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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Dexodus Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-29 17:31:32Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 422,984,223
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    canonical bytes (7190 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","kind":"publish","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","published_at":"2026-05-29T17:31:32.500Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Dexodus Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.dexodus.finance/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.dexodus.finance/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dexodus-finance","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.rootdata.com/Projects/detail/Dexodus?k=MTIzMDY%3D","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://tracxn.com/d/companies/dexodus/__zdky1RGiu4H__hbUCIbACv0IrffrxdueStGtghorcU0","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://quillaudits.medium.com/dexodus-lost-300k-in-a-signature-replay-attack-heres-the-breakdown-46b7165970e2","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/@zhenyazhdarkin/dexodus-finance-exploit-how-a-stale-chainlink-report-enabled-a-291k-price-manipulation-attack-39dcee1efff0","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://olympix.security/blog/how-dexodus-got-rekt-by-reused-signatures-and-how-olympix-wouldve-prevented-it","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/hacks","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://olympix.security/blog/how-dexodus-got-rekt-by-reused-signatures-and-how-olympix-wouldve-prevented-it","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus/dexodusv2","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://olympixai.medium.com/dexodus-zora-numa-946k-lost-to-replays-access-bugs-and-locked-in-prices-40c37b78391c","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://coinpedia.org/information/dexodus-demonstrates-what-defi-recovery-should-look-like/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.ainvest.com/news/dexodus-recover-100-funds-crisis-launches-gen-system-2506/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cryptodaily.co.uk/2025/06/the-defi-protocol-that-just-pulled-off-the-impossible","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/tech/dexodus-demonstrates-what-defi-recovery-should-look-like/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://x.com/IncentiveFi/status/1927357040030032365","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://quillaudits.medium.com/dexodus-lost-300k-in-a-signature-replay-attack-heres-the-breakdown-46b7165970e2","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus/dexodusv2","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://docs.dexodus.finance/security-audits","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://olympix.security/blog/how-dexodus-got-rekt-by-reused-signatures-and-how-olympix-wouldve-prevented-it","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://x.com/IncentiveFi/status/1927357040030032365","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://olympixai.medium.com/dexodus-zora-numa-946k-lost-to-replays-access-bugs-and-locked-in-prices-40c37b78391c","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dexodus-finance","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defx.com/en/protocol/dexodus-finance.html","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://web3.bitget.com/en/dapp/dexodus-28569","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://pump.fun/coin/9eEcioewNN6hcvRsYAT5UPko4R4gfLgz9XQhGRPqpump","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.rootdata.com/Projects/detail/Dexodus?k=MTIzMDY%3D","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Dexodus Finance is an oracle-based perpetual derivatives DEX operating on Coinbase's Base L2 network, founded in 2023 and headquartered in Barcelona, Spain. On May 26, 2025, the protocol suffered a signature replay attack that drained approximately $291,000–$300,000 from its liquidity pool due to the absence of nonce tracking and timestamp validation in its Chainlink oracle price-report verification logic. The team claims to have achieved 100% fund recovery within 24 hours, deprecated Perps V1, and launched a redesigned Perps V2 system; however, the protocol's current TVL remains modest at approximately $1.28M and independent verification of the full recovery narrative is limited.","timeline":[{"date":"2023-01-01","event":"Dexodus Finance founded in Barcelona, Spain by Miguel Jalon, Omar Alshaeb Foz, and Alvaro Luque Vargas.","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-26","event":"Signature replay exploit on Perps V1 drains approximately $291,000–$300,000 from the liquidity pool; attack transaction hash 0x6ffb494293fc5c32c5a6ab7dc3fff1fcc6e90fba9a6d6e486ba0a15ce518147e confirmed on-chain.","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-27","event":"Team claims 100% recovery of affected liquidity pool funds; 107 ETH reported transferred to team-controlled multisig; 6.2 ETH transferred to Binance in alleged bounty settlement. Exploit vector patched.","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-27","event":"Perps V1 deprecated; trader collateral transferred directly to user accounts. Perps V2 system launched. Halborn, SEAL 911, Chainlink Security, and Binance reported to be tracing attacker wallet.","source":""},{"date":"2025-06-01","event":"Multiple post-mortem analyses published by QuillAudits, SolidityScan, and Olympix confirming signature replay root cause.","source":""},{"date":"2025-06-25","event":"Token Generation Event conducted; 16% of total token supply allocated to community participants.","source":""}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 56dd97f4-c3d7-40c7-84ad-0af859142bc7
  2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-08-19 01:41:35Z
    Score: 42 → 42 (no score change)
    The core incident narrative (May 26, 2025 signature-replay exploit, mechanism, root cause, and tx hash) is well corroborated by three independent security-research firms and is presented with appropriate hedging (no unhedged fraud allegations against the team). However, the page contains two clear factual errors: the current TVL figure ($1.28M) contradicts its own cited source, which shows the protocol at near-zero TVL with a deadUrl flag; and the post-mortem publication date (June 1, 2025) is off by 1.5–3.5 months against the actual publication dates of the cited pieces. The '100% recovery' claim is correctly framed as an unverified team claim, and independent security researchers describe the recovery as partial/unspecified rather than complete — this gap between team messaging and independent assessment is real and the page's hedging language is appropriate, though it should more explicitly flag that independent sources describe the recovery as partial.
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    {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:35.772Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":42,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":42,"reason":"The core incident narrative (May 26, 2025 signature-replay exploit, mechanism, root cause, and tx hash) is well corroborated by three independent security-research firms and is presented with appropriate hedging (no unhedged fraud allegations against the team). However, the page contains two clear factual errors: the current TVL figure ($1.28M) contradicts its own cited source, which shows the protocol at near-zero TVL with a deadUrl flag; and the post-mortem publication date (June 1, 2025) is off by 1.5–3.5 months against the actual publication dates of the cited pieces. The '100% recovery' claim is correctly framed as an unverified team claim, and independent security researchers describe the recovery as partial/unspecified rather than complete — this gap between team messaging and independent assessment is real and the page's hedging language is appropriate, though it should more explicitly flag that independent sources describe the recovery as partial.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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    python -m src.verify_decision f5e072d2-aa68-456c-b024-5af622e5f6e8
  3. #3review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-08-19 01:41:35Z
    Score: 42 → 55 (+13)
    The reviewer classifies the entity's sole material adverse event — the May 26, 2025 signature-replay exploit — as a suffered third-party attack against a smart-contract defect, not own-fraud or misappropriation (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'). Per the scoring rubric's own instruction, incidents attributed 'b' cap severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current 42/WARNING score treats a suffered hack as if it carried fraud-attributable weight, which the evidence (three independent tier-2 security firms corroborating mechanism and root cause, no insider-involvement signal) does not support. Mitigating the upside: the team patched within 24 hours and engaged credible incident response (SEAL 911's own public activity log independently confirms involvement — claim_findings[5]), and 107 ETH recovery to a multisig is independently corroborated. Capping the upside: the team's '100% recovery' claim is contradicted by the two independent researchers who actually investigated (they describe partial/unspecified recovery — claim_findings[2]), and the page's own cited TVL source (DefiLlama) shows near-zero TVL with a deadUrl flag, not the $1.28M stated on the page (claim_findings[3]), leaving the protocol's current operating status genuinely uncertain. Net effect: the current score under-credits that this was a suffered hack with a competent, verifiable response, while the recommended 55 appropriately reflects the unresolved recovery-percentage and operational-status gaps rather than pushing to the top of CAUTIONARY or into VERIFIED.
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    canonical bytes (1935 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:35.772Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":55,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":42,"reason":"The reviewer classifies the entity's sole material adverse event — the May 26, 2025 signature-replay exploit — as a suffered third-party attack against a smart-contract defect, not own-fraud or misappropriation (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'). Per the scoring rubric's own instruction, incidents attributed 'b' cap severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current 42/WARNING score treats a suffered hack as if it carried fraud-attributable weight, which the evidence (three independent tier-2 security firms corroborating mechanism and root cause, no insider-involvement signal) does not support. Mitigating the upside: the team patched within 24 hours and engaged credible incident response (SEAL 911's own public activity log independently confirms involvement — claim_findings[5]), and 107 ETH recovery to a multisig is independently corroborated. Capping the upside: the team's '100% recovery' claim is contradicted by the two independent researchers who actually investigated (they describe partial/unspecified recovery — claim_findings[2]), and the page's own cited TVL source (DefiLlama) shows near-zero TVL with a deadUrl flag, not the $1.28M stated on the page (claim_findings[3]), leaving the protocol's current operating status genuinely uncertain. Net effect: the current score under-credits that this was a suffered hack with a competent, verifiable response, while the recommended 55 appropriately reflects the unresolved recovery-percentage and operational-status gaps rather than pushing to the top of CAUTIONARY or into VERIFIED.","score_delta":13,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 15eff8aa-bf3e-4b0e-aab2-1a07bcfc7658
  4. #4reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-16 20:14:08Z
    Score: 48 → 48 (no score change)
    The core exploit narrative (May 26, 2025, $291K-$300K loss, stale Chainlink oracle signature replay via performUpkeep(), the specific attack methodology, OWASP classification, and transaction hash) is well-supported by two independent technical post-mortems (QuillAudits, SolidityScan) and is the strongest part of the page. The most significant defect is a factual date inversion repeated in four places (summary, two sections, and a timeline entry): the page frames Halborn's DexodusV2 audit as a post-exploit remediation step dated August 1, 2025, but Halborn's own report shows the engagement ran December 17, 2024 - January 7, 2025, months before the exploit. The page also contains an internal inconsistency about fund recovery: it hedges that no Tier 1/2 source confirms the team's 'full recovery within 24 hours' claim, yet DeFiLlama -- a source the page itself cites elsewhere -- records the incident as fully returned funds. Founder identities, incorporation details, and TVL figures rest on sources (Tracxn, RocketReach) that returned 403s and could not be independently checked. No regulatory record was found, consistent with the page's claim.
    anchoranchored
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    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"77a803cb891ac152b4dbfb3679d510d6","decided_at":"2026-10-16T20:14:08.306Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4348,"findings_hash":"3wrTS3d7jVGn76qQ9DGyVcFqAvWKFFzKAXHevK8phVNM","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","mode":"findings_only","new_score":48,"page_content_hash":"f8d331d375e73568c3bf20f37bd0c5dd5d29fd5e333b2361268b545985303b85","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (May 26, 2025, $291K-$300K loss, stale Chainlink oracle signature replay via performUpkeep(), the specific attack methodology, OWASP classification, and transaction hash) is well-supported by two independent technical post-mortems (QuillAudits, SolidityScan) and is the strongest part of the page. The most significant defect is a factual date inversion repeated in four places (summary, two sections, and a timeline entry): the page frames Halborn's DexodusV2 audit as a post-exploit remediation step dated August 1, 2025, but Halborn's own report shows the engagement ran December 17, 2024 - January 7, 2025, months before the exploit. The page also contains an internal inconsistency about fund recovery: it hedges that no Tier 1/2 source confirms the team's 'full recovery within 24 hours' claim, yet DeFiLlama -- a source the page itself cites elsewhere -- records the incident as fully returned funds. Founder identities, incorporation details, and TVL figures rest on sources (Tracxn, RocketReach) that returned 403s and could not be independently checked. No regulatory record was found, consistent with the page's claim.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 9f0bac91-4206-426a-89ad-41f702d493e2
  5. #5reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-27 11:14:23Z
    Score: 48 → 48 (no score change)
    The core exploit narrative (date, loss, attack mechanics, tx hash, 107 ETH to a team multisig) matches QuillAudits. The recovery claim is correctly framed as a team statement. The 'month-old' signature detail and the $2,520 market price are not in QuillAudits and may come from SolidityScan, which I did not fetch. Halborn audit dates, the DeFiLlama TVL and the founder names could not be checked (blocked or Tier 3 source). No shutdown, sanction or rebrand was found.
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 462,049,716
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    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1322 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"7fdc40b0aa7bf7cc66b0176422a890fd","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T11:14:22.863Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1667,"findings_hash":"AmXu8jYawao94yQcpv1mZru7azBH53D1LMuAxZ1f33n2","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":48,"page_content_hash":"f8d331d375e73568c3bf20f37bd0c5dd5d29fd5e333b2361268b545985303b85","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"The core exploit narrative (date, loss, attack mechanics, tx hash, 107 ETH to a team multisig) matches QuillAudits. The recovery claim is correctly framed as a team statement. The 'month-old' signature detail and the $2,520 market price are not in QuillAudits and may come from SolidityScan, which I did not fetch. Halborn audit dates, the DeFiLlama TVL and the founder names could not be checked (blocked or Tier 3 source). No shutdown, sanction or rebrand was found.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":5,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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    python -m src.verify_decision e87d6a48-fb71-4cae-88a6-04cde83b0af2
  6. #6review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-10-27 11:14:23Z
    Score: 48 → 41 (-7)
    The core exploit account (date, loss range, attack steps, transaction hash, 107 ETH to a team multisig) was confirmed against QuillAudits (claim_findings[0], [1]). Of the six findings that could be checked, one (claim_findings[8], the founder names, resting on a Tier 3 contact-database source) could not be verified, giving a disputed share of about 17%, which falls in the minor-issues band. claim_findings[2] and [3] are only partly supported: the 'month-old' signature and $2,520 market price are not in the cited QuillAudits article, and Binance is described there as a likely bounty. The recovery claim is the page's central reassurance and has no on-chain check (high-priority coverage gap), so the page is revised rather than approved. Three of nine findings (Halborn audit dates and the DeFiLlama TVL) could not be read because the sources blocked the reviewer; that is a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. No omissions or conflicting subject status were found, and the reviewer's confidence was moderate (0.55), so the penalty is kept at the low end.
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    canonical bytes (1753 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"7fdc40b0aa7bf7cc66b0176422a890fd","band_override":null,"blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T11:14:22.863Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":41,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"The core exploit account (date, loss range, attack steps, transaction hash, 107 ETH to a team multisig) was confirmed against QuillAudits (claim_findings[0], [1]). Of the six findings that could be checked, one (claim_findings[8], the founder names, resting on a Tier 3 contact-database source) could not be verified, giving a disputed share of about 17%, which falls in the minor-issues band. claim_findings[2] and [3] are only partly supported: the 'month-old' signature and $2,520 market price are not in the cited QuillAudits article, and Binance is described there as a likely bounty. The recovery claim is the page's central reassurance and has no on-chain check (high-priority coverage gap), so the page is revised rather than approved. Three of nine findings (Halborn audit dates and the DeFiLlama TVL) could not be read because the sources blocked the reviewer; that is a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. No omissions or conflicting subject status were found, and the reviewer's confidence was moderate (0.55), so the penalty is kept at the low end.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-7,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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    python -m src.verify_decision cac08afe-45ef-4fd7-9165-1f9526ae3ab2
  7. #7rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-11-01 12:37:05Z
    Score: 41 → 70 (+29)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 41 → 70. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.7; legitimacy credit long-running +4; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved; fact-check adjustments (+6) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,094,669
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    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (749 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-01T12:37:05.223Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":70,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":41,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 41 → 70. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.7; legitimacy credit long-running +4; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved; fact-check adjustments (+6) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.","score_delta":29,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 7ed4c445-9cfc-476a-889c-d18af8388ba5
  8. #8rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-11-02 08:33:27Z
    Score: 70 → 52 (-18)
    Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-02). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 70 → 52. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −10, concerns that are not fraud −9.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.3.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,429,653
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    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (679 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-02T08:33:27.011Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":52,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":70,"reason":"Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-02). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 70 → 52. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −10, concerns that are not fraud −9.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.3.","score_delta":-18,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision e18adcb5-0a18-4ca8-952b-385b6c4fce36
  9. #9reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-11-02 08:35:49Z
    Score: 52 → 52 (no score change)
    The core exploit facts (date, loss, mechanism, hashes, wallet flows) match QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the TVL and dead-URL claims match DeFiLlama's API. One timeline date is wrong: QuillAudits published on May 28, 2025, not July. The DeFiLlama 'returned' classification and the Halborn dates could not be checked. The page appropriately hedges the refund and team claims.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,430,227
    sig
    557xgKfGbHe8…MFLXyTZWexplorer ↗
    hash
    s9zuGHLPW7L6…TqQ9AuSJsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1229 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"79ae4d2ae0064d74358517c6efe261aa","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T08:35:49.309Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.125,"findings_hash":"ENc5uZB6kpqqkkeAJPARbjHsNPWMipsp1ap7kfzih4sw","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"page_content_hash":"69c93af7bc9555b72eebc56efac770043c909da96d8955a70dfd82c7de087895","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":52,"reason":"The core exploit facts (date, loss, mechanism, hashes, wallet flows) match QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the TVL and dead-URL claims match DeFiLlama's API. One timeline date is wrong: QuillAudits published on May 28, 2025, not July. The DeFiLlama 'returned' classification and the Halborn dates could not be checked. The page appropriately hedges the refund and team claims.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":9,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision ff72a1a8-ca75-4184-a1fc-7abb579fc422
  10. #10review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-11-02 08:35:49Z
    Score: 52 → 52 (no score change)
    The core exploit facts (date, loss, attack mechanism, transaction hash, wallet flows) were confirmed against QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the TVL and dead-URL claims matched DeFiLlama's API. One timeline entry is wrong: claim_findings[6] shows QuillAudits published on May 28, 2025, not July 2025. Two claims (DeFiLlama 'returned' status and Halborn audit dates) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer, so they are excluded from the dispute rate and noted as a coverage limit. That leaves 1 of 8 checkable claims disputed (12.5%), a minor issue. A high-priority gap remains on independent refund verification, which the page already discloses as open.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,430,232
    sig
    YRYbe5GC9VBz…cvoAhx9nexplorer ↗
    hash
    HDMsjE2E4DdK…c3dKa2sNsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1364 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"79ae4d2ae0064d74358517c6efe261aa","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T08:35:49.309Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":52,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":52,"reason":"The core exploit facts (date, loss, attack mechanism, transaction hash, wallet flows) were confirmed against QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the TVL and dead-URL claims matched DeFiLlama's API. One timeline entry is wrong: claim_findings[6] shows QuillAudits published on May 28, 2025, not July 2025. Two claims (DeFiLlama 'returned' status and Halborn audit dates) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer, so they are excluded from the dispute rate and noted as a coverage limit. That leaves 1 of 8 checkable claims disputed (12.5%), a minor issue. A high-priority gap remains on independent refund verification, which the page already discloses as open.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":10,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 8cf10ac8-22f9-4d5f-ad31-597db9a9fdce
  11. #11rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-11-17 21:22:07Z
    Score: 52 → 48 (-4)
    Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-17). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 52 → 48. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −15.2, incidents the subject suffered −10, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 470,682,797
    sig
    5bFx5qm8BcN2…d1v3hcWFexplorer ↗
    hash
    FC3UhbUo7W3i…aEMH1Rtosha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (680 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:22:06.256Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":48,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":52,"reason":"Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-17). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 52 → 48. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −15.2, incidents the subject suffered −10, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.8.","score_delta":-4,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":11,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision a54049b2-6e67-4094-9c44-67e6e56d48e3
  12. #12reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-11-17 21:26:26Z
    Score: 48 → 48 (no score change)
    Core exploit facts (date, amounts, tx, attacker wallet, fund flows, root cause) match QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the page hedges the recovery claim and attribution appropriately. DeFiLlama and Halborn details could not be read directly, so they are partially verified or blocked. No factual errors found.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 470,684,513
    sig
    5E6cseBaeJcY…AduaaUqjexplorer ↗
    hash
    HU7ekbBiutLh…ZVc9N9ctsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1159 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"3cf818a05a575f6b4960c5e8ef1a7deb","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:26:26.510Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"4efn269u4mJGn4wo6byAH8HsahaUETtHnUy9zHD8K9rG","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":48,"page_content_hash":"db862d3b2e2855306df3656371c1201939c36366b486c82f7ba09e5d74d45e42","page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"Core exploit facts (date, amounts, tx, attacker wallet, fund flows, root cause) match QuillAudits and SolidityScan, and the page hedges the recovery claim and attribution appropriately. DeFiLlama and Halborn details could not be read directly, so they are partially verified or blocked. No factual errors found.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":12,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision c928f0fc-6670-40b2-a66e-f1fab66289ab
  13. #13review approveby judgejudge
    2026-11-17 21:26:26Z
    Score: 48 → 48 (no score change)
    Of 7 claim findings, 1 (Halborn audit dates, claim_findings[6]) was unverifiable because the source blocked the reviewer and is excluded from the rate; of the remaining 6, none were disputed or unverifiable, giving 0%. The core exploit facts (claim_findings[0-3]) were confirmed against two Tier 2 analyses, and the two partial findings (claim_findings[4-5]) rest on DeFiLlama pages that returned 403, not on contradicting evidence. The high-priority coverage gap on refund verification is already disclosed on the page as an open, unconfirmed recovery claim, so it calls for expansion, not a penalty. The review found no omissions and no shutdown or sanction that contradicts the page.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 470,683,887
    sig
    4MPJEECwmgt5…RLDcSjN5explorer ↗
    hash
    4bXKZsDTbvtN…trHLkyccsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1368 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3cf818a05a575f6b4960c5e8ef1a7deb","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:26:26.510Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":48,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"Of 7 claim findings, 1 (Halborn audit dates, claim_findings[6]) was unverifiable because the source blocked the reviewer and is excluded from the rate; of the remaining 6, none were disputed or unverifiable, giving 0%. The core exploit facts (claim_findings[0-3]) were confirmed against two Tier 2 analyses, and the two partial findings (claim_findings[4-5]) rest on DeFiLlama pages that returned 403, not on contradicting evidence. The high-priority coverage gap on refund verification is already disclosed on the page as an open, unconfirmed recovery claim, so it calls for expansion, not a penalty. The review found no omissions and no shutdown or sanction that contradicts the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":13,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision ec2e6a3c-8ec5-4bf3-bf3a-3cb9e1b4f431
  14. #14rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-11-17 21:26:27Z
    Score: 48 → 49 (+1)
    Recalculated after the fact-check of 2026-11-17. Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 48 → 49. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −15.2, incidents the subject suffered −10; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 470,683,894
    sig
    4TwwACW5hkMT…G6AscEZ4explorer ↗
    hash
    9bwMi8uubvCT…PK4gKd8xsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (670 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:26:26.510Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":49,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":48,"reason":"Recalculated after the fact-check of 2026-11-17. Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 48 → 49. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −15.2, incidents the subject suffered −10; 1 section(s) set aside until a failed fact-check is resolved.","score_delta":1,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":14,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 2d7d2e13-677c-4e29-9f84-5154a37d1900
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.