Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457542501
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T06:46:48.025Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T06:47:04.810Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CxapDsregereMvhg9cTHNSFkyExVrWfxRRfC3zJB21N5
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1973 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"1bc965f0d33b9ebc1ed1352a43e5623a","decided_at":"2026-10-16T06:46:47.665Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2105,"findings_hash":"4Cok9qz6pRKobgpoMWofnma2Nt5x8utf44zpUJyYEz77","investigation_id":"0368b0ca-5c94-4621-a143-ccb606bb4038","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"05ece455c3371dc0971bf75919fcf03119146ca769b4bb58f3f031066ca0e932","page_slug":"bonkdao-treasury-governance-attack-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a $20 million BONK treasury drain executed via a legitimate but under-defended governance vote on July 6, 2026, with no smart-contract bug involved — is well supported by multiple independently fetched tier-1 and tier-2 sources, and the specific mechanics (quorum threshold, token amounts, turnout, vote share) check out cleanly. The weakest parts are the Legal Classification section, which conflates two distinct and differently-reasoned Mango Markets court rulings into a single mischaracterized 'wire fraud partially vacated' claim, and the Broader DAO Security Implications section, which misdates the comparable Compound governance incident to 2023 instead of 2024 and cites a 2024-vintage Realms scale statistic without noting its age. Two cited URLs (MEXC, Silicon Report) are dead, consistent with the page's own archive metadata. The MarginFi-loan detail and the OKX attribution are both single-source or contradicted by one of the page's own cited sources, though the page already hedges both with 'reportedly' language. No accepted community submissions existed to review. The most significant gap is temporal: none of the cited reporting extends past early August 2026, leaving roughly ten weeks of potential developments (arrests, recovery, governance reform) unaddressed as of this October 2026 review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}