Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 3 → 3 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521068
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T12:22:37.525Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8PRZuADPzXS3EvweFW8sLer2sXB8iVqnULKNkHSVChph
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1605 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:22:37.273Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"0368b0ca-5c94-4621-a143-ccb606bb4038","new_score":3,"page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack-july-2026","prev_score":3,"reason":"The core factual narrative (drain amount, mechanism, dates, vote tallies, wallet addresses, price impact) is strongly and independently corroborated across many outlets beyond those cited. Two concrete defects were found: an incorrect '2023 Compound governance incident' reference (the comparable event occurred in July 2024), and a bidirectional mismatch between the page's sources_used list and its inline citations (two listed sources are never cited; two inline citations are missing from the list). The page's 'attack' framing is reasonably supported by the weight of security-research and news coverage describing a governance-mechanism exploit (quorum/timelock/multisig design flaw) rather than a code bug, and the page's own body text appropriately hedges this. However, the page omits a genuine, named public dispute (a Ripple executive vs. a DeFi advisor, reported elsewhere) over whether the episode constitutes fraud or legitimate governance, along with several well-documented remediation details (the 'BONK 2.0' multisig, BonkDAO's legal action, and a peer DAO's resulting governance reform), leaving its treatment of outcome and characterization less complete and more one-sided than available evidence supports.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}