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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Alpha Homora: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-30 19:10:44Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 423,217,256
    sig
    gtsrAS4mXY5E…5HnrgNN8explorer ↗
    hash
    Htq8AEoK7qqQ…vNAiMekNsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (7623 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"4ffdc414-f996-4307-8fb2-c582485a1622","kind":"publish","page_slug":"alpha-homora","published_at":"2026-05-30T19:10:44.327Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Alpha Homora","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/alpha-finance-lab-rebrands-expands-into-alpha-venture-dao-to-disrupt-web3-ecosystem/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://alphafinancelab.gitbook.io/alpha-finance-lab/alpha-finance-lab-main/alpha-team","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://coinmarketcap.com/cmc-ai/alpha-finance-lab/what-is/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/alpha-homora-v2-post-mortem/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-alpha-homora-defi-hack-feb-2021","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/cream-finance/alpha-homora-v2-exploit-post-mortem-344d277bdea6","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/alpha-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/alpha-finance-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://nodesblock.com/news/review-of-the-37-5-million-theft-of-alpha-finance-hackers-have-inside-information/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/alpha-homora-v2-post-mortem/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/alpha-homora-v2-post-mortem/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://secureum.substack.com/p/making-alpha-safu-secureum-9","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://twitter.com/alphafinancelab/status/1351892956077150210","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.investing.com/news/cryptocurrency-news/openzeppelin-completes-an-audit-of-alpha-homora-v2-2468376","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/216536/iron-bank-freezes-alpha-homora-lending-accounts-over-bad-debt-dispute","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/216832/iron-bank-tells-alpha-homora-to-take-ownership-of-its-bad-debt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/alpha-homora-cedes-32m-user-funds-iron-bank","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/an-open-letter-to-iron-bank/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/@ibdotxyz/timeline-between-iron-bank-alpha-homora-v2-e0bfe75467b8","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/defi-partners-clash-over-32m-bad-debt-iron-bank-alpha-homora/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.alphaventuredao.io/alpha-finance-lab-rebrands-expands-into-alpha-venture-dao-to-disrupt-web3-ecosystem/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/@stellaxyz_/stella-the-leveraged-strategies-protocol-with-0-cost-to-borrow-bad4f89d5cd3","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.gate.com/crypto-wiki/article/stella-alpha-summary-leveraged-yield-farming-reimagined","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/defi-partners-clash-over-32m-bad-debt-iron-bank-alpha-homora/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/alpha-homora-cedes-32m-user-funds-iron-bank","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blockbytes.com/2023/03/08/iron-bank-vs-alpha-homora-protocol-exploits-protocol/","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Alpha Homora is a leveraged yield farming protocol developed by Alpha Finance Lab (later rebranded to Alpha Venture DAO, then Stella) that allows users to take on leveraged positions in liquidity pools. On February 13, 2021, the protocol suffered a critical exploit in which an attacker drained approximately $37.5 million from Iron Bank (C.R.E.A.M. Finance) by exploiting multiple smart contract vulnerabilities in Alpha Homora V2, including a hidden undisclosed sUSD lending pool, a rounding miscalculation in the borrow function, and an unrestricted reserve function callable by anyone. The resulting bad debt between the two protocols remained largely unresolved for years, culminating in a public dispute in 2023 in which Iron Bank froze Alpha Homora user accounts, and Alpha Homora proposed surrendering approximately $32 million in user funds to satisfy the outstanding obligation.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-10-01","event":"Alpha Homora V1 launches on Ethereum, enabling leveraged ETH yield farming.","source":""},{"date":"2021-01-14","event":"Quantstamp completes audit of Alpha Homora V2, identifying 4 high-severity issues all reported as fixed.","source":""},{"date":"2021-01-20","event":"PeckShield completes audit of Alpha Homora V2; no high-severity issues reported.","source":""},{"date":"2021-01-28","event":"Alpha Homora V2 launches on Ethereum mainnet, integrated with Iron Bank for protocol-to-protocol borrowing.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-13","event":"Exploit occurs at 05:37 UTC: attacker drains approximately $37.5 million from Iron Bank via Alpha Homora V2 using a multi-transaction attack exploiting the hidden sUSD pool, a rounding miscalculation, and the publicly callable resolveReserve function.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-13","event":"C.R.E.A.M. Finance pauses all Iron Bank markets and sets Alpha Homora V2 credit limit to zero pending investigation.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-13","event":"Stolen funds routed through Tornado Cash and Curve Aave pool. Attacker sends 1,000 ETH each to Alpha and C.R.E.A.M. deployer addresses.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-14","event":"Alpha Finance Lab releases post-mortem; confirms team has identified a 'prime suspect'; agrees to 20% protocol fee diversion and 50 million ALPHA token collateral to cover Iron Bank debt.","source":""},{"date":"2021-03-01","event":"Alpha Homora V2 relaunches with restricted token support (ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT) and additional security mitigations.","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-31","event":"Alpha Finance Lab rebrands to Alpha Venture DAO, pivoting to a Web3 incubation and DAO governance model while retaining the ALPHA token.","source":""},{"date":"2023-03-02","event":"Iron Bank publicly reports Alpha Homora's outstanding debt at $31,947,429, with only $481,746 repaid in 25 months. Iron Bank freezes Alpha Homora's lending accounts by altering smart contract code.","source":""},{"date":"2023-03-01","event":"Alpha Venture DAO publishes open letter to Iron Bank, characterizing the account freeze as an unauthorized seizure of user funds.","source":""},{"date":"2023-03-01","event":"Alpha Homora proposes that Iron Bank retain approximately $32 million in user-deposited assets to satisfy the outstanding debt obligation.","source":""},{"date":"2023-06-01","event":"Core development team relaunches leveraged DeFi product as Stella on Arbitrum, with a 0% cost-to-borrow Pay-As-You-Earn model.","source":""}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 07102b42-f477-47eb-b7b0-6ad949f48a95
  2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-09-02 00:43:05Z
    Score: 38 → 38 (no score change)
    The page's central narrative — the February 2021 Alpha Homora V2 exploit, its mechanics, the resulting Iron Bank protocol debt, and the 2023 account-freeze dispute — is well corroborated by multiple independent, live, tier-1/tier-2 sources. However, three specific embellishing details (the post-mortem's alleged 'prime suspect' statement, the precise ETH deployer-address transfer breakdown, and the claim that neither auditor caught any part of the exploited vulnerability) do not hold up against the cited or independently reviewed sources, and two sourcing claims (founder names/roles, peak TVL) rely on now-dead links. The page would benefit from a post-2024 update on the dispute's resolution status.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 443,562,460
    sig
    2ePPMZR1MdZD…z1BfAFeYexplorer ↗
    hash
    9LpijAt8Tnec…wwZGzhVBsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1131 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"dc715a95af815aa0dd2065b7901a45a2","decided_at":"2026-09-02T00:43:05.699Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3125,"investigation_id":"4ffdc414-f996-4307-8fb2-c582485a1622","new_score":38,"page_slug":"alpha-homora","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page's central narrative — the February 2021 Alpha Homora V2 exploit, its mechanics, the resulting Iron Bank protocol debt, and the 2023 account-freeze dispute — is well corroborated by multiple independent, live, tier-1/tier-2 sources. However, three specific embellishing details (the post-mortem's alleged 'prime suspect' statement, the precise ETH deployer-address transfer breakdown, and the claim that neither auditor caught any part of the exploited vulnerability) do not hold up against the cited or independently reviewed sources, and two sourcing claims (founder names/roles, peak TVL) rely on now-dead links. The page would benefit from a post-2024 update on the dispute's resolution status.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 948a3011-ea17-49b6-b78a-55bc812e40ad
  3. #3review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-09-02 00:43:05Z
    Score: 38 → 20 (-18)
    The page's central narrative -- the February 2021 Iron Bank exploit via Alpha Homora V2, its mechanics and dollar amounts, and the 2023 Iron Bank account-freeze/debt dispute -- is solidly confirmed by live, independent tier-1 and tier-2 sources (claim_findings[0], [1], [2], [5], [9], [11], [12]). However, the reviewer's 31% disputed rate crosses into significant-issue territory: claim_findings[7] found no support in Alpha's own post-mortem for the page's claim that the team identified a 'prime suspect,' claim_findings[8] found the specific ETH deployer-address transfer breakdown conflicts with an independently reviewed source, and claim_findings[10] found the page overstates auditor failure since PeckShield reportedly did flag the exploited resolveReserve access-control issue. Two additional claims about the founders and peak TVL rely on now-dead links (claim_findings[3]), and a high-priority coverage gap notes the page has not been updated since 2023-2024 despite a 2026 review date. None of the disputed items undermine the core allegation, but the pattern of embellished or unverifiable secondary detail, combined with stale sourcing on a still-open dispute, warrants revision and a period of active monitoring rather than outright approval or denial.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 443,562,463
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    5HczoyTSvxw4…ZXd4NWoQexplorer ↗
    hash
    J4pmc2i5UJXE…jbQqTM2wsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1745 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"dc715a95af815aa0dd2065b7901a45a2","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-09-02T00:43:05.699Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3125,"investigation_id":"4ffdc414-f996-4307-8fb2-c582485a1622","new_score":20,"page_slug":"alpha-homora","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page's central narrative -- the February 2021 Iron Bank exploit via Alpha Homora V2, its mechanics and dollar amounts, and the 2023 Iron Bank account-freeze/debt dispute -- is solidly confirmed by live, independent tier-1 and tier-2 sources (claim_findings[0], [1], [2], [5], [9], [11], [12]). However, the reviewer's 31% disputed rate crosses into significant-issue territory: claim_findings[7] found no support in Alpha's own post-mortem for the page's claim that the team identified a 'prime suspect,' claim_findings[8] found the specific ETH deployer-address transfer breakdown conflicts with an independently reviewed source, and claim_findings[10] found the page overstates auditor failure since PeckShield reportedly did flag the exploited resolveReserve access-control issue. Two additional claims about the founders and peak TVL rely on now-dead links (claim_findings[3]), and a high-priority coverage gap notes the page has not been updated since 2023-2024 despite a 2026 review date. None of the disputed items undermine the core allegation, but the pattern of embellished or unverifiable secondary detail, combined with stale sourcing on a still-open dispute, warrants revision and a period of active monitoring rather than outright approval or denial.","score_delta":-18,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
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