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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Flamingo Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-09-22 12:08:27Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 449,374,501
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    PT2AQpNojqZH…TQAaSXRFexplorer ↗
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    J6rcZVbs8bsa…FVn91zD1sha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (16483 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"6d170ce4-25fc-4295-94b8-a51859bde52c","kind":"publish","page_slug":"flamingo-finance","published_at":"2026-09-22T12:08:27.234Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Flamingo Finance","sections":[{"content":"Flamingo Finance is a full-stack DeFi protocol built on the NEO N3 blockchain. It was incubated by Neo Global Development (NGD) and launched in September 2020, with NEO founder Da Hongfei and team members Adam Yang and Yuan Gao among those associated with the project. On its first day, the protocol attracted approximately $100 million in total value locked (TVL), rising to approximately $1.6 billion within one week. The protocol comprises five core components: Wrapper (cross-chain asset pegging into n-tokens), Swap (AMM-based decentralized exchange for NEP-5 tokens), Vault (yield farming modeled on Yearn Finance), Perp (derivatives platform), and DAO (governance). The Flamincome sub-protocol, launched alongside the main platform, allows users to stake ERC-20 tokens such as USDT, WBTC, and WETH on the Ethereum network to generate yield. FLM is the protocol's governance token, originally issued with a 150 million token supply and no hard cap.","heading":"Protocol Background","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Project Spotlight: Flamingo Finance, China's Full Stack DeFi Protocol — Crypto Briefing","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/project-spotlight-flamingo-finance-chinas-full-stack-defi-protocol/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Project Spotlight: Flamingo Finance — Investing.com","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.investing.com/analysis/project-spotlight-flamingo-finance-chinas-full-stack-defi-protocol-200540079"}]},{"content":"On approximately August 31, 2026, Flamingo Finance suffered a critical exploit targeting a vulnerability in the interaction between its lending and staking contracts. According to reporting by Neo News Today, the flaw existed in how the lending contract called the staking contract to release LP tokens: reward calculations were performed incorrectly, allowing an attacker to mint approximately 2.19 trillion FLM tokens — more than 3,500 times the pre-exploit circulating supply of roughly 570 million FLM. The attacker then sold the minted FLM across all available FLM liquidity pools on the platform, including FLM/WBTC, FLM/FUSD, and FLM/bNEO pairs, collapsing the FLM price and draining most remaining liquidity. Assets acquired by the attacker included WBTC, FUSD, and bNEO; approximately 11,000 bNEO reportedly remained undrained because further pool imbalancing was technically impossible. Lead developer Atlazor was quoted in Discord as stating: 'Someone found that weakness and exploited it to mint a HUGE amount of FLM by claiming FLM rewards with an incorrect reward calculation.' Team member Mr.Google acknowledged in Discord that 'Right now it feels like the damage may be irreversible.' The Neo Council voted to freeze the attacker's address, preventing further movement of the drained assets. No formal post-mortem or official public statement from Flamingo Finance had been published as of available reporting. The total dollar value of assets drained in this incident has not been independently confirmed in available Tier 1 or Tier 2 sources.","heading":"August 2026 Staking Contract Exploit (FLM Minting)","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance exploited through staking contract vulnerability, trillions of FLM minted — Neo News Today","type":"news_article","url":"https://neonewstoday.com/defi/flamingo-finance-exploited-through-staking-contract-vulnerability-trillions-of-flm-minted/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Protocol Suffers Critical Exploit via Staking Logic Flaw — BrinzTech","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.brinztech.com/breach-alerts/brinztech-alert-flamingo-finance-protocol-suffers-critical-exploit-via-staking-logic-flaw"}]},{"content":"On September 16, 2026, Flamingo Finance suffered a second distinct security incident. According to security firm Blockaid, which detected and reported the event, an attacker exploited a price-manipulation vulnerability in legacy Flamincome strategy contracts that should have been deprecated. The attacker borrowed approximately $18 million USDT via Morpho flash loans, then staked Curve USDP LP tokens into a Strategy contract during the same transaction to artificially inflate the share price of the VaultYUSDT vault. The attacker then redeemed the inflated vault shares for aUSDT at the manipulated favorable rate, netting approximately $345,900 in profit before repaying the flash loan. The victim contracts involved were identified by Blockaid as: primary victim contract at address 0x0461eEFF7C856020E574c0c364FE968Ca06BCc0F and abused token contract at 0xb8d6471cA573C92c7096Ab8600347F6a9Fe268a5. The attacker's primary address was identified as 0x83381e7F7232775735169d72D237B858fFc36871. Blockchain records show this address received 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash approximately two hours before the exploit. Within approximately one hour of the exploit, the address executed a 144.15 ETH transfer and interacted with the cross-chain bridge LI.FI. Flamingo Finance had not responded publicly to the incident as of initial reporting. The vulnerability is reported to have existed in older Flamincome contracts that had not been formally deprecated or their liquidity migrated away from.","heading":"September 16, 2026 Flash Loan Exploit (VaultYUSDT / Flamincome)","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Flags FlamingoFinance Contract Exploit, $345.9K Stolen — Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/09/16/blockaid-flags-flamingofinance-contract-exploit-345-9k-stolen/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"FlamingoFinance Loses $346,000 in DeFi Exploit Using $18M Flash Loan — KuCoin","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/flamingofinance-loses-346-000-in-defi-exploit-using-18m-flash-loan"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Hacked, Attacker Earns $345,900 in Profits — KuCoin","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/flamingo-finance-hacked-attacker-earns-345-900-in-profits"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Hit by $345,900 Flash Loan Attack — Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/flamingo-finance-exploited-for-about-345900-via-flash-loan-attack-96863"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Suffers an Attack, Attacker Profits Approximately $345,900 — PANews","type":"news_article","url":"https://panews.io/articles/01a0aa8f-8473-720a-8bea-3d56f4013ff7"}]},{"content":"On-chain analysis reported by Blockaid identified the primary attacker address associated with the September 16, 2026 flash loan exploit as 0x83381e7F7232775735169d72D237B858fFc36871. Prior to the attack, this address received 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash — a privacy protocol commonly used to obscure the origin of funds — approximately two hours before executing the exploit. Following the attack, the address moved 144.15 ETH and interacted with LI.FI, a cross-chain bridge and token-swap aggregator, which may have been used to move or convert the proceeds across chains. The source of the 144.15 ETH — whether directly from exploit proceeds or from other holdings — was not independently confirmed in available reporting. The use of Tornado Cash for initial funding and LI.FI for post-exploit movement are consistent with patterns observed in other DeFi exploit cases, though attribution of intent requires caution given available sourcing.","heading":"Attacker Blockchain Activity and Obfuscation","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Flags FlamingoFinance Contract Exploit, $345.9K Stolen — Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/09/16/blockaid-flags-flamingofinance-contract-exploit-345-9k-stolen/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"FlamingoFinance Loses $346,000 in DeFi Exploit Using $18M Flash Loan — KuCoin","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/flamingofinance-loses-346-000-in-defi-exploit-using-18m-flash-loan"}]},{"content":"A notable risk factor in the September 16, 2026 flash loan exploit is that the vulnerable contracts were reported to be older Flamincome strategy contracts that had not been formally deprecated. The Flamincome sub-protocol was part of Flamingo Finance's original 2020 launch architecture, designed to allow yield generation on Ethereum-native assets such as USDT. The VaultYUSDT strategy, which was the target of the share-price inflation, appears to have remained accessible to users and liquidity despite being a legacy system. Industry practice in DeFi generally requires that legacy contracts be formally deprecated, migrated, or access-restricted when they are no longer actively maintained, particularly where they interact with newer liquidity pools or vaults. The failure to deprecate these contracts is reported to have been the primary enabling condition for the exploit, according to Blockaid's characterization of the incident.","heading":"Legacy Contract Risk and Deprecation Failures","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Flags FlamingoFinance Contract Exploit, $345.9K Stolen — Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/09/16/blockaid-flags-flamingofinance-contract-exploit-345-9k-stolen/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"FlamingoFinance Loses $346,000 in DeFi Exploit Using $18M Flash Loan — CryptoRank","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptorank.io/news/feed/815dc-flamingofinance-loses-346000-in-defi-exploit-using-18m"}]},{"content":"No regulatory actions, court filings, or government enforcement proceedings against Flamingo Finance, its parent entity Neo Global Development, or associated individuals have been identified in available sources as of September 2026. The protocol is associated with the NEO ecosystem, which has its primary developer community in China. No sanctions designations or OFAC listings for Flamingo Finance or its principals have been identified.","heading":"Regulatory and Legal Status","severity":"low","sources":[]},{"content":"Flamingo Finance had not published a formal public statement, post-mortem, or incident response document in response to either the August 2026 staking exploit or the September 16, 2026 flash loan exploit as of available reporting. Team members acknowledged the August 2026 incident informally via Discord, with one developer describing potential damage as 'irreversible.' No equivalent acknowledgment was publicly documented for the September incident. The absence of formal transparency disclosures is a material concern for users assessing the protocol's incident response posture.","heading":"Official Response and Transparency","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance exploited through staking contract vulnerability, trillions of FLM minted — Neo News Today","type":"news_article","url":"https://neonewstoday.com/defi/flamingo-finance-exploited-through-staking-contract-vulnerability-trillions-of-flm-minted/"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockaid Flags FlamingoFinance Contract Exploit, $345.9K Stolen — Crypto Times","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/09/16/blockaid-flags-flamingofinance-contract-exploit-345-9k-stolen/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"FlamingoFinance Loses $346,000 in DeFi Exploit Using $18M Flash Loan — KuCoin","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/flamingofinance-loses-346-000-in-defi-exploit-using-18m-flash-loan"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Hacked, Attacker Earns $345,900 in Profits — KuCoin","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/flamingo-finance-hacked-attacker-earns-345-900-in-profits"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Hit by $345,900 Flash Loan Attack — Phemex News","type":"news_article","url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/flamingo-finance-exploited-for-about-345900-via-flash-loan-attack-96863"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Suffers an Attack, Attacker Profits Approximately $345,900 — PANews","type":"news_article","url":"https://panews.io/articles/01a0aa8f-8473-720a-8bea-3d56f4013ff7"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance exploited through staking contract vulnerability, trillions of FLM minted — Neo News Today","type":"news_article","url":"https://neonewstoday.com/defi/flamingo-finance-exploited-through-staking-contract-vulnerability-trillions-of-flm-minted/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Flamingo Finance Protocol Suffers Critical Exploit via Staking Logic Flaw — BrinzTech","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.brinztech.com/breach-alerts/brinztech-alert-flamingo-finance-protocol-suffers-critical-exploit-via-staking-logic-flaw"},{"credibility":2,"name":"FlamingoFinance Loses $346,000 in DeFi Exploit Using $18M Flash Loan — CryptoRank","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptorank.io/news/feed/815dc-flamingofinance-loses-346000-in-defi-exploit-using-18m"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Project Spotlight: Flamingo Finance, China's Full Stack DeFi Protocol — Crypto Briefing","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/project-spotlight-flamingo-finance-chinas-full-stack-defi-protocol/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Project Spotlight: Flamingo Finance — Investing.com","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.investing.com/analysis/project-spotlight-flamingo-finance-chinas-full-stack-defi-protocol-200540079"}],"summary":"Flamingo Finance is a NEO-based decentralized finance protocol launched in September 2020 by the Neo Global Development (NGD) team, with involvement from NEO founder Da Hongfei. The protocol suffered two distinct security incidents within weeks of each other in August-September 2026: a staking-contract reward-calculation exploit on approximately August 31, 2026, in which an attacker minted approximately 2.19 trillion FLM tokens and drained liquidity pools; and a separate flash loan attack on September 16, 2026, targeting legacy Flamincome/VaultYUSDT strategy contracts for approximately $345,900 in profit. No official public statements from the Flamingo Finance team had been published in response to either incident as of available reporting.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-09-23","event":"Flamingo Finance officially launches on the NEO blockchain. The protocol includes the Flamincome sub-protocol, Wrapper, Swap, and Vault components. TVL reaches approximately $100 million on day one and $1.6 billion within the first week.","source":"Crypto Briefing","source_url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/project-spotlight-flamingo-finance-chinas-full-stack-defi-protocol/"},{"date":"2026-08-31","event":"Flamingo Finance suffers a critical exploit via a reward-calculation flaw in the interaction between its lending and staking contracts. An attacker mints approximately 2.19 trillion FLM tokens (over 3,500x the then-circulating supply) and drains FLM liquidity pools, acquiring WBTC, FUSD, and bNEO. The Neo Council votes to freeze the attacker's address.","source":"Neo News Today","source_url":"https://neonewstoday.com/defi/flamingo-finance-exploited-through-staking-contract-vulnerability-trillions-of-flm-minted/"},{"date":"2026-09-01","event":"Security firm BrinzTech publishes a breach alert characterizing the staking contract exploit as a critical vulnerability in Flamingo Finance's lending-to-staking contract logic.","source":"BrinzTech","source_url":"https://www.brinztech.com/breach-alerts/brinztech-alert-flamingo-finance-protocol-suffers-critical-exploit-via-staking-logic-flaw"},{"date":"2026-09-16","event":"A second distinct exploit targets Flamingo Finance's legacy Flamincome/VaultYUSDT strategy contracts. The attacker borrows approximately $18 million USDT via Morpho flash loans, inflates VaultYUSDT share prices by staking Curve USDP LP tokens, and redeems aUSDT at a favorable rate, netting approximately $345,900. The attacker's address had received 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash approximately two hours prior. Security firm Blockaid detects and reports the incident. Post-exploit, the address moves 144.15 ETH via LI.FI.","source":"Crypto Times (Blockaid detection report)","source_url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/09/16/blockaid-flags-flamingofinance-contract-exploit-345-9k-stolen/"}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 991f14ae-4ecb-4140-bba2-a0752ae1e2d2
  2. #2rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-10-10 18:41:07Z
    Score: 22 → 26 (+4)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 22 → 26. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −9.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit long-running +10; no established finding that it defrauded anyone, so it stays out of the red band; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; a recent unresolved incident −32.3.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 455,359,935
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    4oe8H6Amg2ZW…EhLUKByQexplorer ↗
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    9t5prmW64tGX…NoyXhkERsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
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    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-10T18:41:07.028Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"6d170ce4-25fc-4295-94b8-a51859bde52c","new_score":26,"page_slug":"flamingo-finance","prev_score":22,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 22 → 26. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −20, concerns that are not fraud −9.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.6; legitimacy credit long-running +10; no established finding that it defrauded anyone, so it stays out of the red band; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; a recent unresolved incident −32.3.","score_delta":4,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 62b75f42-1232-429b-8cac-704fa411ea07
  3. #3reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-27 19:04:48Z
    Score: 26 → 26 (no score change)
    The core incident claims (Aug 2026 staking exploit, Sept 2026 VaultYUSDT flash loan, Aug 2024 Poly Network bridge hack, April 2026 open letter) match the cited reporting. Two timeline defects were found. The Binance Monitoring Tag event adds an 'expanded review of listed tokens' framing that the cited source does not contain. The 2020 launch is labeled 'on Neo N3', which launch-era coverage does not support. The Crypto Times and DefiLlama sources were blocked (403), so the comment-request claim and the TVL figures are unchecked. The sources are credible but mostly Neo News Today, with limited independent corroboration of the August 2026 exploit.
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 462,182,414
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    3wPgyAn7h7NJ…LSv3G7NKexplorer ↗
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    FLCz55mG7s3v…z3V5QTJqsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1507 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"5ffa61b9c9553d6160384ee91a565f19","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:04:48.317Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.125,"findings_hash":"EHmPJpfFkxAPWriF17MufEk4N6dPKq9Nn9muCLNsNmAt","investigation_id":"6d170ce4-25fc-4295-94b8-a51859bde52c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_content_hash":"817dcc623eea1c4bc26e0603f3e3725a9429359935bca660fd8dba61079e0671","page_slug":"flamingo-finance","prev_score":26,"reason":"The core incident claims (Aug 2026 staking exploit, Sept 2026 VaultYUSDT flash loan, Aug 2024 Poly Network bridge hack, April 2026 open letter) match the cited reporting. Two timeline defects were found. The Binance Monitoring Tag event adds an 'expanded review of listed tokens' framing that the cited source does not contain. The 2020 launch is labeled 'on Neo N3', which launch-era coverage does not support. The Crypto Times and DefiLlama sources were blocked (403), so the comment-request claim and the TVL figures are unchecked. The sources are credible but mostly Neo News Today, with limited independent corroboration of the August 2026 exploit.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 17d2e8df-21e1-4942-823f-3754096e4ef5
  4. #4review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-10-27 19:04:48Z
    Score: 26 → 26 (no score change)
    Of 10 claims reviewed, 2 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[2], [9]) and were left out of the count. Of the remaining 8, 1 was disputed (about 12.5%): the Binance Monitoring Tag timeline entry adds an 'expanded review of listed tokens' framing the cited source does not contain (claim_findings[6]). The core incident claims (the August 2026 staking exploit, the September 2026 flash loan, the 2024 Poly Network hack and the April 2026 open letter) match the cited reporting. A separate timeline entry labels the 2020 launch 'on Neo N3', which launch-era coverage does not support (claim_findings[7]), and the reviewer flagged one high-priority coverage gap, the post-mortem and current operating status after the 2026 exploits, so a minor revision is warranted.
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 462,182,420
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    4HiNNn9iXzR6…xvqa8862explorer ↗
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    NLogY8yVtJpp…YGWN7CzUsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1485 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"5ffa61b9c9553d6160384ee91a565f19","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:04:48.317Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"6d170ce4-25fc-4295-94b8-a51859bde52c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"flamingo-finance","prev_score":26,"reason":"Of 10 claims reviewed, 2 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[2], [9]) and were left out of the count. Of the remaining 8, 1 was disputed (about 12.5%): the Binance Monitoring Tag timeline entry adds an 'expanded review of listed tokens' framing the cited source does not contain (claim_findings[6]). The core incident claims (the August 2026 staking exploit, the September 2026 flash loan, the 2024 Poly Network hack and the April 2026 open letter) match the cited reporting. A separate timeline entry labels the 2020 launch 'on Neo N3', which launch-era coverage does not support (claim_findings[7]), and the reviewer flagged one high-priority coverage gap, the post-mortem and current operating status after the 2026 exploits, so a minor revision is warranted.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 6ae0e1a6-c348-4bd8-ae1a-7b919034d582
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.