← Bond Protocol16 decisions on this page
Audit log
Every state-changing event for Bond Protocol: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.
- #1publishby system:backfill2026-05-30 12:14:53ZScore: ? → ? (no score change)anchoranchored
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35zJzpvvtYSU…3xP9aUTqexplorer ↗- hash
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verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (12978 B) ▸
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","kind":"publish","page_slug":"bond-protocol","published_at":"2026-05-30T12:14:53.891Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Bond Protocol","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Introducing Bond Protocol — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/introducing-bond-protocol-8476881f84e4"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OIP-104: Deploy Permissionless OP as Bond Protocol — OlympusDAO Forum","type":"official","url":"https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/1243-oip-104-deploy-permissionless-op-as-bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OlympusDAO Vote to Split Olympus Pro and Rename as Bond Protocol — TokenInsight","type":"news_article","url":"https://tokeninsight.com/en/news/olympusdao-s-vote-to-split-olympus-pro-and-rename-as-bond-protocol-approved"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol — IQ.wiki","type":"research","url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/bond-protocol"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Bond Protocol Incident Report — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-incident-report-e0aa1dfdeab"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Hacker Drains $300,000 from Olympus DAO on Bond Protocol — The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/178927/hacker-drains-olympus-dao"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Explained: The OlympusDAO Hack (October 2022) — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-olympusdao-hack-october-2022"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OlympusDAO Suffer $300K Exploit, White Hat Hacker Returns All Funds — BeInCrypto","type":"news_article","url":"https://beincrypto.com/olympusdao-suffer-300k-exploit-white-hat-hacker-returns-all-funds/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Olympus DAO Bond Protocol Missing Validation Exploit — Medium","type":"research","url":"https://medium.com/@dragotanqueray/olympus-dao-bond-protocol-missing-validation-exploit-d486a6e692d1"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Bond Protocol Incident Report — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-incident-report-e0aa1dfdeab"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit February 2023 — sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond (GitHub)","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond/blob/main/README.md"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit June 2023 — sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond (GitHub)","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit Issues — sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond-judging (GitHub)","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond-judging/issues"},{"credibility":2,"name":"How Bond Protocol Simulates User Interactions to Keep Users Safe — GuardianUI on Medium","type":"research","url":"https://medium.com/guardianui/how-bond-protocol-simulates-user-interactions-to-keep-users-safe-c3fc8f02c755"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Announcing Our $2.5M Seed Round — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/announcing-our-2-5m-seed-round-ff5891ffa654"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol — Alchemy Dapps","type":"other","url":"https://www.alchemy.com/dapps/bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OIP-104: Deploy Permissionless OP as Bond Protocol — OlympusDAO Forum","type":"official","url":"https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/1243-oip-104-deploy-permissionless-op-as-bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond-Protocol GitHub Organization","type":"official","url":"https://github.com/bond-protocol"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol TVL Stats and Charts — DeFiLlama","type":"on_chain","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol Q2 2023 Report — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-q2-2023-report-294f1182807a"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Pendle Bonds on Bond Protocol — Pendle Finance Twitter/X","type":"social_media","url":"https://x.com/pendle_fi/status/1638178409741430790"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol — IQ.wiki","type":"research","url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/bond-protocol"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"ZachXBT — Investigations Archive (Mirror)","type":"research","url":"https://zachxbt.mirror.xyz/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Investigations By ZachXBT — Paragraph","type":"research","url":"https://paragraph.com/@investigations"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Biggest DeFi Hacks in October 2022 — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/biggest-defi-hacks-in-october-2022"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bondly Finance Hack Explained (July 2021) — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-bondly-finance-hack-july-2021"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"What is Bonding (DeFi)? Definition, Examples, Risks — Cube Exchange","type":"research","url":"https://www.cube.exchange/what-is/bonding-defi"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Olympus DAO — DeFiLlama","type":"on_chain","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/olympus-dao"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol General FAQ — Official Docs","type":"official","url":"https://docs.bondprotocol.finance/general-faq"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Olympus DAO Might Be the Future of Money (or It Might Be a Ponzi) — CoinDesk","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/12/05/olympus-dao-might-be-the-future-of-money-or-it-might-be-a-ponzi"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Bond Protocol Incident Report — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-incident-report-e0aa1dfdeab"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Hacker Drains $300,000 from Olympus DAO on Bond Protocol — The Block","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/178927/hacker-drains-olympus-dao"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Explained: The OlympusDAO Hack (October 2022) — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-olympusdao-hack-october-2022"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OlympusDAO Suffer $300K Exploit, White Hat Hacker Returns All Funds — BeInCrypto","type":"news_article","url":"https://beincrypto.com/olympusdao-suffer-300k-exploit-white-hat-hacker-returns-all-funds/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Introducing Bond Protocol — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/introducing-bond-protocol-8476881f84e4"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Announcing Our $2.5M Seed Round — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/announcing-our-2-5m-seed-round-ff5891ffa654"},{"credibility":2,"name":"OIP-104: Deploy Permissionless OP as Bond Protocol — OlympusDAO Forum","type":"official","url":"https://forum.olympusdao.finance/d/1243-oip-104-deploy-permissionless-op-as-bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit February 2023 — GitHub","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond/blob/main/README.md"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit June 2023 — GitHub","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sherlock Audit Issues (February 2023) — GitHub","type":"research","url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond-judging/issues"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol TVL Stats and Charts — DeFiLlama","type":"on_chain","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol — IQ.wiki","type":"research","url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/bond-protocol"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Biggest DeFi Hacks in October 2022 — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/biggest-defi-hacks-in-october-2022"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bond Protocol Q2 2023 Report — Bond Protocol Medium","type":"official","url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-q2-2023-report-294f1182807a"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Olympus DAO Bond Protocol Missing Validation Exploit — Medium","type":"research","url":"https://medium.com/@dragotanqueray/olympus-dao-bond-protocol-missing-validation-exploit-d486a6e692d1"},{"credibility":2,"name":"How Bond Protocol Simulates User Interactions — GuardianUI on Medium","type":"research","url":"https://medium.com/guardianui/how-bond-protocol-simulates-user-interactions-to-keep-users-safe-c3fc8f02c755"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Olympus DAO Might Be the Future of Money (or It Might Be a Ponzi) — CoinDesk","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/12/05/olympus-dao-might-be-the-future-of-money-or-it-might-be-a-ponzi"},{"credibility":2,"name":"ZachXBT — Investigations Archive (Mirror)","type":"research","url":"https://zachxbt.mirror.xyz/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Investigations By ZachXBT — Paragraph","type":"research","url":"https://paragraph.com/@investigations"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Bondly Finance Hack Explained (July 2021) — Halborn","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-bondly-finance-hack-july-2021"}],"summary":"Bond Protocol is a permissionless bonds-as-a-service platform for DeFi, spun out of OlympusDAO's Olympus Pro product via a governance vote in mid-2022. In October 2022 — just weeks after its public launch — the protocol's Fixed-Expiry Teller smart contract was exploited for approximately $300,000 in OHM tokens due to a missing input validation vulnerability that had evaded three prior independent audits. The attacker ultimately returned all funds, the team underwent re-auditing with Zellic and Sherlock, and the protocol raised $2.5M in seed funding, though its TVL has since declined to minimal levels.","timeline":[{"date":"2021-09-01","event":"OlympusDAO launches Olympus Pro, the bonding-as-a-service marketplace that becomes the direct predecessor to Bond Protocol.","source":"OlympusDAO Medium","source_url":"https://olympusdao.medium.com/introducing-olympus-pro-d8db3052fca5"},{"date":"2022-07-15","event":"Bond Protocol formally announced as a standalone entity spun out of OlympusDAO's Olympus Pro following OIP-104 governance vote approval.","source":"Bond Protocol Medium","source_url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/introducing-bond-protocol-8476881f84e4"},{"date":"2022-10-03","event":"Bond Protocol dApp goes live on mainnet, offering permissionless bond market creation for any token pair.","source":"Bond Protocol Medium","source_url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/introducing-bond-protocol-8476881f84e4"},{"date":"2022-10-06","event":"Bond Protocol announces a $2.5M seed round led by Chapter One and IDEO CoLab Ventures, with Alchemy Ventures and Hypersphere Ventures participating.","source":"Bond Protocol Medium","source_url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/announcing-our-2-5m-seed-round-ff5891ffa654"},{"date":"2022-10-21","event":"Fixed-Expiry Teller smart contract exploited for 30,437 OHM (~$300,000). Attacker deploys counterfeit bond tokens and exploits missing input validation in the redeem() function. Funds are returned within hours following negotiation.","source":"Bond Protocol Incident Report — Medium","source_url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-incident-report-e0aa1dfdeab"},{"date":"2022-10-21","event":"Bond Protocol closes all Fixed-Expiry markets and begins working with Zellic on a full re-audit of the codebase.","source":"Bond Protocol Incident Report — Medium","source_url":"https://medium.com/@Bond_Protocol/bond-protocol-incident-report-e0aa1dfdeab"},{"date":"2023-02-01","event":"First Sherlock competitive audit of Bond Protocol conducted, covering new oracle-based auctioneers, fixed price auctioneer, Chainlink oracle, and batch auction wrapper contracts.","source":"Sherlock Audit — GitHub","source_url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-bond/blob/main/README.md"},{"date":"2023-06-01","event":"Second Sherlock competitive audit conducted, covering Bond Protocol's Options Liquidity Mining (OLM) system and related contracts.","source":"Sherlock Audit — GitHub","source_url":"https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond"},{"date":"2023-10-01","event":"Bond Protocol launches the DAOversified podcast focused on DAO treasury management and operations.","source":"Bond Protocol — IQ.wiki","source_url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/bond-protocol"},{"date":"2026-05-01","event":"Bond Protocol TVL measured at approximately $75,900 on DeFiLlama, down sharply from peak activity levels in 2022-2023.","source":"DeFiLlama — Bond Protocol","source_url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/bond-protocol"}]},"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 53da7b7f-ad30-4cfb-888c-f82af37ceb05 - #2reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-08-19 01:41:36ZScore: 42 → 42 (no score change)The verifiable claims on this page (spin-out from OlympusDAO, the October 2022 Fixed-Expiry Teller exploit and its ~$300K/full-recovery outcome, the $2.5M seed round, post-incident re-auditing, and the current near-zero TVL) are all independently corroborated by credible, mostly non-official sources and are presented without unhedged fraud language. The one factual defect found is a timeline omission/mischaracterization: the page's 'first' post-incident Sherlock audit (Feb 2023) was actually preceded by a November 2022 Sherlock contest and a November 2022 Zellic re-audit, both omitted — an error that, if anything, makes Bond Protocol's remediation look slower than it was, i.e. the record is more favorable to the entity than the page states. The larger caveat is structural: every section body in the review input was empty, so this review could only validate the summary and timeline, not the page's actual prose — that is a gap in the review process itself, not a finding about the page's accuracy.anchoranchored
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{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:36.746Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":42,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"The verifiable claims on this page (spin-out from OlympusDAO, the October 2022 Fixed-Expiry Teller exploit and its ~$300K/full-recovery outcome, the $2.5M seed round, post-incident re-auditing, and the current near-zero TVL) are all independently corroborated by credible, mostly non-official sources and are presented without unhedged fraud language. The one factual defect found is a timeline omission/mischaracterization: the page's 'first' post-incident Sherlock audit (Feb 2023) was actually preceded by a November 2022 Sherlock contest and a November 2022 Zellic re-audit, both omitted — an error that, if anything, makes Bond Protocol's remediation look slower than it was, i.e. the record is more favorable to the entity than the page states. The larger caveat is structural: every section body in the review input was empty, so this review could only validate the summary and timeline, not the page's actual prose — that is a gap in the review process itself, not a finding about the page's accuracy.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision fd9980ee-989c-473d-bb71-44bdac106235 - #3review approve with notesby judgejudge2026-08-19 01:41:36ZScore: 42 → 58 (+16)This is a calibration correction, not a content dispute: every material factual claim on the page is independently corroborated (claim_findings[0]-[6]) and disputed_pct is 0.18 with zero disputed findings, so the page's substance is not in question. The current score of 42 (WARNING) reflects treatment appropriate to own-fraud or negligence conduct, but the entity's only incident is a suffered smart-contract exploit (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b') with same-day full fund recovery, a transparent public postmortem, and a substantive multi-audit remediation program — no own-fraud, exit-scam, or misappropriation finding exists anywhere in the review. Per the rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a 'suffered' incident with no fraud finding caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69); 58 places the entity in the lower-middle of that band, reflecting both the exculpatory recovery/remediation record and the residual concerns (bug missed by multiple prior audits, near-zero current TVL and thin team) that argue against a higher placement. Notes: (Add the November 2022 Sherlock audit contest (sherlock-audit/2022-11-bond-judging) to the timeline — the Feb 2023 contest was not the first post-incident audit, and the omission currently understates how quickly the team responded.) (Confirm the 'Bondly Finance Hack Explained (July 2021)' Halborn citation is clearly labeled as an unrelated, similarly-named project and not presented in a way a skimming reader could conflate with Bond Protocol.) (Verify the ZachXBT citations (zachxbt.mirror.xyz, paragraph.com/@investigations) are entity-specific reporting on Bond Protocol; if they are only general archive landing pages, remove them or label as general context.) (Add coverage of current operational thinness (third-party data showing headcount near 1) alongside the existing TVL-decline note.)anchoranchored
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{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T01:41:36.746Z","decision":"review_approve_with_notes","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":58,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a calibration correction, not a content dispute: every material factual claim on the page is independently corroborated (claim_findings[0]-[6]) and disputed_pct is 0.18 with zero disputed findings, so the page's substance is not in question. The current score of 42 (WARNING) reflects treatment appropriate to own-fraud or negligence conduct, but the entity's only incident is a suffered smart-contract exploit (calibration_assessment.incident_attributions[0], attribution 'b') with same-day full fund recovery, a transparent public postmortem, and a substantive multi-audit remediation program — no own-fraud, exit-scam, or misappropriation finding exists anywhere in the review. Per the rubric's fraud-likelihood semantics, a 'suffered' incident with no fraud finding caps severity at CAUTIONARY (50-69); 58 places the entity in the lower-middle of that band, reflecting both the exculpatory recovery/remediation record and the residual concerns (bug missed by multiple prior audits, near-zero current TVL and thin team) that argue against a higher placement. Notes: (Add the November 2022 Sherlock audit contest (sherlock-audit/2022-11-bond-judging) to the timeline — the Feb 2023 contest was not the first post-incident audit, and the omission currently understates how quickly the team responded.) (Confirm the 'Bondly Finance Hack Explained (July 2021)' Halborn citation is clearly labeled as an unrelated, similarly-named project and not presented in a way a skimming reader could conflate with Bond Protocol.) (Verify the ZachXBT citations (zachxbt.mirror.xyz, paragraph.com/@investigations) are entity-specific reporting on Bond Protocol; if they are only general archive landing pages, remove them or label as general context.) (Add coverage of current operational thinness (third-party data showing headcount near 1) alongside the existing TVL-decline note.)","score_delta":16,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision edf0f82d-e87a-42ec-affc-5168e747dbae - #4reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-08-25 07:51:36ZScore: 62 → 62 (no score change)The page's central narrative — the October 2022 Fixed-Expiry Teller exploit, its white-hat resolution, the $2.5M seed round, and the three-firm audit history — is well corroborated by independent news, security-research, and auditor-published sources. The main issues found are a likely misattribution of the $3.3M Immunefi bug bounty to 'Bond Protocol' specifically (evidence points to it being OlympusDAO's own program), reliance on the protocol's own self-reported Q1 2023 metrics without independent corroboration, and an understated 'difficult to confirm' framing of current TVL/activity when a concrete current TVL figure was readily discoverable via the page's own cited source.anchoranchored
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{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:51:35.864Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":62,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":62,"reason":"The page's central narrative — the October 2022 Fixed-Expiry Teller exploit, its white-hat resolution, the $2.5M seed round, and the three-firm audit history — is well corroborated by independent news, security-research, and auditor-published sources. The main issues found are a likely misattribution of the $3.3M Immunefi bug bounty to 'Bond Protocol' specifically (evidence points to it being OlympusDAO's own program), reliance on the protocol's own self-reported Q1 2023 metrics without independent corroboration, and an understated 'difficult to confirm' framing of current TVL/activity when a concrete current TVL figure was readily discoverable via the page's own cited source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision d631577b-c6ae-4cd6-8450-7b0e33e3c30a - #5review reviseby judgejudge2026-08-25 07:51:36ZScore: 62 → 54 (-8)Recomputing disputed_pct from the finding array as (disputed + unverifiable) / total_claims gives 3/29 = 10.34%, which places this page just inside the 10-30% revise band rather than the approve band the reviewer's rounded 0.10 figure suggests (claim_findings[11], [21], [22]). The one disputed claim is a moderate issue: the page attributes a $3.3M Immunefi bug bounty to Bond Protocol's own program, but independently consulted sources tie that bounty to OlympusDAO's program, and a Bond-Protocol-specific Immunefi URL 404s (claim_findings[11]). The two unverifiable items are comparatively minor - a vague, unnamed 'third-party database' claim and per-chain bonding counts sourced only to an unfetchable self-report (claim_findings[21], [22]). Weighing against these issues, the page's core narrative held up well: the October 2022 exploit mechanics, dollar figures, and white-hat return were corroborated across four independent sources, and the three-firm audit trail (yAcademy, Sherlock, Zellic) was verified against each auditor's own published repositories rather than taken on the protocol's word (claim_findings[13], [17]). A high-priority coverage gap - no on-chain transaction hashes cited for the exploit - further supports a revise rather than approve outcome, and reviewer confidence (0.72) is high enough that no additional softening is warranted.anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 443,512,602
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4sU82KZH2SUT…TAJAijdZexplorer ↗- hash
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verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1717 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:51:35.864Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":54,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":62,"reason":"Recomputing disputed_pct from the finding array as (disputed + unverifiable) / total_claims gives 3/29 = 10.34%, which places this page just inside the 10-30% revise band rather than the approve band the reviewer's rounded 0.10 figure suggests (claim_findings[11], [21], [22]). The one disputed claim is a moderate issue: the page attributes a $3.3M Immunefi bug bounty to Bond Protocol's own program, but independently consulted sources tie that bounty to OlympusDAO's program, and a Bond-Protocol-specific Immunefi URL 404s (claim_findings[11]). The two unverifiable items are comparatively minor - a vague, unnamed 'third-party database' claim and per-chain bonding counts sourced only to an unfetchable self-report (claim_findings[21], [22]). Weighing against these issues, the page's core narrative held up well: the October 2022 exploit mechanics, dollar figures, and white-hat return were corroborated across four independent sources, and the three-firm audit trail (yAcademy, Sherlock, Zellic) was verified against each auditor's own published repositories rather than taken on the protocol's word (claim_findings[13], [17]). A high-priority coverage gap - no on-chain transaction hashes cited for the exploit - further supports a revise rather than approve outcome, and reviewer confidence (0.72) is high enough that no additional softening is warranted.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 43886b0a-0a41-4a4f-a1ba-059f9b76ae4f - #6reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-17 08:27:17ZScore: 54 → 54 (no score change)The page's core narrative — permissionless bonding infrastructure spun out of OlympusDAO, a well-documented October 2022 exploit that was fully reimbursed within hours, a credible $2.5M seed round, and a plausible recent slowdown — is well supported by independent reporting (The Block, Decrypt, Halborn, BeInCrypto) and by direct inspection of the cited GitHub organization. The most substantive problem is the audit narrative: the page twice asserts that all three auditors, including Zellic, reviewed the code 'prior to launch'/'prior to the incident,' but Zellic's own published report documents an engagement of October 26–November 2, 2022, which postdates both the October 3 launch and the October 21 exploit — it was a post-incident review, not a pre-incident one. The July 15, 2022 timeline date for Bond Protocol's introduction is also in tension with an independent read of the cited Medium post (which points to July 19), though a different cited source (IQ.wiki) supports July 15, so this is left as unverifiable. Several Q1 2023 metrics (the $22.9M TBV figure, 147% growth, and specific bonding counts) and the Tracxn single-employee claim could not be checked because the primary sources returned HTTP 403 to automated fetches. The most significant gap is the omission of the team's own framing of Bond Protocol's decline: an OlympusDAO RFC describes a direct successor, Axis, citing declining bond-issuer traction, which would meaningfully sharpen the page's vague 'limited recent public disclosures' framing.anchoranchored
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- ●mainnet-betaslot 457,970,074
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5S9kHRUpnb2f…Z2nebCRLexplorer ↗- hash
J8oGiaEj8diA…65g9TLtJsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (2123 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"6662c04726b76c597b5059c6aeb0e8af","decided_at":"2026-10-17T08:27:16.887Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4286,"findings_hash":"4XMkJZdwoXf39Nie85wzpdwodG58fY4g5SH23BbimBUt","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","mode":"findings_only","new_score":54,"page_content_hash":"c4e8c18137f0ffe80fc0ccdd8dfc73c7f76b3c914a4fb2d137ce32e37e447d46","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":54,"reason":"The page's core narrative — permissionless bonding infrastructure spun out of OlympusDAO, a well-documented October 2022 exploit that was fully reimbursed within hours, a credible $2.5M seed round, and a plausible recent slowdown — is well supported by independent reporting (The Block, Decrypt, Halborn, BeInCrypto) and by direct inspection of the cited GitHub organization. The most substantive problem is the audit narrative: the page twice asserts that all three auditors, including Zellic, reviewed the code 'prior to launch'/'prior to the incident,' but Zellic's own published report documents an engagement of October 26–November 2, 2022, which postdates both the October 3 launch and the October 21 exploit — it was a post-incident review, not a pre-incident one. The July 15, 2022 timeline date for Bond Protocol's introduction is also in tension with an independent read of the cited Medium post (which points to July 19), though a different cited source (IQ.wiki) supports July 15, so this is left as unverifiable. Several Q1 2023 metrics (the $22.9M TBV figure, 147% growth, and specific bonding counts) and the Tracxn single-employee claim could not be checked because the primary sources returned HTTP 403 to automated fetches. The most significant gap is the omission of the team's own framing of Bond Protocol's decline: an OlympusDAO RFC describes a direct successor, Axis, citing declining bond-issuer traction, which would meaningfully sharpen the page's vague 'limited recent public disclosures' framing.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 920aa0a5-2bbd-4126-b418-f32597861967 - #7reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-10-29 14:01:50ZScore: 54 → 54 (no score change)The exploit facts (amount, contract, date, return of funds) match The Block. The current-status claim is consistent with DefiLlama's dead-URL flag and near-zero TVL. The page is candid about what it could not verify. Zellic dates and findings, the PitchBook status and the Immunefi $75K bounty could not be independently checked. The Immunefi source is dead. No contradiction of the page was found.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 462,907,361
- sig
5wnX1DjrRuMq…rGKPVZZEexplorer ↗- hash
6ir9AenaSTcr…Y9dMr7Jfsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1246 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"34507b59c48443e73d2241f5ef5d7487","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T14:01:49.874Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.25,"findings_hash":"Hw4P5rfXMfNBprBFBZT3mtWzwncP6P6avAEizKv6Moxh","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":54,"page_content_hash":"48105c444757ad1d0443fddd6afd53f5350ae905d9865affe78034f5e26a4da1","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":54,"reason":"The exploit facts (amount, contract, date, return of funds) match The Block. The current-status claim is consistent with DefiLlama's dead-URL flag and near-zero TVL. The page is candid about what it could not verify. Zellic dates and findings, the PitchBook status and the Immunefi $75K bounty could not be independently checked. The Immunefi source is dead. No contradiction of the page was found.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":4,"sequence_num":7,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 1fd03136-8385-4bb4-9d07-49d08fb0f608 - #8review reviseby judgejudge2026-10-29 14:01:50ZScore: 54 → 49 (-5)The core exploit facts (amount, contract, date, return of funds) were confirmed against The Block (claim_findings[0], [1]), and no claim was disputed. One of four scored claims could not be verified because its cited Immunefi bounty listing is dead (claim_findings[3]), and the DefiLlama TVL claim was only partly checked (claim_findings[4]), which places the page in the 10-30% band (25%). Two of six findings (Zellic report, PitchBook) were blocked to the reviewer and were left out of the percentage; that is a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. The penalty is kept at the light end because the reviewer's confidence was moderate and found no omissions or contradicting status.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 462,907,366
- sig
2BeRWj9CXr1n…7EWuRXLfexplorer ↗- hash
BcN9RpdyU7zq…vKtPJwDksha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1470 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"34507b59c48443e73d2241f5ef5d7487","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T14:01:49.874Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":49,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":54,"reason":"The core exploit facts (amount, contract, date, return of funds) were confirmed against The Block (claim_findings[0], [1]), and no claim was disputed. One of four scored claims could not be verified because its cited Immunefi bounty listing is dead (claim_findings[3]), and the DefiLlama TVL claim was only partly checked (claim_findings[4]), which places the page in the 10-30% band (25%). Two of six findings (Zellic report, PitchBook) were blocked to the reviewer and were left out of the percentage; that is a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. The penalty is kept at the light end because the reviewer's confidence was moderate and found no omissions or contradicting status.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-5,"score_limit":{"applied":-5,"limited":true,"proposed":-8,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-5},"scored_claims":4,"sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision a3a7d0f5-6c46-4d8e-a33c-eac4c0cc3d03 - #9rescoreby systemsystem2026-11-01 12:37:36ZScore: 49 → 73 (+24)Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 49 → 73. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.7; legitimacy credit long-running +8; fact-check adjustments (+3) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,095,427
- sig
5cDoHWQcjM9S…iKqiph39explorer ↗- hash
E5hWuZZA8HYc…JEzW3YW2sha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (685 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-01T12:37:36.453Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":73,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":49,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 49 → 73. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.7; legitimacy credit long-running +8; fact-check adjustments (+3) now shown as page reliability, not in the score.","score_delta":24,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":9,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 17cf97b5-38ba-4c6d-a373-826ee9fc5e9c - #10reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-01 17:56:12ZScore: 73 → 73 (no score change)The October 2022 exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt: date, amount, function, PeckShield, return of funds, the $217M figure and the audit statement all match. The 2026 TVL collapse and the seed round could not be verified because the sources were blocked or aggregator-only, and the page hedges both appropriately. No contradictions were found. The current status of the project is undetermined.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,183,984
- sig
5rCRaRimV2ZP…JMi5Q2uXexplorer ↗- hash
5KFh8hwjkHTX…XkE3gYBgsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1268 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"0f8cd02cec139674d2e345f5018f2bbf","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T17:56:12.886Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2,"findings_hash":"HATnVXgj5Yu3fj8RX1noegkPWikEFfw5EYo5a2gseguQ","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":73,"page_content_hash":"8207ba4b6dc7cbb6a7c024fae0b0f3c74efee444760933a2c716063c1f5d8622","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":73,"reason":"The October 2022 exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt: date, amount, function, PeckShield, return of funds, the $217M figure and the audit statement all match. The 2026 TVL collapse and the seed round could not be verified because the sources were blocked or aggregator-only, and the page hedges both appropriately. No contradictions were found. The current status of the project is undetermined.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":5,"sequence_num":10,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 67e14bdd-da7e-48fc-af72-9aefbae2ee45 - #11review reviseby judgejudge2026-11-01 17:56:13ZScore: 73 → 73 (no score change)The October 2022 exploit account, which is the page's core allegation, was confirmed by The Block and Decrypt on date, amount, function, PeckShield attribution, fund return and the audit statement (claim_findings[0-2]). One of the six checked claims, the $2.5M seed round, could not be verified beyond an aggregator (claim_findings[5]), which gives a disputed share of 1 in 5 (20%) after leaving out the blocked DeFiLlama TVL claim (claim_findings[3]). The page already hedges both the seed round and the 2026 TVL decline. The current-status and 2026 TVL coverage gap is high priority and reviewer confidence is low (0.5), so the penalty is kept at the low end of the minor band.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,183,989
- sig
3kgzATyGq1X2…k25GvHZFexplorer ↗- hash
AfwLZwcfjB8R…7JoR29Tfsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1360 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"0f8cd02cec139674d2e345f5018f2bbf","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T17:56:12.886Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2,"investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":73,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":73,"reason":"The October 2022 exploit account, which is the page's core allegation, was confirmed by The Block and Decrypt on date, amount, function, PeckShield attribution, fund return and the audit statement (claim_findings[0-2]). One of the six checked claims, the $2.5M seed round, could not be verified beyond an aggregator (claim_findings[5]), which gives a disputed share of 1 in 5 (20%) after leaving out the blocked DeFiLlama TVL claim (claim_findings[3]). The page already hedges both the seed round and the 2026 TVL decline. The current-status and 2026 TVL coverage gap is high priority and reviewer confidence is low (0.5), so the penalty is kept at the low end of the minor band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":5,"sequence_num":11,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision cfeef518-7d9e-43b1-ae4e-1f5b0d029f2b - #12rescoreby systemsystem2026-11-01 21:52:22ZScore: 73 → 74 (+1)Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-01). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 73 → 74. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.3; legitimacy credit long-running +8.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,249,994
- sig
2GREXXLSkQvG…9yKBXxMwexplorer ↗- hash
7cv5ff1ZugxU…QhamNuZWsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (710 B) ▸
{"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-11-01T21:52:21.589Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":74,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":73,"reason":"Re-read and rescored after the page was re-researched (2026-11-01). Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 73 → 74. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −0.3; legitimacy credit long-running +8.","score_delta":1,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":12,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision d130de8b-ee00-4f8e-b2d7-6487f8ed97e8 - #13reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-01 21:53:54ZScore: 74 → 74 (no score change)The October 2022 exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt on amount, date, attribution, auditors, bounty and the funds being returned. The seed round, PitchBook status and 2026 TVL figures are hedged by the page itself and could only be partly checked because of 403s and truncated API data. No contradicting current information or shutdown announcement was found. The only omission is minor: the reported $75k bounty paid to the attacker.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,250,421
- sig
dwtSah5xicQT…pVX3Lfnjexplorer ↗- hash
J8f7275JHUfj…w5hdRxiRsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1342 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"064751b63fe56b10f678be85e16a7f37","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T21:53:54.757Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"94DiaL6GAK2s6sd4myaJYD1hgExbCxWXn4z4CgF7mKjp","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":74,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":1},"page_content_hash":"842caba0fad721c7a4cbe0c4012b248614764e60e30a8112c93a02846d66b424","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":74,"reason":"The October 2022 exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt on amount, date, attribution, auditors, bounty and the funds being returned. The seed round, PitchBook status and 2026 TVL figures are hedged by the page itself and could only be partly checked because of 403s and truncated API data. No contradicting current information or shutdown announcement was found. The only omission is minor: the reported $75k bounty paid to the attacker.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":13,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision ebf815c0-8f7c-43a4-8ec6-90a6e1604879 - #14review reviseby judgejudge2026-11-01 21:53:55ZScore: 74 → 74 (no score change)None of the checkable claims were disputed. claim_findings[0] to [4] (the October 2022 exploit amount, date, PeckShield attribution, auditors, bounty and same-day return) were confirmed by The Block and Decrypt, and claim_findings[6] (the October 2026 TVL collapse) was partly confirmed. Three of nine findings (the seed round, the PitchBook status and the 2023 all-time-high TVL) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer or the data was truncated; these are left out of the percentage and are a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. The calculated dispute rate is 0%, but the review has an open high-priority coverage gap on the project's official 2026 status, the only current-status claim on the page, and reviewer confidence is moderate (0.55), so the verdict is a small revision rather than a plain approval. The only omission, a reported $75k bounty paid to the attacker, is minor and does not change the verdict.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 464,250,426
- sig
3QArAa4Nouk6…ovM6Pcxfexplorer ↗- hash
J69Eyqyv6yPg…dMNnRAehsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (2712 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"064751b63fe56b10f678be85e16a7f37","band_override":{"actual_delta":-5,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0,"expected_delta_range":[0,0],"expected_verdict":"review_approve","rationale":"None of the checkable claims were disputed. claim_findings[0] to [4] (the October 2022 exploit amount, date, PeckShield attribution, auditors, bounty and same-day return) were confirmed by The Block and Decrypt, and claim_findings[6] (the October 2026 TVL collapse) was partly confirmed. Three of nine findings (the seed round, the PitchBook status and the 2023 all-time-high TVL) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer or the data was truncated; these are left out of the percentage and are a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. The calculated dispute rate is 0%, but the review has an open high-priority coverage gap on the project's official 2026 status, the only current-status claim on the page, and reviewer confidence is moderate (0.55), so the verdict is a small revision rather than a plain approval. The only omission, a reported $75k bounty paid to the attacker, is minor and does not change the verdict."},"blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T21:53:54.757Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":74,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":74,"reason":"None of the checkable claims were disputed. claim_findings[0] to [4] (the October 2022 exploit amount, date, PeckShield attribution, auditors, bounty and same-day return) were confirmed by The Block and Decrypt, and claim_findings[6] (the October 2026 TVL collapse) was partly confirmed. Three of nine findings (the seed round, the PitchBook status and the 2023 all-time-high TVL) could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer or the data was truncated; these are left out of the percentage and are a coverage limit, not a defect of the page. The calculated dispute rate is 0%, but the review has an open high-priority coverage gap on the project's official 2026 status, the only current-status claim on the page, and reviewer confidence is moderate (0.55), so the verdict is a small revision rather than a plain approval. The only omission, a reported $75k bounty paid to the attacker, is minor and does not change the verdict.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":14,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 33d37d3c-1d71-48e5-9aa1-7652f78b81b0 - #15reviewby reviewerreviewer2026-11-17 21:28:36ZScore: 74 → 74 (no score change)The exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt. The TVL collapse is real and dated correctly, but exact dollar figures could only be checked against the Ethereum series, where they differ slightly. The page appropriately hedges the unconfirmed shutdown. The Zellic re-audit and seed-round details were not verified.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,684,668
- sig
5LfM7bA7ZBZa…Lqr2Ja7uexplorer ↗- hash
4YiKeqKuW4yu…NLWT82HWsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1179 B) ▸
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"7fd06d0f96f28a99c76e8380d3cda613","blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:28:36.689Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"FNpUy7ZehkjZWWSenDzGMNqhJevw8cpD367ERguuUze8","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":74,"page_content_hash":"925c90528ba07716a6d697e0297024d989cd9888fff7c229fa43919df345e468","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":74,"reason":"The exploit narrative is well supported by The Block and Decrypt. The TVL collapse is real and dated correctly, but exact dollar figures could only be checked against the Ethereum series, where they differ slightly. The page appropriately hedges the unconfirmed shutdown. The Zellic re-audit and seed-round details were not verified.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":15,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision 6046b416-5c90-44a4-b4df-906d86e862c9 - #16review approveby judgejudge2026-11-17 21:28:37ZScore: 74 → 74 (no score change)None of the eight claim findings was disputed. The core exploit account (claim_findings[0] to [2]) was confirmed by Tier 1 sources The Block and Decrypt, and the hedged statement about no shutdown announcement (claim_findings[6]) was confirmed. The TVL figures (claim_findings[4], [5]) were only partially supported because the reviewer could check just the Ethereum series, though the date and size of the collapse match. Two findings (the Zellic re-audit and the seed round, claim_findings[3] and [7]) were marked source_blocked and are left out of the percentage, which leaves a disputed share of 0% of 6 scored findings. This is a coverage limit rather than a defect of the page. The review reports no omissions and no conflict with the subject's status.anchoranchored
- chain
- ●mainnet-betaslot 470,684,521
- sig
5sA4UGaiVtds…83v7DLJaexplorer ↗- hash
6W6rT81SEWoN…5huchSxmsha256 → base58
verifying row…full verify ↗canonical bytes (1438 B) ▸
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"7fd06d0f96f28a99c76e8380d3cda613","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-17T21:28:36.689Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":74,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":74,"reason":"None of the eight claim findings was disputed. The core exploit account (claim_findings[0] to [2]) was confirmed by Tier 1 sources The Block and Decrypt, and the hedged statement about no shutdown announcement (claim_findings[6]) was confirmed. The TVL figures (claim_findings[4], [5]) were only partially supported because the reviewer could check just the Ethereum series, though the date and size of the collapse match. Two findings (the Zellic re-audit and the seed round, claim_findings[3] and [7]) were marked source_blocked and are left out of the percentage, which leaves a disputed share of 0% of 6 scored findings. This is a coverage limit rather than a defect of the page. The review reports no omissions and no conflict with the subject's status.","reviewer_def_hash":"fdb97944d5e6ae9b148ae8c41caf98db055a4c751afd15721cb2e08d11dfd37a","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":6,"sequence_num":16,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}Verify offline (run on your own machine)python -m src.verify_decision d9880757-cab7-4691-8b66-aae04128624c
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine —
python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.