Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← AVOID.NET

Entity Graph

Browse extracted entities, relationships, and potential duplicates.

Total entities
29,211
Relationships
32,356
Potential duplicates
0

Entities (event)

↯
Bitcoin Beach Wallet rebranded to Blink.(2023-01-01:blink-wallet)event
e9272519
↯
Bitcoin Beach Wallet restructured as a separate Salvadoran financial institution.(2021-01-01:blink-wallet)event
612ec381
↯
Bitcoin Beach Wallet launched in El Zonte, El Salvador, through a collaboration between Galoy founder Nicolas Burtey and Bitcoin Beach community leader Mike Peterson.(2020-01-01:blink-wallet)event
9463f547
↯
Root cause of the breach, exact number of affected accounts, and total funds lost remain undisclosed; Blink has promised a full post-mortem that had not been published as of this report.(2026-09:blink-wallet)event
c77315a8
↯
Multiple crypto news outlets, including Crypto Briefing, Bitcoin.com News, and The Crypto Times, reported that 'a few dozen' custodial accounts were drained, citing Blink's initial public statement.(2026-09-19:blink-wallet)event
23e91517
↯
Blink begins winding down custodial accounts in certain regions for regulatory reasons, setting a first user migration deadline of 31 August 2026.(2026-08:blink-wallet)event
9185d1e7
↯
Blink launches non-custodial accounts built on the Spark protocol, described by the company as 'six years in the making,' allowing users to hold their own keys within the same app.(2026:blink-wallet)event
8ce2960f
↯
Bitcoin Beach Wallet rebrands to Blink.(2023:blink-wallet)event
bedabf71
↯
Bitcoin becomes legal tender in El Salvador; the Bitcoin Beach Wallet gains international recognition and is structured as its own Salvadoran financial institution.(2021:blink-wallet)event
76c4ee32
↯
Galoy, founded by Nicolas Burtey, begins building the Bitcoin Beach Wallet with the Bitcoin Beach community project in El Zonte, El Salvador — the predecessor to Blink Wallet.(2020:blink-wallet)event
1180286a
↯
KelpDAO and Aave jointly announce that rsETH has been fully restored. The final tranche of 20,373.7 rsETH is transferred to the LayerZero lockbox contract, completing recovery approximately five weeks after the exploit. All Aave markets and rsETH operations confirmed as functioning normally.(2026-05-25:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
5c10b3f7
↯
LayerZero Labs publishes its full public incident report detailing the attack timeline, social engineering vector, RPC compromise methodology, and attribution to DPRK TraderTraitor unit.(2026-05-18:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
42e9d01c
↯
LayerZero reverses course, publicly admitting: 'We made a mistake by allowing our DVN to act as a 1/1 DVN for high-value transactions. We own that.' LayerZero announces it will no longer service 1-of-1 DVN configurations and will migrate all defaults to a minimum of 3-of-3.(2026-05-09:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
4b36925d
↯
DeFi United coalition releases detailed technical recovery proposal for restoring rsETH backing.(2026-04-28:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
597b36ed
↯
Aave V3 freezes all rsETH and wrsETH reserves across deployments, sets LTV to zero. DeFi contagion triggers reported $8–10 billion in deposit outflows from Aave. Bloomberg reports incident as largest crypto hack of 2026.(2026-04-19:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
0ff64eca
↯
According to LayerZero's incident report, a LayerZero Labs developer was socially engineered into cloning a malicious GitHub repository, which installed malware on their system and allowed the attacker to harvest session keys and access LayerZero's RPC cloud environment.(2026-03-06:kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026)event
5ea0bed3
↯
Multiple crypto news outlets report the incident. Osmosis outlines two-step governance recovery plan: seize frozen attacker BTC and draw ~17.19 BTC from community pool to restore 1:1 allBTC backing.(2026-09-09:nomic-chain)event
3cc2a7fd
↯
The Nomic chain appears to halt.(2026-09-07:nomic-chain)event
53e981a7
↯
Nomic ceases producing Bitcoin checkpoints, triggering investigation by Osmosis into its reserves.(2026-09-06:nomic-chain)event
c434365e
↯
On-chain researcher Rarma later traces approximately 671.1 ETH in liquidated proceeds to Tornado Cash via Ethereum, representing roughly $1 million in cashed-out funds.(2026-07-17:nomic-chain)event
33b53926
↯
Attacker exploits a double-spend vulnerability in Nomic's custom IBC forwarding mechanism, beginning to mint approximately 40.650602 unbacked nBTC across approximately 25 cross-chain transfers to Osmosis.(2026-06-25:nomic-chain)event
ac5af22d
↯
Nomic's official social media account publishes its last post, according to later reporting by Protos. GitHub commit activity also reportedly ceases around this period.(2024-01-01:nomic-chain)event
69feaecb
↯
Nomic Stakenet launches, releasing NOM staking token via ATOM airdrop and activating the nBTC Bitcoin bridge.(2023-01-01:nomic-chain)event
cf98ee77
↯
Nomic development begins by early Cosmos contributors at Turbofish, led by CEO Matt Bell.(2018-01-01:nomic-chain)event
c3e8bca8
↯
Fetch.ai publishes a preliminary on-chain attack analysis on ASI:One platform, attributing the root cause to a compromised backend signature key for the SingularityNET cross-chain bridge. Fetch.ai and SingularityNET jointly deactivate affected wallets and contracts.(2026-09-20:fetch-ai-nunet-cross-project-exploit-september-2026)event
484f693d
↯
Nostra issued public statement confirming the pause, warning users against wallet-connect scams, and indicating a detailed post-mortem would follow. Final loss figures and recovery status remained unconfirmed.(2026-09-18:nostra-finance)event
7a1cafc0
↯
Borrowed proceeds were routed through AVNU, Ekubo, and JediSwap on Starknet. Nostra detected the exploit and paused all supply, borrow, withdrawal, and liquidation functions.(2026-09-17:nostra-finance)event
653467c7
↯
Nostra paused borrowing against xSTRK and sSTRK after price feed errors inflated their oracle values approximately three times within a narrow block range. No confirmed financial losses reported.(2025-03-24:nostra-finance)event
b1e303c2
↯
NSTR governance token distributed via airdrop. Founder David Garai stepped down as CEO shortly thereafter.(2024-06-01:nostra-finance)event
32f88b94
↯
Nostra launched nstSTRK liquid staking token on Starknet.(2024-03-01:nostra-finance)event
3cd68be0
↯
On-chain investigator ZachXBT publicly accuses zkSNARKs of extracting an estimated $17 million via the auction while delivering no promised utility, governance, or partnerships; story is quickly picked up by PANews, KuCoin, Cryptonomist, Cryptobriefing, Phemex, and other crypto-native outlets.(2026-09-19:zksnarks-zcash-nft-project)event
a80c3e1c
↯
NFT-community figure Leonidas (LeonidasNFT) publicly alleges the zkSNARKs team was previously involved in Ordinals-related projects characterized as scams; claim remains unverified.(2026-09-18:zksnarks-zcash-nft-project)event
64ec5cf8
↯
zkSNARKs blind auction on the Zilkroad marketplace closes, selling 8,000 of 10,000 NFTs at a uniform clearing price of 1.5 ZEC after drawing 16,971 bids.(2026-09-17:zksnarks-zcash-nft-project)event
e03aec28
↯
ThreatFabric publishes full technical disclosure of Manic. Kaspersky publishes parallel analysis. SecurityWeek, The Hacker News, Security Affairs, and other outlets report on the disclosure.(2026-08-22:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
b1e92832
↯
Manic C2 infrastructure confirmed live, with panel and API active through approximately July 28, 2026.(2026-07-24:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
1333c9d2
↯
Updated Manic wrapper deployed with in-memory DEX loading, enhanced anti-analysis protections, lock-screen secret phishing, and launcher-hiding behavior.(2026-07-13:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
fbff3459
↯
First retained Manic wrapper and implant samples appear in late May 2026, using a booking-app lure.(2026-05-01:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
a1f0b7fc
↯
Manic production C2 services come online in late March to April 2026.(2026-03-01:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
e1b8b9ba
↯
First Manic-associated infrastructure domains registered, per ThreatFabric analysis.(2026-02-01:manic-android-banking-trojan)event
6c6b3c85
↯
eSecurity Planet publishes further coverage summarizing Manic's bank-account-draining capability and offline mesh exfiltration.(2026-08-31:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
76f91d16
↯
Kaspersky publishes its own analysis of Manic on the Kaspersky Daily blog, corroborating ThreatFabric's findings on offline data exfiltration and credential theft.(2026-08:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
51a6d044
↯
BleepingComputer publishes coverage of Manic's Wi-Fi/Bluetooth mesh exfiltration technique, including Google's statement that no apps containing the malware were found on Google Play.(2026-08-20:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
e0808f4a
↯
Following a development hiatus, a reworked Manic build is deployed with stronger anti-analysis protections, in-memory DEX loading, and new lock-screen secret theft capability; a new operator panel/API is also introduced.(2026-07:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
cca497aa
↯
The first retained malware wrapper and implant appear, using a booking-app lure for initial distribution.(2026-05:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
944af832
↯
Development and production services supporting the Manic campaign begin to come online, per ThreatFabric's infrastructure timeline (dated to late March/April 2026).(2026-03:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
3c9072ce
↯
First infrastructure associated with the Manic campaign (domain registration under a fabricated persona) is registered, marking the earliest traced activity of the malware family.(2026-02:manic-android-banking-trojan-crypto-wallet-targeting-malware)event
574b71aa
↯
Multiple crypto news outlets — including CryptoBriefing, Cryptonomist, KuCoin News, Phemex News, and ChainCatcher — publish coverage of ZachXBT's allegations. No response from the zkSNARKs team is reported.(2026-09-19:zksnarks-nft-zcash)event
1b2df0b4
↯
NFT community figure LeonidasNFT publicly alleges that members of the anonymous zkSNARKs team were previously involved in Ordinals-related scam projects. The claims are unverified and no named individuals or specific prior projects have been confirmed.(2026-09-18:zksnarks-nft-zcash)event
892d491f
↯
48-hour blind auction for 8,000 zkSNARKs NFTs concludes on Zilkroad at a clearing price of 1.5 ZEC per unit, generating approximately 25,305 ZEC (~$36.94 million) in total bid volume. Approximately 13,309 ZEC (~$19.43 million) is refunded to unsuccessful bidders; the project retains approximately 12,000 ZEC (~$17.5 million).(2026-09-17:zksnarks-nft-zcash)event
c30b30bb
↯
Security Boulevard published a follow-up article featuring additional expert commentary (Sectigo, DataVisor, Black Duck) framing the campaign as a consent-phishing-style social engineering attack.(2026-09-01:fake-crypto-aml-checker-drainer-campaign)event
4b0d4908
Data refreshes within about 10 minutes · All metrics derived from Supabase