← Resolv5 decisions on this page
Audit log
Every state-changing event for Resolv: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-05-19 20:13:20ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 420,839,291
- sig
5VpRMwLVMpwn…M1E4MsxWexplorer ↗- hash
EGkwQKSZ16pE…sqPXQttNsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (5469 B) ▸
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","kind":"publish","page_slug":"resolv","published_at":"2026-05-19T20:13:20.243Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Resolv","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/04/15/resolv-labs-raises-usd10m-as-crypto-investor-appetite-for-yield-bearing-stablecoins-soars"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/stablecoin-protocol-resolv-s-tvl-soars-above-usd400-million"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cryptorank.io/ico/resolv"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-resolv-hack-march-2026"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://coinbureau.com/review/resolv-protocol-review/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/lessons-from-the-resolv-hack/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://resolv.xyz/blog/resolv-postmortem-march-22-2026-incident"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/lessons-from-the-resolv-hack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-resolv-hack-march-2026"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/blob/master/Resolv/Treasury%20Extension/README.md"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/03/23/resolv-stablecoin-drops-70-after-usd80-million-exploit-after-attacker-mints-usr"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.govinfosecurity.com/cryptohack-roundup-hacker-mints-24m-from-resolv-a-31196"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.crunchbase.com/person/ivan-kozlov-4bb9"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/04/15/resolv-labs-raises-usd10m-as-crypto-investor-appetite-for-yield-bearing-stablecoins-soars"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://wellfound.com/company/resolv-labs-1/people"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://resolv.xyz/blog/resolv-postmortem-march-22-2026-incident"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/lessons-from-the-resolv-hack/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://blockaid.io/blog/how-a-compromised-key-minted-80m-in-resolvs-usr-stablecoin-and-triggered-a-depeg"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/crypto/articles/resolv-23m-hack-highlights-defi-174413345.html"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/resolv-labs-exploit-explained"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://news.bitcoin.com/resolv-labs-pauses-protocol-after-23m-exploit-triggers-usr-stablecoin-depeg/"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Resolv is a DeFi protocol issuing USR, a delta-neutral stablecoin backed by ETH with perpetual futures hedging, developed by Resolv Labs. On March 22, 2026, the protocol suffered a critical exploit in which an attacker compromised Resolv's AWS key management infrastructure to mint 80 million unbacked USR tokens, extracting approximately $23–25 million in ETH and triggering a severe stablecoin depeg. The protocol remains paused as of May 2026 while recovery and infrastructure remediation are underway.","timeline":[{"date":"2024-11-01","event":"Resolv protocol launches; TVL begins growing rapidly, rising over 380% through November–December 2024.","source":""},{"date":"2024-12-01","event":"Resolv TVL hits $77 million all-time high at the time, per DeFiLlama.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-06","event":"Resolv TVL peaks at approximately $448 million, per DeFiLlama.","source":""},{"date":"2025-04-15","event":"Resolv Labs announces $10 million seed funding led by Cyber.Fund and Maven 11, with participation from Coinbase Ventures, Animoca Ventures, Arrington Capital, and others.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-22","event":"Critical exploit: attacker compromises AWS KMS signing key via GitHub Actions credential exfiltration from a contractor's account. Mints 80 million USR in two transactions using ~$100K–$200K USDC, extracting $23–25M in ETH. USR depegs to $0.0025 on Curve. Protocol paused at 05:16 UTC.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-23","event":"CoinDesk and major outlets report on the exploit. Fluid/Instadapp confirms over $10 million in bad debt and $300 million in outflows attributed to the Resolv depeg.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-26","event":"Resolv Labs publishes official postmortem. 46 million of the 80 million illicitly minted USR burned or blacklisted. External forensic investigation begins with Hypernative, Hexens, MixBytes, SEAL 911, Mandiant, and ZeroShadow.","source":""},{"date":"2026-05-11","event":"Resolv Labs posts update on X confirming ongoing recovery coordination with affected counterparties. Protocol has not relaunched as of this date.","source":""}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 56ec6b5b-f67a-44e0-9a7c-7beb258b1369 - #2rescoreby systemsystem2026-10-10 18:49:01ZScore: 22 → 53 (+31)Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 22 → 53. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6.4, concerns that are not fraud −6.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8; legitimacy credit long-running +2.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 455,368,984
- sig
2oP9h78ZSPoo…mT7o34Ptexplorer ↗- hash
C1dQ9rv6iGyw…XMvSkk9Psha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (637 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-10T18:49:01.195Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","new_score":53,"page_slug":"resolv","prev_score":22,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 22 → 53. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6.4, concerns that are not fraud −6.4, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8; legitimacy credit long-running +2.","score_delta":31,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision c7a13446-4c50-4c99-8a2b-89569c1edcce - #3acceptby agent:avoid-moderatoranalyzer2026-10-22 00:11:03ZScore: 53 → 52 (-1)Chainalysis's own post-mortem confirms an AWS KMS key compromise let the attacker mint ~80M USR (~$23-25M extracted) with no on-chain maximum-mint safeguard, matching the note fully.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 459,826,979
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5osW57Jkbrj4…tSJWTzfoexplorer ↗- hash
5uDWHD1v2FL5…Nz5xZWkisha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (646 B) ▸
{"actor":"agent:avoid-moderator","decided_at":"2026-10-22T00:11:02.861Z","decision":"accept","investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","new_score":52,"page_slug":"resolv","prev_score":53,"reason":"Chainalysis's own post-mortem confirms an AWS KMS key compromise let the attacker mint ~80M USR (~$23-25M extracted) with no on-chain maximum-mint safeguard, matching the note fully.","score_delta":-1,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":"a2c091d69d3d9e9ec0d2bc09c8ee7a1257edb52dda16e92033435dd0a3f1d49d","submission_id":"c1b87c02-657a-43b5-90d3-385c4603d63c","submission_kind":"url","submission_valence":"incriminating","v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 59c8e77f-e5e6-4b5f-b584-e9e3466a2f8b - #4reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-02 05:42:49ZScore: 52 → 52 (no score change)The core exploit narrative (AWS KMS key compromise, 80M USR minted in two transactions, about $25M extracted, pause at 05:16 UTC) matches the official postmortem and Chainalysis. Problems: the $0.0025 depeg low conflicts with other sources, Mandiant and ZeroShadow are described as engaged when the postmortem says planned, the postmortem is dated 2026-03-26 but is dated April 4, and the GitHub contractor chain is not supported by two of the cited sources. The May 2026 status is unsourced and the subject's current status could not be determined.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,381,826
- sig
5oiz2AQHg237…J32Nbiqfexplorer ↗- hash
9V5unqHRaatT…1jKpQoUhsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1390 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"348aff7ea5e1174bbc5177589423c607","decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:42:49.503Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4,"findings_hash":"HLJnnJ79vy5MRQzTp7MHkqwSJhdtvkKsjQx7CEHHaGjp","investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"d7bf017ef05795dff1fc70996c21791238484a377aba82980ac3b807931fc7ad","page_slug":"resolv","prev_score":52,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (AWS KMS key compromise, 80M USR minted in two transactions, about $25M extracted, pause at 05:16 UTC) matches the official postmortem and Chainalysis. Problems: the $0.0025 depeg low conflicts with other sources, Mandiant and ZeroShadow are described as engaged when the postmortem says planned, the postmortem is dated 2026-03-26 but is dated April 4, and the GitHub contractor chain is not supported by two of the cited sources. The May 2026 status is unsourced and the subject's current status could not be determined.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision f0340837-a2cb-4de4-97f2-b0fa744c75b7 - #5review reviseby judgejudge2026-11-02 05:42:49ZScore: 52 → 52 (no score change)About 36% of the 11 reviewed claims were disputed or could not be verified (4 of 11). The core exploit account (key compromise, 80M USR minted, roughly $25M extracted, pause at 05:16 UTC) matches the official postmortem (claim_findings[0], [5]). The problems are at the edges: Mandiant and ZeroShadow are described as engaged when the postmortem says planned (claim_findings[2]), the postmortem is dated 2026-03-26 but the source dates it April 4 (claim_findings[3]), and the May 2026 status and the peak TVL figure could not be sourced (claim_findings[7], [9]). The depeg low and the GitHub contractor attack chain are only partly supported, and the page's status is stale, so it needs correction and a refresh. The penalty is kept in the lower part of the band because the central allegations hold up and the disputed items are mostly peripheral.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,381,831
- sig
5LCu2izzGGDs…UVNeXkZNexplorer ↗- hash
4R2wSjaENNDd…5JavvdYjsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1485 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"348aff7ea5e1174bbc5177589423c607","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:42:49.503Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4,"investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"page_slug":"resolv","prev_score":52,"reason":"About 36% of the 11 reviewed claims were disputed or could not be verified (4 of 11). The core exploit account (key compromise, 80M USR minted, roughly $25M extracted, pause at 05:16 UTC) matches the official postmortem (claim_findings[0], [5]). The problems are at the edges: Mandiant and ZeroShadow are described as engaged when the postmortem says planned (claim_findings[2]), the postmortem is dated 2026-03-26 but the source dates it April 4 (claim_findings[3]), and the May 2026 status and the peak TVL figure could not be sourced (claim_findings[7], [9]). The depeg low and the GitHub contractor attack chain are only partly supported, and the page's status is stale, so it needs correction and a refresh. The penalty is kept in the lower part of the band because the central allegations hold up and the disputed items are mostly peripheral.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 5dd1b4d2-f73f-4181-9fe9-7d676d0c293a
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.