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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Resolv
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#5
Score
52 → 52 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464381831
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T05:42:49.859Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T05:43:17.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T05:43:17.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
4R2wSjaENNDdTaG4CS3y97p9Sr91eE3MtVWB5JavvdYj
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1485 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"348aff7ea5e1174bbc5177589423c607","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:42:49.503Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4,"investigation_id":"7d3916be-be64-4d1c-b1fe-f9509b3dd168","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"page_slug":"resolv","prev_score":52,"reason":"About 36% of the 11 reviewed claims were disputed or could not be verified (4 of 11). The core exploit account (key compromise, 80M USR minted, roughly $25M extracted, pause at 05:16 UTC) matches the official postmortem (claim_findings[0], [5]). The problems are at the edges: Mandiant and ZeroShadow are described as engaged when the postmortem says planned (claim_findings[2]), the postmortem is dated 2026-03-26 but the source dates it April 4 (claim_findings[3]), and the May 2026 status and the peak TVL figure could not be sourced (claim_findings[7], [9]). The depeg low and the GitHub contractor attack chain are only partly supported, and the page's status is stale, so it needs correction and a refresh. The penalty is kept in the lower part of the band because the central allegations hold up and the disputed items are mostly peripheral.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}