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GANA Payment1 decision on this page

Audit log

Every state-changing event for GANA Payment: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot taken at submission time, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-18 23:34:57Z
    Score: ?? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
    chain
    mainnet-betaslot 420,653,455
    sig
    2oi38ouBvgkf…HxNHoM5yexplorer ↗
    hash
    CRFYXNTAHHG2…XXZS9kZLsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (3201 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"f6f7d21c-80a9-499d-a2cc-0de47fa985d9","kind":"publish","page_slug":"gana-payment","published_at":"2026-05-18T23:34:57.004Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"GANA Payment","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"GANA Payment was a BNB Smart Chain payment-focused DeFi project (BEP-20 token) that launched on November 11, 2025 and was exploited nine days later on November 20, 2025, resulting in losses exceeding $3.1 million. On-chain investigator ZachXBT confirmed the attack, which involved a compromised deployer private key combined with abuse of EIP-7702 to drain the project's staking contract; stolen funds were subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash on both BSC and Ethereum. The GANA token lost over 90% of its value within 24 hours of the exploit.","timeline":[{"date":"2025-11-11","event":"GANA Payment launches on BNB Smart Chain with GANA BEP-20 token and staking contract; no security audit published.","source":"","source_url":"https://rekt.news/gana-payment-rekt"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Exploit occurs: attacker leverages compromised deployer private key and EIP-7702 abuse to drain $3.1M from GANA staking contracts on BSC.","source":"","source_url":"https://www.banklesstimes.com/articles/2025/11/20/gana-payment-drained-for-3-1m-in-bsc-exploit-zachxbt-confirms/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"ZachXBT publicly discloses the exploit via Telegram; identifies consolidation wallet 0x2e8a8670b734e260cedbc6d5a05532264aae5c38 and Tornado Cash laundering on BSC (1,140 BNB, ~$1.04M).","source":"","source_url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/379619/gana-payment-exploit"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Attacker bridges funds to Ethereum and deposits 346.8 ETH (~$1.05M) into Tornado Cash in incremental batches; ~346 ETH remains dormant in attacker wallet.","source":"","source_url":"https://coinfomania.com/gana-payment-exploited-for-3-1m-hacker-laundered-via-tornado/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"GANA token collapses over 90% from ~$2.98 to ~$0.31 within 24 hours of exploit disclosure.","source":"","source_url":"https://www.banklesstimes.com/articles/2025/11/20/gana-payment-drained-for-3-1m-in-bsc-exploit-zachxbt-confirms/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"GANA Payment team announces engagement of third-party security firm and pledges comprehensive reboot plan; no specific team members identified publicly.","source":"","source_url":"https://nulltx.com/gana-payment-hit-by-3-1m-exploit-as-attacker-launders-funds-across-chains/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Hacken publishes technical post-mortem detailing EIP-7702 exploit mechanism, eight coordinated theft addresses, and `setRatesPerSec` rate inflation attack.","source":"","source_url":"https://hacken.io/insights/gana-payment-hack-explained/"}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision a7e121a8-99f9-4609-aed2-3b0553a2a9c5
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.