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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Dexodus Finance
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
42 → 55 (+13)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443509077
Off-chain at
2026-08-19T01:41:35.947Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
29VNggH3FuM9To7AKaCCXtmdyPFMBx1VZkyUmpQQG5s8
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1935 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:35.772Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"303d6dc0-64f2-4fd3-b0f2-6049f92eef1b","new_score":55,"page_slug":"dexodus-finance","prev_score":42,"reason":"The reviewer classifies the entity's sole material adverse event — the May 26, 2025 signature-replay exploit — as a suffered third-party attack against a smart-contract defect, not own-fraud or misappropriation (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b'). Per the scoring rubric's own instruction, incidents attributed 'b' cap severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69), so the current 42/WARNING score treats a suffered hack as if it carried fraud-attributable weight, which the evidence (three independent tier-2 security firms corroborating mechanism and root cause, no insider-involvement signal) does not support. Mitigating the upside: the team patched within 24 hours and engaged credible incident response (SEAL 911's own public activity log independently confirms involvement — claim_findings[5]), and 107 ETH recovery to a multisig is independently corroborated. Capping the upside: the team's '100% recovery' claim is contradicted by the two independent researchers who actually investigated (they describe partial/unspecified recovery — claim_findings[2]), and the page's own cited TVL source (DefiLlama) shows near-zero TVL with a deadUrl flag, not the $1.28M stated on the page (claim_findings[3]), leaving the protocol's current operating status genuinely uncertain. Net effect: the current score under-credits that this was a suffered hack with a competent, verifiable response, while the recommended 55 appropriately reflects the unresolved recovery-percentage and operational-status gaps rather than pushing to the top of CAUTIONARY or into VERIFIED.","score_delta":13,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}