Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · dTRINITY dLEND
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 52 → 40 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443512492
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T07:44:56.373Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4vXniFWos4Jp4mv1cQXh5mBojvCh4DrNRzUsXmmvatjj
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1874 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:44:56.088Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":40,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":52,"reason":"The page's core content — both security incidents (the $56,000 September 2025 exploit and the $257,000 March 2026 index-manipulation attack) — is strongly corroborated across multiple independent sources down to transaction hashes and figures, and the large majority of claims (33 of 48) were confirmed outright. However, the Security Audits section overstates the Cyberscope engagement: the page's own cited source states 'No Cyberscope Audit' was completed, describing only an automated scan, not a manual audit comparable to Halborn's (claim_findings[32]). The same section also gives an incorrect date for the Hats Finance audit competition (August 2025 instead of the primary source's June 16-July 4, 2025), repeated in both the Security Audits section and the timeline (claim_findings[33], [47]), and this error produces an internally inconsistent claim that the competition occurred 'after' the September 2025 exploit when it in fact preceded it under any version of the dates (claim_findings[36]). Additional partially-supported findings — a claim of uniform 100% loss-coverage across both incidents when that commitment is documented only for the March 2026 case (claim_findings[2]), and a 'chain-isolated reserves' framing for Katana that overstates architectural parity with Fraxtal/Ethereum (claim_findings[27], [41]) — add minor overstatement but do not change the substance of what happened. Disputed claims sit at 18.75%, squarely in the minor-issues band, and no coverage gap was flagged high priority.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}