55ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchorpending
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{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"0368b0ca-5c94-4621-a143-ccb606bb4038","kind":"publish","page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack-july-2026","published_at":"2026-08-02T17:17:55.043Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"BonkDAO Treasury Governance Attack (July 2026)","sections":[{"content":"BonkDAO, the decentralized autonomous organization governing the BONK memecoin ecosystem on the Solana blockchain, lost approximately $20 million in BONK tokens on July 6, 2026, in what security researchers have characterized as the most significant governance-attack-as-exploit in Solana DAO history. The attack did not exploit any smart contract vulnerability. Every transaction was valid and authorized under BonkDAO's own governance rules as implemented on Solana's Realms platform. The attacker spent approximately $4.4 million to acquire voting tokens sufficient to meet the minimum quorum threshold, submitted a proposal containing hidden transfer instructions, cast essentially all participating votes, and triggered an automatic treasury transfer — all within the bounds of BonkDAO's documented governance parameters. BONK's market price fell between 7% and 10% in the 24 hours following public disclosure on July 7, 2026.","heading":"Incident Overview","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK faces $20 million treasury drain after attacker spends $4 million to pass malicious proposal — CoinDesk","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/07/07/bonk-faces-usd20-million-treasury-drain-after-attacker-spends-usd4-million-to-pass-malicious-proposal"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO loses $20 million following malicious governance proposal attack — The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/407343/bonkdao-loses-20-million-following-malicious-governance-proposal-attack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Solana Meme Coin Bonk Treasury Drained of $20 Million in Malicious Governance Attack — Decrypt","type":"news_article","url":"https://decrypt.co/372862/solana-meme-coin-bonk-treasury-drained-20-million"}]},{"content":"The attack unfolded in three phases across eight days. On June 30, 2026, an anonymous wallet submitted Bonk Improvement Proposal #76 to BonkDAO's governance system on Realms. The proposal was titled 'BIP #76 - Sowellian BonkDAO' and was framed as organizational restructuring, claiming to implement Sowellian governance, install new members and council, rebuild from the ashes, monetize holdings, and stop the bleeding, with voter rewards dangled as an incentive. Buried within this language was an instruction to transfer 4.43 trillion BONK tokens to an attacker-controlled wallet. Between July 4 and July 5, 2026, the attacker acquired approximately 882.38 billion BONK — just above the 879.95 billion BONK quorum threshold representing 1% of circulating supply — through purchases on Bybit and Binance, and reportedly using a $4 million loan from the MarginFi lending protocol. Purchases were deliberately spread across multiple exchange wallets over several days to avoid triggering whale-detection alerts. On July 6, 2026, the attacker cast votes representing effectively 99.878% of all participating voting power. Only seven wallets voted in favor; more than 18,000 eligible token holders did not vote, yielding a total turnout of approximately 2.9%. The proposal passed and Realms executed the treasury transfer immediately and automatically. The stolen 4.43 trillion BONK (valued at approximately $19.3-$21 million at transfer time) moved to an initial receiving wallet with an address ending in 'JHvQ,' which had been funded via a Bybit account. By 3:30 p.m. ET on July 6, the tokens had been moved to a secondary Solana address ending in 'eh42' (full confirmed address: EXaJnmrLf7RAKLfn1hehoKX94keKYmvZm5H5zuYVeh42). Within hours, approximately $148,000-$188,000 worth of tokens were transferred to OKX, and approximately $5.3 million worth was reportedly sold immediately. The Realms proposal is publicly accessible on-chain.","heading":"Attack Timeline and Methodology","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK DAO Lost $20 Million Without a Hack — CryptoTicker","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptoticker.io/en/bonk-dao-governance-attack-20-million-treasury-drain/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"$20M of Treasury Funds Lost in BonkDAO Governance Blunder — Solana Floor","type":"news_article","url":"https://solanafloor.com/news/20-m-of-treasury-funds-lost-in-bonk-dao-governance-blunder"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The BONK governance attack: How a DAO lost $20 million in one proposal — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/the-bonk-governance-attack-how-a-dao-lost-20-million-in-one-proposal/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BonkDAO $20M Governance Attack: A Bought Vote — SigIntZero","type":"research","url":"https://sigintzero.com/blog/bonkdao-20m-governance-takeover"}]},{"content":"The attack exploited three compounding structural failures in BonkDAO's governance design, none of which constituted a smart contract bug. First, BonkDAO operated with a 1% circulating-supply quorum threshold that could be satisfied by a single concentrated buyer; the quorum measured token weight rather than independent-participant count, meaning a lone actor controlling enough tokens could meet the threshold unilaterally. Second, there was no execution timelock between a proposal's passage and its on-chain execution: once the vote concluded, Realms executed the treasury instruction automatically and immediately with no human review window. Solana's Realms platform supports timelock configuration, but BonkDAO had not enabled it. Third, BonkDAO maintained no multisig or council checkpoint for large treasury movements, meaning no secondary authorization layer existed to veto anomalous proposals before funds were released. The combination rendered the attack purely arithmetic: as long as the cost of acquiring quorum (approximately $4.4 million) was less than the treasury value (approximately $20 million), the attack was profitable. Security researchers noted that Solana's Realms platform hosts over 800 DAOs collectively managing more than $1.5 billion in treasuries, and any DAO with token-weighted quorum voting, low voter participation, and no timelock faces an identical structural exposure. By contrast, major Ethereum-based governance systems such as Compound, Aave, and Uniswap implemented mandatory timelock queues — typically 48-72 hours for large treasury actions — as standard practice following earlier governance attack research. Security firm Halborn and analyst platform SigIntZero both published post-mortems identifying these three failures as the root cause.","heading":"Governance Vulnerabilities Exploited","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Explained: The BonkDAO Hack (July 2026) — Halborn Security","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-bonkdao-hack-july-2026"},{"credibility":2,"name":"What is a governance attack? How BonkDAO lost $20M in a single vote — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/what-is-a-governance-attack-how-bonkdao-lost-20m-in-a-single-vote/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BonkDAO $20M Governance Attack: A Bought Vote — SigIntZero","type":"research","url":"https://sigintzero.com/blog/bonkdao-20m-governance-takeover"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO's treasury raided for $20M due to lack of governance interest — CryptoSlate","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptoslate.com/bonkdaos-estimated-20m-drain-exposes-a-serious-security-fault-line-for-memecoin-treasuries/"}]},{"content":"On-chain security analyst Specter published a preliminary attribution investigation shortly after the attack, alleging wallet-level exposure between addresses tied to the attacker and wallets connected to the founder of the Realms governance platform and an individual known online as 'crypto_notte.' Crypto_notte is identified in reporting as an early BONK and Realms user and the founder of Viper Protocol. Specter's analysis reported that these parties' wallets shared the same exchange deposit address as a wallet believed to belong to the attacker, and that wallets tied to the incident had conducted multiple on-chain transactions with Viper Protocol. The attacker's initial wallet (ending in 'JHvQ') was confirmed to have been funded via a Bybit account, which investigators noted may contain KYC-verified identity information. Specter explicitly framed the investigation as a quick investigation, not a completed attribution report, and stated that the findings do not prove that either person carried out the attack. The analyst cautioned that wallet-level exposure can include direct transfers, shared counterparties, funding links or other on-chain interactions, and that governance attacks frequently involve exchange funding, wallet splitting, OTC movements, and intermediary addresses that can create misleading on-chain proximity. The Realms founder has not been publicly named in verified reporting. No law enforcement charges were announced in available coverage. These attribution claims are flagged as low confidence pending a completed investigation.","heading":"On-Chain Attribution and Alleged Links (Low Confidence)","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Links BONK DAO Attacker Addresses To Realms Founder Exposure — CryptoAdventure","type":"on_chain","url":"https://cryptoadventure.com/specter-links-bonk-dao-attacker-addresses-to-realms-founder-exposure/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Investigates BONK DAO Governance Attack Linked to Realms Founder and Crypto Notte — KuCoin News","type":"on_chain","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/specter-investigates-bonk-dao-governance-attack-linked-to-realms-founder-and-crypto-notte"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Links Realms Founder to BONK DAO Governance Attack — Phemex","type":"on_chain","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/specter-links-realms-founder-to-bonk-dao-governance-attack-92683"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BONK Attack Wallet Shows Links to Realms Founder in $20 Million Governance Exploit — BloomingBit","type":"on_chain","url":"https://en.bloomingbit.io/feed/news/115770"}]},{"content":"BonkDAO publicly confirmed the attack and identified the exchange wallets used to purchase BONK in the days before the proposal was submitted. The DAO initiated coordination with cryptocurrency exchanges, cross-chain bridge operators, the Solana Foundation, and law enforcement agencies to trace the stolen funds and pursue potential asset freezes. Exchanges Upbit and Kraken both suspended BONK deposits and withdrawals in response to the incident. The relatively small transfer of approximately $148,000-$188,000 to OKX immediately after the attack was flagged as potentially yielding account identification information useful to investigators, given that the Bybit-funded initial wallet may carry KYC-linked identity records. As of early July 2026 reporting, approximately $5.3 million worth of stolen tokens had allegedly been sold, while the remaining balance was moved to a secondary holding wallet. Full recovery of the stolen funds was characterized by analysts as uncertain, because the transactions were fully authorized under BonkDAO's governance rules and no technical exploit grounds existed for a protocol-level reversal. BonkDAO confirmed law enforcement notification but did not name the specific agencies involved. No arrests had been reported in available coverage.","heading":"Response and Recovery Efforts","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Suffers $20 Million Treasury Exploit as Stolen BONK Heads to Exchanges — CryptoWisser","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptowisser.com/news/bonkdao-suffers-20m-usd-treasury-exploit-as-stolen-bonk-heads-to-exchanges"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Hit by $20M Treasury Drain in Governance Attack, BONK Slides — The Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/07/bonkdao-hit-by-20m-treasury-drain-in-governance-attack-bonk-slides/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO reveals $20M treasury raid after malicious governance attack — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/bonkdao-reveals-20m-dollars-treasury-raid-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK Memecoin And Solana Ecosystem BonkDAO Suffers Significant Treasury Drain — Crowdfund Insider","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2026/07/290028-bonk-memecoin-and-solana-ecosystems-bonkdao-suffers-significant-treasury-drain-in-governance-attack/"}]},{"content":"BONK's market price declined between 7% and 10% in the 24 hours following attack disclosure on July 7, 2026. At the time of reporting, BONK was trading at approximately $0.000004113-$0.000004314, with a market capitalization of roughly $380 million. Trading volume increased more than 48% in the immediate aftermath, consistent with a combination of panic selling and opportunistic accumulation. The attack reduced the effective treasury value of BonkDAO by approximately $20 million in a single transaction, compounding the price impact of the market's reaction. Exchanges Upbit and Kraken suspended BONK deposits and withdrawals, further disrupting normal market access.","heading":"Market Impact","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK Price Today: BONK at $0.000004113 as a $20M DAO Drain Explains the Selling Everyone Felt — CryptoRank","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptorank.io/news/feed/a182a-bonk-price-today-bonk-at-0-000004113-as-a-20m-dao-drain-explains-the-selling-everyone-felt"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Hacked: $20M Treasury Drained in Governance Attack — MEXC News","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.mexc.com/news/1198992"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bonk (BONK) Drops After $20M Governance Attack — CoinMarketCap Top Stories","type":"news_article","url":"https://coinmarketcap.com/top-stories/6a4cc1dda9331c53b73baeb0/"}]},{"content":"Security researchers identified the BonkDAO attack as exposing a systemic risk across Solana's Realms-based governance ecosystem. Realms hosts over 800 DAOs collectively managing more than $1.5 billion in treasuries, and any DAO using token-weighted quorum voting without timelocks, multisig checkpoints, or participation floors faces an identical attack surface if treasury value exceeds the cost of acquiring quorum. Proposed security reforms discussed in post-mortem analyses include mandatory execution timelocks of 24-72 hours on treasury-touching proposals; higher quorum thresholds requiring both token weight and minimum independent-participant counts; conviction-voting mechanisms that weight long-term token holders over freshly purchased voting power; emergency multisig veto authority for large treasury movements; real-time alerts for rapid voting-power accumulation; and proposal simulation requirements before community voting begins. The incident drew comparisons to the Beanstalk protocol flash-loan governance exploit of April 2022 (approximately $182 million) and the 2023 Compound governance incident, while highlighting that Solana's Realms platform had not yet adopted the defensive standards that major Ethereum-based governance frameworks had implemented in prior years. Halborn Security published a technical post-mortem. The event generated renewed industry debate about whether capital-funded governance participation constitutes fraud or a permissioned action under current law.","heading":"Broader DAO Security Implications","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Explained: The BonkDAO Hack (July 2026) — Halborn Security","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-bonkdao-hack-july-2026"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Incentivize democracy at the cost of security? Inside Bonk's $20M exploit — CryptoNews Analytics","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptonews.net/news/analytics/33112280/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Attacker Drains $20M From BonkDAO Treasury Through Token-Weighted Exploit — CoinPedia","type":"news_article","url":"https://coinpedia.org/news/attacker-drains-20m-from-bonkdao-treasury-through-token-weighted-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK DAO Loses $20 Million in Governance Attack, Token Falls 10% — Yahoo Finance","type":"news_article","url":"https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/crypto/articles/bonk-dao-loses-20-million-180738851.html"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK faces $20 million treasury drain after attacker spends $4 million to pass malicious proposal — CoinDesk","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/07/07/bonk-faces-usd20-million-treasury-drain-after-attacker-spends-usd4-million-to-pass-malicious-proposal"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO loses $20 million following malicious governance proposal attack — The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/407343/bonkdao-loses-20-million-following-malicious-governance-proposal-attack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Solana Meme Coin Bonk Treasury Drained of $20 Million in Malicious Governance Attack — Decrypt","type":"news_article","url":"https://decrypt.co/372862/solana-meme-coin-bonk-treasury-drained-20-million"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The BONK governance attack: How a DAO lost $20 million in one proposal — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/the-bonk-governance-attack-how-a-dao-lost-20-million-in-one-proposal/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"What is a governance attack? How BonkDAO lost $20M in a single vote — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/what-is-a-governance-attack-how-bonkdao-lost-20m-in-a-single-vote/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO reveals $20M treasury raid after malicious governance attack — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/bonkdao-reveals-20m-dollars-treasury-raid-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK DAO Lost $20 Million Without a Hack — CryptoTicker","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptoticker.io/en/bonk-dao-governance-attack-20-million-treasury-drain/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"$20M of Treasury Funds Lost in BonkDAO Governance Blunder — Solana Floor","type":"news_article","url":"https://solanafloor.com/news/20-m-of-treasury-funds-lost-in-bonk-dao-governance-blunder"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Treasury Loses $20M in Malicious Governance Attack, BONK Slides 8% — Bitcoin.com News","type":"news_article","url":"https://news.bitcoin.com/bonkdao-treasury-loses-20m-in-malicious-governance-attack-bonk-slides-8/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Hit by $20M Treasury Drain in Governance Attack — The Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/07/bonkdao-hit-by-20m-treasury-drain-in-governance-attack-bonk-slides/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BonkDAO Governance Attack Drains $20M in BONK Tokens — Bitcoin Foundation","type":"news_article","url":"https://bitcoinfoundation.org/news/altcoins/bonkdao-governance-attack-drains-20m-in-bonk-from-treasury/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Attacker Drains $20M From BonkDAO Treasury Through Token-Weighted Exploit — CoinPedia","type":"news_article","url":"https://coinpedia.org/news/attacker-drains-20m-from-bonkdao-treasury-through-token-weighted-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO Suffers $20 Million Treasury Exploit as Stolen BONK Heads to Exchanges — CryptoWisser","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptowisser.com/news/bonkdao-suffers-20m-usd-treasury-exploit-as-stolen-bonk-heads-to-exchanges"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BonkDAO's treasury raided for $20M — CryptoSlate","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptoslate.com/bonkdaos-estimated-20m-drain-exposes-a-serious-security-fault-line-for-memecoin-treasuries/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Links BONK DAO Attacker Addresses To Realms Founder Exposure — CryptoAdventure","type":"on_chain","url":"https://cryptoadventure.com/specter-links-bonk-dao-attacker-addresses-to-realms-founder-exposure/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Investigates BONK DAO Governance Attack Linked to Realms Founder and Crypto Notte — KuCoin","type":"on_chain","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/specter-investigates-bonk-dao-governance-attack-linked-to-realms-founder-and-crypto-notte"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Specter Links Realms Founder to BONK DAO Governance Attack — Phemex","type":"on_chain","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/specter-links-realms-founder-to-bonk-dao-governance-attack-92683"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BONK Attack Wallet Shows Links to Realms Founder — BloomingBit","type":"on_chain","url":"https://en.bloomingbit.io/feed/news/115770"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Explained: The BonkDAO Hack (July 2026) — Halborn Security","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-bonkdao-hack-july-2026"},{"credibility":3,"name":"BonkDAO $20M Governance Attack: A Bought Vote — SigIntZero","type":"research","url":"https://sigintzero.com/blog/bonkdao-20m-governance-takeover"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Incentivize democracy at the cost of security? Inside Bonk's $20M exploit — CryptoNews Analytics","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptonews.net/news/analytics/33112280/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK Memecoin And Solana Ecosystem BonkDAO Suffers Significant Treasury Drain — Crowdfund Insider","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2026/07/290028-bonk-memecoin-and-solana-ecosystems-bonkdao-suffers-significant-treasury-drain-in-governance-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK DAO Loses $20 Million in Governance Attack, Token Falls 10% — Yahoo Finance","type":"news_article","url":"https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/crypto/articles/bonk-dao-loses-20-million-180738851.html"},{"credibility":2,"name":"BONK Price Today: $20M DAO Drain — CryptoRank","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptorank.io/news/feed/a182a-bonk-price-today-bonk-at-0-000004113-as-a-20m-dao-drain-explains-the-selling-everyone-felt"}],"summary":"On July 6, 2026, an unidentified attacker drained approximately $20 million in BONK tokens from BonkDAO's treasury on Solana's Realms governance platform by spending roughly $4.4 million to acquire just over 1% of BONK's circulating supply, meeting the DAO's quorum threshold and passing Bonk Improvement Proposal #76 with 99.9% approval across only seven voting wallets — a turnout of 2.9%. The attack exploited three compounding structural design failures — a permissively low quorum floor, no execution timelock, and no multisig safeguard — rather than any smart contract code vulnerability, and is widely characterized as the most significant governance-attack-as-exploit in Solana DAO history.","timeline":[{"date":"2026-06-30","event":"Anonymous wallet submitted Bonk Improvement Proposal #76 (BIP-76 – Sowellian BonkDAO) to BonkDAO's governance system on Realms. The proposal was framed as organizational restructuring but contained a hidden instruction to transfer 4.43 trillion BONK to an attacker-controlled wallet.","source":"CryptoTicker / crypto.news","source_url":"https://cryptoticker.io/en/bonk-dao-governance-attack-20-million-treasury-drain/"},{"date":"2026-07-04","event":"Attacker began accumulating BONK tokens through purchases on Bybit and Binance and reportedly via a $4 million loan from the MarginFi protocol, spreading purchases across multiple wallets over two days to avoid detection.","source":"CoinDesk / Phemex","source_url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/07/07/bonk-faces-usd20-million-treasury-drain-after-attacker-spends-usd4-million-to-pass-malicious-proposal"},{"date":"2026-07-05","event":"Attacker completed token acquisition, holding approximately 882.38 billion BONK — just above the 879.95 billion quorum threshold representing 1% of circulating supply. Total acquisition cost approximately $4.4 million.","source":"CryptoTicker","source_url":"https://cryptoticker.io/en/bonk-dao-governance-attack-20-million-treasury-drain/"},{"date":"2026-07-06","event":"BIP-76 passed with 99.9% of votes cast (seven wallets in favor, 18,000+ holders abstaining, 2.9% total turnout). Attacker-linked wallets controlled approximately 99.878% of votes. Realms executed the treasury transfer automatically, moving 4.43 trillion BONK (approximately $19.3-$21 million) to attacker wallet ending in JHvQ. By 3:30 p.m. ET, funds moved to secondary address EXaJnmrLf7RAKLfn1hehoKX94keKYmvZm5H5zuYVeh42 (ending in eh42). Approximately $148,000-$188,000 transferred to OKX; approximately $5.3 million reportedly sold.","source":"CryptoTicker / Solana Floor / CoinDesk","source_url":"https://solanafloor.com/news/20-m-of-treasury-funds-lost-in-bonk-dao-governance-blunder"},{"date":"2026-07-07","event":"BonkDAO publicly confirmed the attack. BONK price fell 7%-10% in the following 24 hours. Exchanges Upbit and Kraken suspended BONK deposits and withdrawals. BonkDAO announced coordination with the Solana Foundation, exchanges, bridge operators, and law enforcement. On-chain analyst Specter published preliminary attribution findings linking attacker wallets to the Realms platform founder and crypto_notte via shared exchange deposit addresses, explicitly caveated as incomplete and non-conclusive.","source":"CoinDesk / CryptoAdventure / Decrypt","source_url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/07/07/bonk-faces-usd20-million-treasury-drain-after-attacker-spends-usd4-million-to-pass-malicious-proposal"}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 947c2c71-a732-4630-b26d-bc2f0bbe80f4
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.