Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve_with_notes · dTRINITY dLEND
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 42 → 56 (+14)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443509062
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-19T01:41:34.219Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6niHimkicwz2VJdwe1GG96mkAWdEMoUBLgUWvGoDrq8D
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2438 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:34.038Z","decision":"review_approve_with_notes","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","new_score":56,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a calibration adjudication: content accuracy and score are judged separately. On content, claim_findings[1] and claim_findings[5] are disputed — the page's summary and one timeline entry say dLEND runs on Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana, but DefiLlama's protocol record and dTRINITY's own docs show the third chain is Sonic, with Katana receiving only a dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partnerships, not a native dLEND market. This is an internal contradiction (the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry correctly names Sonic) but it does not change a reader's conclusion about the entity's risk profile, so it is minor, not material — the core incident narrative (claim_findings[2,3,7,8,9,10]) is well corroborated across independent security writeups, BlockSec, and DefiLlama's hack record, and there is no unhedged allegation on the page. On score: the sole substantive negative event is a suffered third-party smart-contract exploit (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'), which under the fraud-likelihood rubric caps the entity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), not the current WARNING(42). The reviewer's recommended score of 56 — lower-middle of CAUTIONARY, reflecting fast/transparent disclosure and a modest loss against unconfirmed reimbursement completion and a still-unrecovered lending market — is well reasoned and consistent with the evidence. I agree with the reviewer's calibration read and adopt its recommended score. Notes: (Correct the summary's chain list from 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Katana' to 'Fraxtal, Ethereum, and Sonic' to match DefiLlama and the page's own 2026-05-28 timeline entry.) (Revise the 2025-10-01 timeline entry: Katana received a native dUSD deployment via Morpho/Yearn partner integrations, not a native dLEND lending market.) (Add a timeline entry for the Sonic deployment (live since ~May 2025), currently omitted entirely despite being one of dLEND's three actual chains.) (Note in the incident section that reimbursement completion is unconfirmed — DefiLlama's hacks record shows returnedFunds unset.)","score_delta":14,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}