Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Flamingo Finance
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 26 → 26 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462182420
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:04:48.564Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:04:59.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:04:59.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- NLogY8yVtJppv6NP9o1U7B7oLLr6nNCWZgcYGWN7CzU
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1485 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"5ffa61b9c9553d6160384ee91a565f19","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:04:48.317Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"6d170ce4-25fc-4295-94b8-a51859bde52c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"flamingo-finance","prev_score":26,"reason":"Of 10 claims reviewed, 2 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[2], [9]) and were left out of the count. Of the remaining 8, 1 was disputed (about 12.5%): the Binance Monitoring Tag timeline entry adds an 'expanded review of listed tokens' framing the cited source does not contain (claim_findings[6]). The core incident claims (the August 2026 staking exploit, the September 2026 flash loan, the 2024 Poly Network hack and the April 2026 open letter) match the cited reporting. A separate timeline entry labels the 2020 launch 'on Neo N3', which launch-era coverage does not support (claim_findings[7]), and the reviewer flagged one high-priority coverage gap, the post-mortem and current operating status after the 2026 exploits, so a minor revision is warranted.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}