Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Bond Protocol
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 62 → 54 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443512602
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T07:51:36.489Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7t1H6hXiecx7ScCSnjNtq2tZMkWZxpPAC5od2XSqXkcD
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1717 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:51:35.864Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","new_score":54,"page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":62,"reason":"Recomputing disputed_pct from the finding array as (disputed + unverifiable) / total_claims gives 3/29 = 10.34%, which places this page just inside the 10-30% revise band rather than the approve band the reviewer's rounded 0.10 figure suggests (claim_findings[11], [21], [22]). The one disputed claim is a moderate issue: the page attributes a $3.3M Immunefi bug bounty to Bond Protocol's own program, but independently consulted sources tie that bounty to OlympusDAO's program, and a Bond-Protocol-specific Immunefi URL 404s (claim_findings[11]). The two unverifiable items are comparatively minor - a vague, unnamed 'third-party database' claim and per-chain bonding counts sourced only to an unfetchable self-report (claim_findings[21], [22]). Weighing against these issues, the page's core narrative held up well: the October 2022 exploit mechanics, dollar figures, and white-hat return were corroborated across four independent sources, and the three-firm audit trail (yAcademy, Sherlock, Zellic) was verified against each auditor's own published repositories rather than taken on the protocol's word (claim_findings[13], [17]). A high-priority coverage gap - no on-chain transaction hashes cited for the exploit - further supports a revise rather than approve outcome, and reviewer confidence (0.72) is high enough that no additional softening is warranted.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}