Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · BonkDAO Treasury Governance Attack (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 3 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521071
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T12:22:37.696Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9kiieuhkz1V5C29baE1fnpSKWyN68ATqi3RdETCRRJUd
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2241 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T12:22:37.273Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"0368b0ca-5c94-4621-a143-ccb606bb4038","new_score":0,"page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack-july-2026","prev_score":3,"reason":"The page's central narrative -- the $20 million treasury drain, the $4.4 million quorum-buying cost, the BIP-76 vote mechanics, wallet movements, exchange suspensions, and price impact -- is confirmed and independently corroborated well beyond the page's own citations (claim_findings[0-3], [6-13], [17-18], [20-23], [25-26]). The disputed rate is 16.1%, driven by two disputed and three unverifiable items rather than any challenge to the core allegation. Two concrete errors were identified: the page's comparison to a 'the 2023 Compound governance incident' is a dated error, since the comparable event occurred in July 2024 (claim_findings[27]), and an unsourced superlative -- calling this 'the most significant governance-attack-as-exploit in Solana DAO history' -- appears in no source found (claim_findings[4]). The page's source list also fails bookkeeping checks in both directions: two listed sources are never cited inline, and two inline citations are missing from the source list (claim_findings[30]). More substantively, while the page's body text correctly frames this as a governance-mechanism exploit rather than a code bug (claim_findings[29]), it omits a genuine, named public dispute over whether the episode was fraud or legitimate governance functioning as designed, and omits documented remediation and resolution details -- an active legal action, the 'BONK 2.0' multisig holding the bulk of unrecovered funds, and a peer DAO's resulting governance reform (claim_findings[24], [29]; coverage_gaps: 'Named public dispute over characterization' and 'Concrete downstream governance reform', both flagged high/medium priority). None of these issues undermine the underlying facts, but together they leave the page's framing more one-sided and less complete than the evidence supports, warranting revision rather than approval or denial.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}