← dTRINITY dLEND12 decisions on this page
Audit log
Every state-changing event for dTRINITY dLEND: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-05-29 02:41:13ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 422,849,412
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{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","kind":"publish","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","published_at":"2026-05-29T02:41:13.016Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"dTRINITY dLEND","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.dtrinity.org","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://decrypt.co/297381/dtrinity-launches-subsidized-stablecoin-lending-protocol-on-fraxtal-l2","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dtrinity-dlend","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.dtrinity.org/core-components/dlend-money-markets","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.verichains.io/p/deep-dive-into-the-dtribity-cbbtc","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blocksec.com/blog/weekly-web3-security-incident-roundup-mar-16-mar-22-2026","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cryip.co/dtrinitys-dlend-protocol-exploit-drains-around-257k-on-ethereum/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/dtrinity-dlend-on-ethereum-hit-by-deposit-inflation-attack-causing-257-000-bad-debt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://phemex.com/news/article/defi-lending-protocol-dtrinity-suffers-260000-exploit-67152","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.verichains.io/p/deep-dive-into-the-dtribity-cbbtc","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blocksec.com/blog/weekly-web3-security-incident-roundup-mar-16-mar-22-2026","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://dev.to/cryip/dtrinity-exploit-breakdown-257k-lost-due-to-share-accounting-index-sync-bug-2k7a","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://chainwire.org/2024/12/18/dtrinity-launches-subsidized-stablecoin-lending-protocol-on-fraxtal-l2/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cyberscope.io/audits/dtrinity","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/dtrinity-dlend-on-ethereum-hit-by-deposit-inflation-attack-causing-257-000-bad-debt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.mexc.com/news/951990","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blocksec.com/blog/weekly-web3-security-incident-roundup-mar-16-mar-22-2026","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dtrinity-dlend","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.bitget.com/news/detail/12560605274307","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.dtrinity.org/protocol-components/trin","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.dtrinity.org/core-components/trin-token-and-points","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/dtrinity-usd","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/stablecoin/dtrinity-usd","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dtrinity-dlend","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://chainwire.org/2024/12/18/dtrinity-launches-subsidized-stablecoin-lending-protocol-on-fraxtal-l2/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://tracxn.com/d/companies/stably/__yi1ncBcJKDlxCKsUnjhVVsT7VdSRn4o8yyqY22-QRg","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cbinsights.com/company/stably/people","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/dtrinity","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"dTRINITY is a DeFi protocol self-described as the world's first subsidized stablecoin system, with dLEND serving as its Aave v3-forked lending market deployed across Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana. On March 17, 2026, the dLEND Ethereum deployment was exploited via an empty-market liquidityIndex inflation attack, resulting in approximately $257,000 in bad debt drained from the dUSD lending pool. The protocol paused operations and pledged to cover losses with internal funds, though the incident raised questions about audit coverage and the adequacy of pre-deployment testing on the Ethereum instance.","timeline":[{"date":"2024-12-18","event":"dTRINITY launches dLEND on Fraxtal L2, marketing itself as the world's first subsidized stablecoin protocol. Smart contract audits with Halborn, Verichains, and Cyberscope cited.","source":""},{"date":"2025-10-01","event":"dTRINITY expands dLEND to Katana network (Polygon-based DeFi L2).","source":""},{"date":"2026-01-01","event":"dTRINITY deploys dLEND on Ethereum mainnet, completing the multi-chain rollout.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-17","event":"Attacker at address 0x08cfdff8ded5f1326628077f38d4f90df6417fd9 exploits dLEND Ethereum deployment via empty-market liquidityIndex inflation using Morpho Blue flash loans, draining approximately $257,300 in dUSD and creating bad debt. Protocol paused.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-18","event":"dTRINITY announces the exploit publicly, confirms bad debt of approximately $257,000, states team will cover losses with internal funds within 24 hours, and confirms Fraxtal and Katana deployments are unaffected.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-22","event":"BlockSec includes dTRINITY in its weekly Web3 security incident roundup for March 16 to 22, 2026, alongside six other DeFi incidents totaling approximately $82.7 million in sector losses.","source":""},{"date":"2026-05-28","event":"DefiLlama reports dLEND TVL at approximately $885,000 across Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic, with $0 in active loans, indicating the lending market has not recovered to pre-exploit utilization levels.","source":""}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 2fc791ea-c9a2-4890-b177-5923d216600a - #2reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-08-19 01:41:34ZScore: 42 → 42 (no score change)The core incident narrative (March 17, 2026 dLEND-Ethereum empty-market liquidityIndex exploit, ~$257K loss, quick pause, pledge to cover losses with internal funds, Fraxtal/Katana-branded-unaffected messaging) is well corroborated by independent security writeups, BlockSec's incident roundup, and DefiLlama's own hack record, and the page appropriately hedges the pledge as a commitment rather than a completed fact. However, the page contains a clear internal factual error: the summary and one timeline entry claim dLEND is deployed on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana, while DefiLlama's own data and dTRINITY's docs show dLEND actually runs on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic — Katana received only a dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partnerships, not a native dLEND market. The page's own final timeline entry (which correctly names Sonic) contradicts its own summary. This is a reportable accuracy defect, not an editorializing problem — there is no unhedged allegation of wrongdoing on this page, and the single incident is properly attributable to a suffered smart-contract exploit rather than any conduct by the team.anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 443,508,961
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{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:34.038Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":42,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":42,"reason":"The core incident narrative (March 17, 2026 dLEND-Ethereum empty-market liquidityIndex exploit, ~$257K loss, quick pause, pledge to cover losses with internal funds, Fraxtal/Katana-branded-unaffected messaging) is well corroborated by independent security writeups, BlockSec's incident roundup, and DefiLlama's own hack record, and the page appropriately hedges the pledge as a commitment rather than a completed fact. However, the page contains a clear internal factual error: the summary and one timeline entry claim dLEND is deployed on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana, while DefiLlama's own data and dTRINITY's docs show dLEND actually runs on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic — Katana received only a dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partnerships, not a native dLEND market. The page's own final timeline entry (which correctly names Sonic) contradicts its own summary. This is a reportable accuracy defect, not an editorializing problem — there is no unhedged allegation of wrongdoing on this page, and the single incident is properly attributable to a suffered smart-contract exploit rather than any conduct by the team.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision d146b7ef-8417-46fc-b2b0-343b10e46603 - #3review approve with notesby judgejudge2026-08-19 01:41:34ZScore: 42 → 56 (+14)This is a calibration adjudication: content accuracy and score are judged separately. On content, claim_findings[1] and claim_findings[5] are disputed — the page's summary and one timeline entry say dLEND runs on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana, but DefiLlama's protocol record and dTRINITY's own docs show the third chain is Sonic, with Katana receiving only a dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partnerships, not a native dLEND market. This is an internal contradiction (the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry correctly names Sonic) but it does not change a reader's conclusion about the entity's risk profile, so it is minor, not material — the core incident narrative (claim_findings[2,3,7,8,9,10]) is well corroborated across independent security writeups, BlockSec, and DefiLlama's hack record, and there is no unhedged allegation on the page. On score: the sole substantive negative event is a suffered third-party smart-contract exploit (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'), which under the fraud-likelihood rubric caps the entity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), not the current WARNING(42). The reviewer's recommended score of 56 — lower-middle of CAUTIONARY, reflecting fast/transparent disclosure and a modest loss against unconfirmed reimbursement completion and a still-unrecovered lending market — is well reasoned and consistent with the evidence. I agree with the reviewer's calibration read and adopt its recommended score. Notes: (Correct the summary's chain list from 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana' to 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic' to match DefiLlama and the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry.) (Revise the 2025-10-01 timeline entry: Katana received a native dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partner integrations, not a native dLEND lending market.) (Add a timeline entry for the Sonic deployment (live since ~May 2025), currently omitted entirely despite being one of dLEND's three actual chains.) (Note in the incident section that reimbursement completion is unconfirmed — DefiLlama's hacks record shows returnedFunds unset.)anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 443,509,062
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{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:34.038Z","decision":"review_approve_with_notes","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":56,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a calibration adjudication: content accuracy and score are judged separately. On content, claim_findings[1] and claim_findings[5] are disputed — the page's summary and one timeline entry say dLEND runs on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana, but DefiLlama's protocol record and dTRINITY's own docs show the third chain is Sonic, with Katana receiving only a dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partnerships, not a native dLEND market. This is an internal contradiction (the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry correctly names Sonic) but it does not change a reader's conclusion about the entity's risk profile, so it is minor, not material — the core incident narrative (claim_findings[2,3,7,8,9,10]) is well corroborated across independent security writeups, BlockSec, and DefiLlama's hack record, and there is no unhedged allegation on the page. On score: the sole substantive negative event is a suffered third-party smart-contract exploit (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'), which under the fraud-likelihood rubric caps the entity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), not the current WARNING(42). The reviewer's recommended score of 56 — lower-middle of CAUTIONARY, reflecting fast/transparent disclosure and a modest loss against unconfirmed reimbursement completion and a still-unrecovered lending market — is well reasoned and consistent with the evidence. I agree with the reviewer's calibration read and adopt its recommended score. Notes: (Correct the summary's chain list from 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana' to 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic' to match DefiLlama and the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry.) (Revise the 2025-10-01 timeline entry: Katana received a native dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partner integrations, not a native dLEND lending market.) (Add a timeline entry for the Sonic deployment (live since ~May 2025), currently omitted entirely despite being one of dLEND's three actual chains.) (Note in the incident section that reimbursement completion is unconfirmed — DefiLlama's hacks record shows returnedFunds unset.)","score_delta":14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision c57523ea-3155-4d18-8796-2367d0b0d051 - #4reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-08-25 07:44:56ZScore: 52 → 52 (no score change)The large majority of factual claims on this page — including both security-incident narratives, TVL/peg figures, and protocol overview details — are well-supported by their cited sources and corroborated independently. However, the review found a clear, cited-source contradiction on the Cyberscope 'audit' claim (Cyberscope's own page says no formal audit was completed, only an automated scan), a factual date error on the Hats Finance audit competition (the cited primary source gives June–July 2025, not August 2025 as stated twice on the page), and an internally inconsistent claim that the audit competition occurred 'after' the September 2025 exploit when it in fact preceded it under any of the dates involved. Several other claims involve minor overstatements of architectural parity across chains (Katana) or rely on weak/self-reported sourcing (regulatory-absence claims sourced only to the company's own website; several audits sourced only to the protocol's own documentation).anchoranchored
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{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:44:56.088Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":52,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":52,"reason":"The large majority of factual claims on this page — including both security-incident narratives, TVL/peg figures, and protocol overview details — are well-supported by their cited sources and corroborated independently. However, the review found a clear, cited-source contradiction on the Cyberscope 'audit' claim (Cyberscope's own page says no formal audit was completed, only an automated scan), a factual date error on the Hats Finance audit competition (the cited primary source gives June–July 2025, not August 2025 as stated twice on the page), and an internally inconsistent claim that the audit competition occurred 'after' the September 2025 exploit when it in fact preceded it under any of the dates involved. Several other claims involve minor overstatements of architectural parity across chains (Katana) or rely on weak/self-reported sourcing (regulatory-absence claims sourced only to the company's own website; several audits sourced only to the protocol's own documentation).","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 5d30283a-683a-48ef-8c69-906aeaca709d - #5review reviseby judgejudge2026-08-25 07:44:56ZScore: 52 → 40 (-12)The page's core content — both security incidents (the $56,000 September 2025 exploit and the $257,000 March 2026 index-manipulation attack) — is strongly corroborated across multiple independent sources down to transaction hashes and figures, and the large majority of claims (33 of 48) were confirmed outright. However, the Security Audits section overstates the Cyberscope engagement: the page's own cited source states 'No Cyberscope Audit' was completed, describing only an automated scan, not a manual audit comparable to Halborn's (claim_findings[32]). The same section also gives an incorrect date for the Hats Finance audit competition (August 2025 instead of the primary source's June 16-July 4, 2025), repeated in both the Security Audits section and the timeline (claim_findings[33], [47]), and this error produces an internally inconsistent claim that the competition occurred 'after' the September 2025 exploit when it in fact preceded it under any version of the dates (claim_findings[36]). Additional partially-supported findings — a claim of uniform 100% loss-coverage across both incidents when that commitment is documented only for the March 2026 case (claim_findings[2]), and a 'chain-isolated reserves' framing for Katana that overstates architectural parity with Fraxtal/Ethereum (claim_findings[27], [41]) — add minor overstatement but do not change the substance of what happened. Disputed claims sit at 18.75%, squarely in the minor-issues band, and no coverage gap was flagged high priority.anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 443,512,492
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{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:44:56.088Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":40,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":52,"reason":"The page's core content — both security incidents (the $56,000 September 2025 exploit and the $257,000 March 2026 index-manipulation attack) — is strongly corroborated across multiple independent sources down to transaction hashes and figures, and the large majority of claims (33 of 48) were confirmed outright. However, the Security Audits section overstates the Cyberscope engagement: the page's own cited source states 'No Cyberscope Audit' was completed, describing only an automated scan, not a manual audit comparable to Halborn's (claim_findings[32]). The same section also gives an incorrect date for the Hats Finance audit competition (August 2025 instead of the primary source's June 16-July 4, 2025), repeated in both the Security Audits section and the timeline (claim_findings[33], [47]), and this error produces an internally inconsistent claim that the competition occurred 'after' the September 2025 exploit when it in fact preceded it under any version of the dates (claim_findings[36]). Additional partially-supported findings — a claim of uniform 100% loss-coverage across both incidents when that commitment is documented only for the March 2026 case (claim_findings[2]), and a 'chain-isolated reserves' framing for Katana that overstates architectural parity with Fraxtal/Ethereum (claim_findings[27], [41]) — add minor overstatement but do not change the substance of what happened. Disputed claims sit at 18.75%, squarely in the minor-issues band, and no coverage gap was flagged high priority.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision ce676913-8ef9-4702-9742-2eccf85c9a47 - #6reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-16 09:20:49ZScore: 40 → 40 (no score change)The page's core narrative — two distinct, well-documented security incidents (a $56,000 Sept 2025 swap-adapter authorization exploit affecting only team funds, and a $257,000 March 2026 liquidity-index/empty-market exploit on the Ethereum cbBTC market) — is well supported by multiple independent technical write-ups (Verichains, DARKNAVY, BlockSec, Olympix, KuCoin/ChainCatcher) whose dates, amounts, and transaction hashes cross-check consistently. The five-audit history matches dTRINITY's own documentation precisely. Two weaknesses stand out: the January 2026 Ethereum launch date in the timeline is not actually supported by its cited source, which (as currently published) describes Ethereum support as forthcoming rather than confirming a live launch date, even though independent exploit reporting confirms an Ethereum deployment existed by March 2026; and several granular figures (exact dUSD peg price, Katana launch month, specific exploited function/contract names in the Sept 2025 incident) could not be independently verified due to source access restrictions (403s) or lack of corroborating detail elsewhere. No evidence contradicts the page's claims of no regulatory action and no fraud allegations. The biggest substantive gap is the absence of any independent confirmation that the committed March 2026 bad-debt repayment was actually completed, and of any analysis of governance/multisig centralization risk, which the page itself acknowledges as unverified.anchoranchored
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{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"df1ba26ad5c966c37ea026b6733f8e7a","decided_at":"2026-10-16T09:20:49.580Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2143,"findings_hash":"FWcfxJQT9wJvT28NvUDzaZwpG8tgdWVpVAEwXcunMbu5","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","mode":"findings_only","new_score":40,"page_content_hash":"d503a4f96de722b604936ddc938aaa2e53e4dce246771b7136e0bbd4132d89a0","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":40,"reason":"The page's core narrative — two distinct, well-documented security incidents (a $56,000 Sept 2025 swap-adapter authorization exploit affecting only team funds, and a $257,000 March 2026 liquidity-index/empty-market exploit on the Ethereum cbBTC market) — is well supported by multiple independent technical write-ups (Verichains, DARKNAVY, BlockSec, Olympix, KuCoin/ChainCatcher) whose dates, amounts, and transaction hashes cross-check consistently. The five-audit history matches dTRINITY's own documentation precisely. Two weaknesses stand out: the January 2026 Ethereum launch date in the timeline is not actually supported by its cited source, which (as currently published) describes Ethereum support as forthcoming rather than confirming a live launch date, even though independent exploit reporting confirms an Ethereum deployment existed by March 2026; and several granular figures (exact dUSD peg price, Katana launch month, specific exploited function/contract names in the Sept 2025 incident) could not be independently verified due to source access restrictions (403s) or lack of corroborating detail elsewhere. No evidence contradicts the page's claims of no regulatory action and no fraud allegations. The biggest substantive gap is the absence of any independent confirmation that the committed March 2026 bad-debt repayment was actually completed, and of any analysis of governance/multisig centralization risk, which the page itself acknowledges as unverified.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision e454c98c-fa13-461f-9b13-52dbe511efa5 - #7reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-29 14:06:24ZScore: 40 → 40 (no score change)The page is conservative and heavily hedged. Both exploit narratives (Sept 2025 about $56K, Mar 2026 about $257K), the team responses and the Hashlock audit match their sources. The Cyberscope contradiction claim could not be read (429) and the DefiLlama zero-loans detail was not directly readable. The only soft spot is the implied causal link between the exploits and the TVL decline. The page omits that the Ethereum deployment was suspended and does not report the restoration outcome.anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 462,908,668
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{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"1437cdc16f4f7d96c6113bb9bd3a10b2","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T14:06:24.330Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.125,"findings_hash":"7PXxnsjFakNcCEf42NLjeABnroBNGYKJ2MDfZGfr2gzs","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":40,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"fd2ae3b5fd03bc9b4f6248c466afeaa8dc88b41d8f1a2bb1e7737d0fa7760274","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":40,"reason":"The page is conservative and heavily hedged. Both exploit narratives (Sept 2025 about $56K, Mar 2026 about $257K), the team responses and the Hashlock audit match their sources. The Cyberscope contradiction claim could not be read (429) and the DefiLlama zero-loans detail was not directly readable. The only soft spot is the implied causal link between the exploits and the TVL decline. The page omits that the Ethereum deployment was suspended and does not report the restoration outcome.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":7,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision bc01bcde-82ee-4fc8-9564-2d9cdf24d134 - #8review reviseby judgejudge2026-10-29 14:06:24ZScore: 40 → 35 (-5)Of 9 claims reviewed, 1 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[5], Cyberscope) and is excluded; of the remaining 8, none were disputed and 1 was unverifiable (claim_findings[8], the dapp listing, which was not fetched), giving about 12.5%, which falls in the minor band. Both exploit accounts, the team responses and the Hashlock audit match their sources. Two soft spots remain: the TVL decline is described as following the security incidents although the page itself says no source attributes it (claim_findings[7]), and the page omits the temporary suspension of the Ethereum deployment and the repayment outcome (minor omission). A small penalty is applied; the subject is operating and nothing contradicts the page.anchoranchored
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855tTKWreAz9…c38JddhZsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1440 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"1437cdc16f4f7d96c6113bb9bd3a10b2","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T14:06:24.330Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":35,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":40,"reason":"Of 9 claims reviewed, 1 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[5], Cyberscope) and is excluded; of the remaining 8, none were disputed and 1 was unverifiable (claim_findings[8], the dapp listing, which was not fetched), giving about 12.5%, which falls in the minor band. Both exploit accounts, the team responses and the Hashlock audit match their sources. Two soft spots remain: the TVL decline is described as following the security incidents although the page itself says no source attributes it (claim_findings[7]), and the page omits the temporary suspension of the Ethereum deployment and the repayment outcome (minor omission). A small penalty is applied; the subject is operating and nothing contradicts the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-5,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 4a50c988-e073-43bb-afc8-cc5c40c1b574 - #9reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-02 21:52:03ZScore: 35 → 35 (no score change)The two incident narratives (Sept 2025 approval abuse and March 2026 deposit inflation) are accurately sourced to Revoke.cash, Verichains and ChainCatcher, and I found no outright errors. The Cyberscope audit discrepancy, the SlowMist citation (an EOS DApp category URL) and the BeInCrypto sector statistics could not be verified. The TVL figure is a point-in-time value that has since moved. The page hedges appropriately on unknowns.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,653,081
- sig
4Rr7qtatyz4H…1qWKNtKzexplorer ↗- hash
Ad6gWQ9uuYTa…5qRNMrtisha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1325 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"427bc784c1a687a743e36c03cec71b36","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T21:52:03.832Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2857,"findings_hash":"3ogJSSZHtbQ52j1DkUUTj8RDbAkNapzxA711oq9e2Xku","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":35,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"7288d0b08532e178e11d4860e2c5a48d1d05a015c9cd6f752e25f01d7bdcd84c","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":35,"reason":"The two incident narratives (Sept 2025 approval abuse and March 2026 deposit inflation) are accurately sourced to Revoke.cash, Verichains and ChainCatcher, and I found no outright errors. The Cyberscope audit discrepancy, the SlowMist citation (an EOS DApp category URL) and the BeInCrypto sector statistics could not be verified. The TVL figure is a point-in-time value that has since moved. The page hedges appropriately on unknowns.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":9,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 0053d9c2-834b-4c3f-aa74-9c18cdc22679 - #10review reviseby judgejudge2026-11-02 21:52:04ZScore: 35 → 42 (+7)Both security incident narratives (September 2025 approval abuse and March 2026 deposit inflation) were confirmed against Revoke.cash, Verichains and ChainCatcher, and no claim was disputed. Two of seven checkable claims could not be verified: the SlowMist citation points to an EOS DApp category page that does not appear to match (claim_findings[1]), and the BeInCrypto sector statistics were not found (claim_findings[8]), giving roughly 29% unverified. Two further claims (Cyberscope listing, December 2024 press release) were excluded because the sources blocked the reviewer, which limits coverage but is not a defect of the page. A high-priority gap remains: the page lacks dTRINITY's own post-mortems and an official status update on the Ethereum market, so a small penalty applies.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,653,087
- sig
5NWSNAdqJTHj…qq2TbrxRexplorer ↗- hash
7qZbWs3qinx2…kBSDgDjesha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1646 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"427bc784c1a687a743e36c03cec71b36","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T21:52:03.832Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2857,"investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":42,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":35,"reason":"Both security incident narratives (September 2025 approval abuse and March 2026 deposit inflation) were confirmed against Revoke.cash, Verichains and ChainCatcher, and no claim was disputed. Two of seven checkable claims could not be verified: the SlowMist citation points to an EOS DApp category page that does not appear to match (claim_findings[1]), and the BeInCrypto sector statistics were not found (claim_findings[8]), giving roughly 29% unverified. Two further claims (Cyberscope listing, December 2024 press release) were excluded because the sources blocked the reviewer, which limits coverage but is not a defect of the page. A high-priority gap remains: the page lacks dTRINITY's own post-mortems and an official status update on the Ethereum market, so a small penalty applies.","replaces_fact_checks":{"score_before_fact_checks":52,"undone":2},"reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":7,"score_limit":{"applied":-10,"limited":false,"proposed":-10,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-10},"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":10,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 058010b8-e037-4f50-b551-3a097e8071fc - #11reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-17 21:43:52ZScore: 42 → 42 (no score change)The incident details (September 2025 approval abuse, March 2026 deposit inflation), the audit discrepancy and the sector TVL context all match the sources I could read. The page hedges where evidence is thin. The DefiLlama TVL figures and the official X posts could not be read, so those claims are unscored. The subject's current operating status remains unclear.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,688,680
- sig
4NouAv2RVZtW…wVspc2n6explorer ↗- hash
Eaot4YFuZQi9…YakwZi55sha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1211 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2e44e467346d297f7d9371a0c9ff3d68","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:43:52.398Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"43Ygrz4w68eSrbGz6DWVZNSvLt8EAFis7jdoyS7tbsm5","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":42,"page_content_hash":"884c82977a8bfa6b481b2baf8522ce5a9bcc9d2fb2f22700fd5b4b2d807d1028","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":42,"reason":"The incident details (September 2025 approval abuse, March 2026 deposit inflation), the audit discrepancy and the sector TVL context all match the sources I could read. The page hedges where evidence is thin. The DefiLlama TVL figures and the official X posts could not be read, so those claims are unscored. The subject's current operating status remains unclear.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":11,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 60753210-2f58-4787-9aa8-42219ae2ffb8 - #12review approveby judgejudge2026-11-17 21:43:52ZScore: 42 → 52 (+10)Of 9 claim findings, 2 were unreadable because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[5]) and are left out of the count; of the remaining 7, none were disputed or unverifiable, giving a disputed rate of 0%. The incident details, audit discrepancy and sector TVL context matched the sources the reviewer could read (claim_findings[0], [2], [3], [4], [6], [7]), and the one partially supported item (claim_findings[8], Katana) is already hedged on the page. The high-priority gap on post-incident status is stated openly on the page as unconfirmed and no omission or status contradiction was reported, so it calls for expansion rather than a penalty. About 22% of findings were blocked, including the official X posts and live DefiLlama figures, which is a coverage limit rather than a defect of the page.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,688,686
- sig
iRJt2Qd4Y3fA…KGHgndyEexplorer ↗- hash
ADDbmVLWp3Wd…C2pM4WoAsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1579 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2e44e467346d297f7d9371a0c9ff3d68","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:43:52.398Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":52,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":42,"reason":"Of 9 claim findings, 2 were unreadable because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[5]) and are left out of the count; of the remaining 7, none were disputed or unverifiable, giving a disputed rate of 0%. The incident details, audit discrepancy and sector TVL context matched the sources the reviewer could read (claim_findings[0], [2], [3], [4], [6], [7]), and the one partially supported item (claim_findings[8], Katana) is already hedged on the page. The high-priority gap on post-incident status is stated openly on the page as unconfirmed and no omission or status contradiction was reported, so it calls for expansion rather than a penalty. About 22% of findings were blocked, including the official X posts and live DefiLlama figures, which is a coverage limit rather than a defect of the page.","replaces_fact_checks":{"score_before_fact_checks":52,"undone":3},"reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":10,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":12,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision d3a834b4-6305-4e1d-92b5-d556cef4f776
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.