Audit log

Every state-changing event for Curve Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

1. #1publishby system:backfill

   2026-05-20 18:59:00Z
   Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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   {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","kind":"publish","page_slug":"curve-dex","published_at":"2026-05-20T18:59:00.691Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Curve DEX","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/curve-finance-liquidity-provider-dao"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://coinbureau.com/review/curve-finance-crv"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/curve-finance-liquidity-pool-hack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://blockworks.co/news/curve-suffers-exploit"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-vyper-exploit-whole-story-so-far"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-finance-disburse-49-million-compensation-hack-victims"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/01/curve-finances-62m-exploit-exposes-larger-issues-for-defi-ecosystem/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2023/07/31/a-curve-founders-168m-stash-is-under-stress-creating-a-risk-for-defi-as-a-whole"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/243183/michael-egorov-has-sold-a-total-of-106-million-crv-for-42-million"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/08/03/curve-founder-still-owes-80m-despite-raising-nearly-30m-in-past-two-days"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://protos.com/curve-finance-gentlemans-agreement-expires-counterparties-dump-crv/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://decrypt.co/235149/curve-founder-liquidation-crv-token"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-suffers-massive-liquidations"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-finance-michael-egorov-bad-debt-llamma"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2024/12/19/founder-of-de-fi-giant-curve-gets-liquidated-again-as-crv-slumps"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-finance-disburse-49-million-compensation-hack-victims"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://hackmd.io/@LlamaRisk/BJzSKHNjn"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://news.curve.finance/curve-domain-incident/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.vibraniumaudits.com/post/curve-finance-faces-dual-security-breaches-x-account-compromised-and-dns-hijack"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://resources.curve.fi/risks-security/security/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coinbase.com/institutional/research-insights/research/market-intelligence/curve-finance-exploit"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-finance-founder-100-million-debt-could-trigger-defi-implosion"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://research.kaiko.com/insights/curve-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://resources.curve.fi/risks-security/security/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptorank.io/news/feed/9de9f-curve-dao-token-crv-price-prediction-2030-2"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Curve Finance is a major decentralized exchange and automated market maker (AMM) on Ethereum, optimized for low-slippage swaps of pegged assets such as stablecoins. On July 30, 2023, several of its liquidity pools were drained of approximately $70 million due to a reentrancy vulnerability in the Vyper smart contract compiler (versions 0.2.15, 0.2.16, and 0.3.0), one of the largest DeFi exploits of 2023. Separately, founder Michael Egorov's practice of using large CRV holdings as loan collateral across multiple DeFi protocols created systemic risk that culminated in a $140 million liquidation event in June 2024, generating over $10 million in bad debt across connected protocols.","timeline":[{"date":"2019-11-01","event":"Michael Egorov publishes the StableSwap whitepaper, laying out the AMM formula that will become Curve Finance.","source":""},{"date":"2020-01-01","event":"Curve Finance protocol launches on Ethereum mainnet.","source":""},{"date":"2020-08-13","event":"CRV governance token and Curve DAO contracts deployed by anonymous community member 0xc4ad.","source":""},{"date":"2021-06-01","event":"Curve v2 (Cryptoswap) launches, extending the AMM to volatile asset pairs.","source":""},{"date":"2023-07-30","event":"Multiple Curve pools exploited via Vyper compiler reentrancy vulnerability; approximately $70 million drained. CRV price drops sharply, placing Egorov's $100M+ collateralized loan positions near liquidation.","source":""},{"date":"2023-08-01","event":"Curve Finance offers $1.85 million bounty for identification of the attacker.","source":""},{"date":"2023-08-07","event":"As of this date, 73% of stolen funds ($52.3 million) returned by white hat actors and the alleged attacker. Egorov has sold 106 million CRV for $42 million in OTC deals to stabilize loan positions.","source":""},{"date":"2023-08-08","event":"Alleged Alchemix attacker returns approximately $12.7 million voluntarily.","source":""},{"date":"2023-09-27","event":"Egorov deposits $35 million CRV to fully settle his Aave debt position.","source":""},{"date":"2023-12-21","event":"Curve DAO votes 94% approval to disburse $49.2 million in compensation to July hack victims.","source":""},{"date":"2024-02-01","event":"Informal six-month OTC lockup expires; several OTC buyers begin selling CRV on exchanges, pushing price below $0.40.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-13","event":"CRV price falls approximately 24–30% in two days; Egorov's entire $141 million CRV collateral position liquidated across five protocols (Inverse, UwU Lend, Fraxlend, LlamaLend, Aave), generating over $10 million in bad debt on Curve Lend.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-14","event":"Egorov sells 30 million CRV for $6 million USDT to clear LlamaLend bad debt; states all bad debt fully repaid.","source":""},{"date":"2024-12-19","event":"Third liquidation event: CRV slump triggers renewed liquidation of Egorov positions, per CoinDesk reporting.","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-05","event":"Curve Finance official X account compromised; attacker promotes fraudulent CRV airdrop phishing campaign.","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-12","event":"curve.fi primary domain hijacked at DNS registrar level; visitors redirected to phishing site. Smart contracts unaffected. Protocol processes over $400 million in on-chain volume during outage.","source":""},{"date":"2025-08-01","event":"Curve reduces annual CRV inflation rate to 5.02%, cutting approximately 22 million tokens per year in emissions.","source":""}]},"v":1}

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2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-06-13 21:46:47Z
   Score: 38 → 38 (no score change)
   The Curve DEX investigation is broadly accurate on the major events but contains three notable errors: the $1.85M bounty is dated August 1 when it was actually announced August 6-7; the Alchemix fund return is dated August 8 when it occurred August 4-5; and the OTC lockup expiry is described as pushing CRV 'below $0.40' when the cited source reports CRV was ~$0.47 at expiry. The bad debt description in the summary slightly overstates geographic scope (primarily LlamaLend, not broadly 'across connected protocols'). All five section content fields are empty, meaning the investigation is structurally incomplete.
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   {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-13T21:46:47.585Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":38,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":38,"reason":"The Curve DEX investigation is broadly accurate on the major events but contains three notable errors: the $1.85M bounty is dated August 1 when it was actually announced August 6-7; the Alchemix fund return is dated August 8 when it occurred August 4-5; and the OTC lockup expiry is described as pushing CRV 'below $0.40' when the cited source reports CRV was ~$0.47 at expiry. The bad debt description in the summary slightly overstates geographic scope (primarily LlamaLend, not broadly 'across connected protocols'). All five section content fields are empty, meaning the investigation is structurally incomplete.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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3. #3review reviseby judgejudge

   2026-06-13 21:46:47Z
   Score: 38 → 26 (-12)
   17% of claims (3 of 18) were disputed by the reviewer. Two timeline entries carry incorrect dates: claim_findings[9] places the $1.85M public bounty on August 1, 2023 when Tier 2 sources (Decrypt, CoinTelegraph) confirm it was announced August 6-7 after a deadline expired; claim_findings[11] dates the Alchemix fund return to August 8, 2023 when contemporaneous reporting confirms it occurred August 4-5. claim_findings[14] additionally states OTC selling pushed CRV below $0.40, contradicting the cited Protos source which reports CRV was approximately $0.47 at expiry. These are timeline precision errors rather than disputes of the core narrative. A high-priority coverage gap also flags that all five section content fields are empty strings, leaving the page with no narrative body — this structural incompleteness independently warrants revision regardless of the factual findings.
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   {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-13T21:46:47.585Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":26,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":38,"reason":"17% of claims (3 of 18) were disputed by the reviewer. Two timeline entries carry incorrect dates: claim_findings[9] places the $1.85M public bounty on August 1, 2023 when Tier 2 sources (Decrypt, CoinTelegraph) confirm it was announced August 6-7 after a deadline expired; claim_findings[11] dates the Alchemix fund return to August 8, 2023 when contemporaneous reporting confirms it occurred August 4-5. claim_findings[14] additionally states OTC selling pushed CRV below $0.40, contradicting the cited Protos source which reports CRV was approximately $0.47 at expiry. These are timeline precision errors rather than disputes of the core narrative. A high-priority coverage gap also flags that all five section content fields are empty strings, leaving the page with no narrative body — this structural incompleteness independently warrants revision regardless of the factual findings.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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4. #4reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-06-14 23:15:45Z
   Score: 26 → 26 (no score change)
   Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Curve Finance is a legitimate, long-running DeFi protocol that has suffered a series of security incidents and governance stress events but has not committed fraud, run a Ponzi scheme, or executed an exit scam. The two largest incidents driving the current WARNING score are (a) the July 2023 exploit, which was caused by a compiler-level bug in the third-party Vyper language and is therefore not attributable to Curve's own negligence or fraud — roughly 73% of funds were recovered — and (b) the June 2024 founder liquidation, where bad debt was fully repaid within days. The 2025 X-account and DNS hijacks are third-party infrastructure attacks that did not compromise the protocol's smart contracts. The VC fraud lawsuit was dismissed by a California appeals court in February 2025. With ~$1.43B TVL in mid-2026, active governance, a scheduled emissions reduction program, and no unresolved fraud findings, Curve meets the CAUTIONARY band criteria (legitimate operator with material caveats): its caveats include continued founder governance-token concentration risk, the unresolved Swiss lawsuit, and the pattern of infrastructure security breaches. A score of 62 (CAUTIONARY) is appropriate under the band semantics — the current score of 38 (WARNING) over-penalizes the entity by treating a third-party compiler exploit and a resolved bad-debt episode as if they were ongoing fraud indicators.
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   {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:15:45.355Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":26,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":26,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Curve Finance is a legitimate, long-running DeFi protocol that has suffered a series of security incidents and governance stress events but has not committed fraud, run a Ponzi scheme, or executed an exit scam. The two largest incidents driving the current WARNING score are (a) the July 2023 exploit, which was caused by a compiler-level bug in the third-party Vyper language and is therefore not attributable to Curve's own negligence or fraud — roughly 73% of funds were recovered — and (b) the June 2024 founder liquidation, where bad debt was fully repaid within days. The 2025 X-account and DNS hijacks are third-party infrastructure attacks that did not compromise the protocol's smart contracts. The VC fraud lawsuit was dismissed by a California appeals court in February 2025. With ~$1.43B TVL in mid-2026, active governance, a scheduled emissions reduction program, and no unresolved fraud findings, Curve meets the CAUTIONARY band criteria (legitimate operator with material caveats): its caveats include continued founder governance-token concentration risk, the unresolved Swiss lawsuit, and the pattern of infrastructure security breaches. A score of 62 (CAUTIONARY) is appropriate under the band semantics — the current score of 38 (WARNING) over-penalizes the entity by treating a third-party compiler exploit and a resolved bad-debt episode as if they were ongoing fraud indicators.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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5. #5review approveby judgejudge

   2026-06-14 23:15:45Z
   Score: 26 → 62 (+36)
   This is a severity-calibration review, not a fact-dispute review: all six claim_findings are supported and disputed_pct is 0%. The page content stands as accurate and must remain published. The review establishes with high confidence (0.88) that the current WARNING-band score over-penalizes Curve Finance on three grounds: (1) the July 2023 $70M exploit originated from a Vyper compiler bug, a third-party failure not attributable to Curve protocol design, and 73% of funds were recovered (claim_findings[0-1]); (2) the $10M bad debt generated by the June 2024 founder liquidation was fully repaid by Egorov personally within days, making any framing of it as an unresolved community loss inaccurate (claim_findings[2]); and (3) the VC fraud lawsuit was dismissed by a California appeals court in February 2025, removing it as an active fraud indicator (claim_findings[3]). Curve continues to operate with approximately $1.43B TVL and $126B annual volume (claim_findings[4]), and the 2025 X-account and DNS incidents were infrastructure-layer attacks that did not breach its smart contracts (claim_findings[5]). Material caveats remain — ongoing Swiss proceedings, founder governance-token concentration, and a pattern of infrastructure security breaches — which correctly place the entity in the CAUTIONARY band rather than SAFE. A score_modifier_delta of +36 moves the score toward the reviewer-recommended 62 (CAUTIONARY), correcting the mis-calibration from the current over-penalized WARNING band.
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   {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:15:45.355Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":62,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":26,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration review, not a fact-dispute review: all six claim_findings are supported and disputed_pct is 0%. The page content stands as accurate and must remain published. The review establishes with high confidence (0.88) that the current WARNING-band score over-penalizes Curve Finance on three grounds: (1) the July 2023 $70M exploit originated from a Vyper compiler bug, a third-party failure not attributable to Curve protocol design, and 73% of funds were recovered (claim_findings[0-1]); (2) the $10M bad debt generated by the June 2024 founder liquidation was fully repaid by Egorov personally within days, making any framing of it as an unresolved community loss inaccurate (claim_findings[2]); and (3) the VC fraud lawsuit was dismissed by a California appeals court in February 2025, removing it as an active fraud indicator (claim_findings[3]). Curve continues to operate with approximately $1.43B TVL and $126B annual volume (claim_findings[4]), and the 2025 X-account and DNS incidents were infrastructure-layer attacks that did not breach its smart contracts (claim_findings[5]). Material caveats remain — ongoing Swiss proceedings, founder governance-token concentration, and a pattern of infrastructure security breaches — which correctly place the entity in the CAUTIONARY band rather than SAFE. A score_modifier_delta of +36 moves the score toward the reviewer-recommended 62 (CAUTIONARY), correcting the mis-calibration from the current over-penalized WARNING band.","score_delta":36,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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6. #6reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-10-17 01:12:55Z
   Score: 60 → 60 (no score change)
   The page's core narrative — the July 2023 Vyper reentrancy exploit, its recovery, the DAO compensation vote, and Michael Egorov's recurring CRV-collateralized liquidations — is well supported by its cited sources, and several figures were independently corroborated beyond the citations given (pool-by-pool losses, bounty amounts and dates, the 2020 CRV/DAO deployment story, the 2025 X/DNS incidents, and the 2025 CRV inflation cut). Two defects recur across multiple locations: a '53 investors' figure that belongs to a later, larger cumulative CRV sale is misattached to an earlier $42M tranche in both a section and the timeline, and the December 2024 liquidation is characterized as 'a repeat of the earlier episode' when it was in fact about 160 times smaller than the June 2024 event and CoinDesk did not use that framing. A specific '$11.5 million' Curve Lend bad-debt figure could not be traced to any source, cited or independent, and conflicts in granularity with the better-supported ~$10 million figure used elsewhere on the page. The '427.5 million CRV' pledged-collateral figure is only partially supported, since the page's own cited source gives a different token count for the same 47%-of-supply claim. None of these issues are fabrications; they read as compounding errors from synthesizing multiple overlapping news cycles about the same ongoing story.
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   {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"8ee248f97cba750b3bf7666b447cac74","decided_at":"2026-10-17T01:12:55.782Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2353,"findings_hash":"AWy9RTANH1rudmk7Khq7rALEjrP5rsiNPBG2qGkUm18Q","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","mode":"findings_only","new_score":60,"page_content_hash":"289c303766186276bcd9a979313f46a463049b1bba4c6a72a7980ee501ed25d3","page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":60,"reason":"The page's core narrative — the July 2023 Vyper reentrancy exploit, its recovery, the DAO compensation vote, and Michael Egorov's recurring CRV-collateralized liquidations — is well supported by its cited sources, and several figures were independently corroborated beyond the citations given (pool-by-pool losses, bounty amounts and dates, the 2020 CRV/DAO deployment story, the 2025 X/DNS incidents, and the 2025 CRV inflation cut). Two defects recur across multiple locations: a '53 investors' figure that belongs to a later, larger cumulative CRV sale is misattached to an earlier $42M tranche in both a section and the timeline, and the December 2024 liquidation is characterized as 'a repeat of the earlier episode' when it was in fact about 160 times smaller than the June 2024 event and CoinDesk did not use that framing. A specific '$11.5 million' Curve Lend bad-debt figure could not be traced to any source, cited or independent, and conflicts in granularity with the better-supported ~$10 million figure used elsewhere on the page. The '427.5 million CRV' pledged-collateral figure is only partially supported, since the page's own cited source gives a different token count for the same 47%-of-supply claim. None of these issues are fabrications; they read as compounding errors from synthesizing multiple overlapping news cycles about the same ongoing story.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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7. #7reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-10-17 02:14:49Z
   Score: 60 → 60 (no score change)
   The page is substantially well-sourced and most load-bearing figures -- the July 2023 Vyper exploit mechanics and per-pool losses, the recovery and bounty timeline, the December 2023 DAO compensation vote, Egorov's 2023 CRV-backed loan exposure, and the June 2024 liquidation cascade -- check out closely against primary and credible secondary sources (Chainalysis, Vyper's own post-mortem, CoinDesk, The Block, Curve's own announcements). The clearest concrete defect found is a named-entity error: 'DW Labs' should be 'DWF Labs,' a real and well-documented OTC buyer. A precise '53 investors' figure for the CRV OTC sales could not be corroborated anywhere and should be treated as unverifiable. Two citations are dead: a Cointelegraph article on the $49M compensation vote (404, with a live CoinGape replacement already cited elsewhere in the page) and a duplicate blockworks.com URL that 403s and is redundant with a working blockworks.co citation used alongside it in three places. Two softer issues are a bad-debt figure ($11.5M) for the June 2024 Curve Lend cascade that is real but competes with an equally-cited $10M figure without acknowledgment, and a December 2024 'further liquidation' reference that is technically accurate but, next to the much larger June 2024 episode, risks implying comparable severity for an event roughly two orders of magnitude smaller.
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   canonical bytes (1969 B) ▸

   {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2e25914ab3c2121dc5e1ddec64dde82f","decided_at":"2026-10-17T02:14:49.717Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.0526,"findings_hash":"FF5Yg5jZgZQKGq6YRJhvKrgtZaKKuLCReLjxuVTRrreD","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","mode":"findings_only","new_score":60,"page_content_hash":"289c303766186276bcd9a979313f46a463049b1bba4c6a72a7980ee501ed25d3","page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":60,"reason":"The page is substantially well-sourced and most load-bearing figures -- the July 2023 Vyper exploit mechanics and per-pool losses, the recovery and bounty timeline, the December 2023 DAO compensation vote, Egorov's 2023 CRV-backed loan exposure, and the June 2024 liquidation cascade -- check out closely against primary and credible secondary sources (Chainalysis, Vyper's own post-mortem, CoinDesk, The Block, Curve's own announcements). The clearest concrete defect found is a named-entity error: 'DW Labs' should be 'DWF Labs,' a real and well-documented OTC buyer. A precise '53 investors' figure for the CRV OTC sales could not be corroborated anywhere and should be treated as unverifiable. Two citations are dead: a Cointelegraph article on the $49M compensation vote (404, with a live CoinGape replacement already cited elsewhere in the page) and a duplicate blockworks.com URL that 403s and is redundant with a working blockworks.co citation used alongside it in three places. Two softer issues are a bad-debt figure ($11.5M) for the June 2024 Curve Lend cascade that is real but competes with an equally-cited $10M figure without acknowledgment, and a December 2024 'further liquidation' reference that is technically accurate but, next to the much larger June 2024 episode, risks implying comparable severity for an event roughly two orders of magnitude smaller.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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8. #8rescoreby systemsystem

   2026-10-27 06:03:18Z
   Score: 60 → 63 (+3)
   Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 60 → 63. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −15.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.4; legitimacy credit well known and widely used +25, long-running +10; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; fact-check adjustments (+24) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.
   anchoranchored

   chain

   ●mainnet-betaslot 461,962,781

   sig

   xKW7REZoyiWJ…skfxAykLcopyexplorer ↗

   hash

   3CorD9UicgVG…9YKbXDYscopysha256 → base58

   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (805 B) ▸

   {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:03:18.425Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":63,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":60,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 60 → 63. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −15.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.4; legitimacy credit well known and widely used +25, long-running +10; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; fact-check adjustments (+24) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.","score_delta":3,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

   Verify offline (run on your own machine)

   python -m src.verify_decision 0254dd67-b0f6-468d-a90e-a6ce8469369ccopy
9. #9reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-11-02 00:24:27Z
   Score: 63 → 63 (no score change)
   The core narrative holds: the Vyper reentrancy exploit, the roughly 73% recovery by Aug 7, the June 2024 roughly $140M founder liquidation and the May 2025 DNS hijack all match the sources I fetched. Errors found: the 10% bounty deadline is given as August 4 in three places but sources give 08:00 UTC August 6; a TechCrunch attribution is not what the article says; the December 2024 liquidation is under $1M but is framed as a repeat; and bad-debt figures vary across sources. The page omits the UwU Lend context for the June 2024 event. Only a sample of the page's claims was verified.
   anchoranchored

   chain

   ●mainnet-betaslot 464,292,603

   sig

   5KXDQY2xmdQb…fGQXGUgMcopyexplorer ↗

   hash

   2KrZQjWXQUA5…TdMUVbkmcopysha256 → base58

   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (1474 B) ▸

   {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"de56e5832519b5e5a2cccf67cb3bc9a0","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:24:27.645Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3636,"findings_hash":"8MaxFQjiKZEX5MVgGZ6Xhx2zX5HM7LgTP8kKUVo8etJF","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":63,"omissions":{"material":1,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"289c303766186276bcd9a979313f46a463049b1bba4c6a72a7980ee501ed25d3","page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":63,"reason":"The core narrative holds: the Vyper reentrancy exploit, the roughly 73% recovery by Aug 7, the June 2024 roughly $140M founder liquidation and the May 2025 DNS hijack all match the sources I fetched. Errors found: the 10% bounty deadline is given as August 4 in three places but sources give 08:00 UTC August 6; a TechCrunch attribution is not what the article says; the December 2024 liquidation is under $1M but is framed as a repeat; and bad-debt figures vary across sources. The page omits the UwU Lend context for the June 2024 event. Only a sample of the page's claims was verified.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":9,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

   Verify offline (run on your own machine)

   python -m src.verify_decision 1e788b36-6b38-4b24-bb57-e5ce2e3f6a71copy
10. #10review reviseby judgejudge

    2026-11-02 00:24:27Z
    Score: 63 → 63 (no score change)
    Of 11 scored claim findings (one blocked source excluded), 3 were disputed and 1 could not be found, giving about 36%, which falls in the significant-issues band. The three disputed findings (claim_findings[1], [2], [3]) are one error repeated: the 10% bounty deadline is given as August 4 but the cited sources say 08:00 UTC August 6. Several other claims are only partly supported (claim_findings[5], [6], [7], [8]), including a TechCrunch attribution the article does not make, inconsistent bad-debt figures, and a December 2024 liquidation under $1M framed as a repeat of the $140M event. The page also omits the UwU Lend context for the June 2024 liquidation. The core narrative (Vyper reentrancy exploit, roughly 73% recovery, DNS hijack) was confirmed, so the penalty sits at the lower end of the band.
    anchoranchored

    chain

    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,292,608

    sig

    66eY8Wux34Us…deTZrB33copyexplorer ↗

    hash

    A8n8kjQw3v3C…MqMLEgT4copysha256 → base58

    verifying row…full verify ↗

    canonical bytes (1881 B) ▸

    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"de56e5832519b5e5a2cccf67cb3bc9a0","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:24:27.645Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3636,"investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":63,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":63,"reason":"Of 11 scored claim findings (one blocked source excluded), 3 were disputed and 1 could not be found, giving about 36%, which falls in the significant-issues band. The three disputed findings (claim_findings[1], [2], [3]) are one error repeated: the 10% bounty deadline is given as August 4 but the cited sources say 08:00 UTC August 6. Several other claims are only partly supported (claim_findings[5], [6], [7], [8]), including a TechCrunch attribution the article does not make, inconsistent bad-debt figures, and a December 2024 liquidation under $1M framed as a repeat of the $140M event. The page also omits the UwU Lend context for the June 2024 liquidation. The core narrative (Vyper reentrancy exploit, roughly 73% recovery, DNS hijack) was confirmed, so the penalty sits at the lower end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":10,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission: the page presents the June 2024 liquidation purely as a CRV price decline and leaves out the UwU Lend exploit context that Cointelegraph and Egorov both tie to it. This confirms the significant band already implied by the percentage rather than moving it."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

    Verify offline (run on your own machine)

    python -m src.verify_decision a8d1c3b7-0f33-4684-abe8-f4e9e589717acopy
11. #11rescoreby systemsystem

    2026-11-02 00:24:28Z
    Score: 63 → 64 (+1)
    Recalculated after the fact-check of 2026-11-02. Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 63 → 64. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −15.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit well known and widely used +25, long-running +10; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved.
    anchoranchored

    chain

    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,292,613

    sig

    54TpWnnnTtHj…idU8c6YAcopyexplorer ↗

    hash

    8j6by1cenMrG…Tjj1CqpQcopysha256 → base58

    verifying row…full verify ↗

    canonical bytes (839 B) ▸

    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:24:27.645Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"3e4567af-0a09-4107-b598-0cddbf8e26fa","new_score":64,"page_slug":"curve-dex","prev_score":63,"reason":"Recalculated after the fact-check of 2026-11-02. Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 63 → 64. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −15.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit well known and widely used +25, long-running +10; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved.","score_delta":1,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":11,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

    Verify offline (run on your own machine)

    python -m src.verify_decision 16cefcdd-0b42-4c0c-a491-4245705e10b7copy