Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
publish · GANA Payment
- Sequence
- #1
- Score
- →
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 420653455
- Off-chain at
- 2026-05-18T23:34:57.065Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CRFYXNTAHHG2sLQrYZaVq6kgVkShdwSWmnh3XXZS9kZL
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (3201 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"f6f7d21c-80a9-499d-a2cc-0de47fa985d9","kind":"publish","page_slug":"gana-payment","published_at":"2026-05-18T23:34:57.004Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"GANA Payment","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"GANA Payment was a BNB Smart Chain payment-focused DeFi project (BEP-20 token) that launched on November 11, 2025 and was exploited nine days later on November 20, 2025, resulting in losses exceeding $3.1 million. On-chain investigator ZachXBT confirmed the attack, which involved a compromised deployer private key combined with abuse of EIP-7702 to drain the project's staking contract; stolen funds were subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash on both BSC and Ethereum. The GANA token lost over 90% of its value within 24 hours of the exploit.","timeline":[{"date":"2025-11-11","event":"GANA Payment launches on BNB Smart Chain with GANA BEP-20 token and staking contract; no security audit published.","source":"","source_url":"https://rekt.news/gana-payment-rekt"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Exploit occurs: attacker leverages compromised deployer private key and EIP-7702 abuse to drain $3.1M from GANA staking contracts on BSC.","source":"","source_url":"https://www.banklesstimes.com/articles/2025/11/20/gana-payment-drained-for-3-1m-in-bsc-exploit-zachxbt-confirms/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"ZachXBT publicly discloses the exploit via Telegram; identifies consolidation wallet 0x2e8a8670b734e260cedbc6d5a05532264aae5c38 and Tornado Cash laundering on BSC (1,140 BNB, ~$1.04M).","source":"","source_url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/379619/gana-payment-exploit"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Attacker bridges funds to Ethereum and deposits 346.8 ETH (~$1.05M) into Tornado Cash in incremental batches; ~346 ETH remains dormant in attacker wallet.","source":"","source_url":"https://coinfomania.com/gana-payment-exploited-for-3-1m-hacker-laundered-via-tornado/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"GANA token collapses over 90% from ~$2.98 to ~$0.31 within 24 hours of exploit disclosure.","source":"","source_url":"https://www.banklesstimes.com/articles/2025/11/20/gana-payment-drained-for-3-1m-in-bsc-exploit-zachxbt-confirms/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"GANA Payment team announces engagement of third-party security firm and pledges comprehensive reboot plan; no specific team members identified publicly.","source":"","source_url":"https://nulltx.com/gana-payment-hit-by-3-1m-exploit-as-attacker-launders-funds-across-chains/"},{"date":"2025-11-20","event":"Hacken publishes technical post-mortem detailing EIP-7702 exploit mechanism, eight coordinated theft addresses, and `setRatesPerSec` rate inflation attack.","source":"","source_url":"https://hacken.io/insights/gana-payment-hack-explained/"}]},"v":1}