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Agave3 decisions on this page

Audit log

Every state-changing event for Agave: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot taken at submission time, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-28 15:33:46Z
    Score: ?? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
    chain
    mainnet-betaslot 422,748,317
    sig
    49rY9EPDDqLL…AtALfN5qexplorer ↗
    hash
    BxBhVo5ejuqZ…fGi7b4bVsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (4139 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"81f77d2a-2c49-4e61-9298-d94c9922ddbc","kind":"publish","page_slug":"agave","published_at":"2026-05-28T15:33:46.500Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Agave","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/agave-hundred-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.theblock.co/post/137932/defi-protocols-agave-and-hundred-finance-exploited-on-gnosis-chain-for-11-million","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/03/15/defi-lending-protocol-agave-plunges-over-20-amid-exploit-investigation","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://fortune.com/crypto/2022/03/16/crypto-investor-scam-agave-defi/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/agave-hundred-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.vidma.io/blog/the-agave-and-hundred-finance-hack-a-11-7m-reentrancy-exploit","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/immunefi/a-poc-of-the-hundred-finance-heist-4121f23a098","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/unlucky-agave-and-hundred-finance-defi-protocols-exploited-for-11m","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/03/15/defi-lending-protocol-agave-plunges-over-20-amid-exploit-investigation","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/agave","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://x.com/agave_lending","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://fortune.com/crypto/2022/03/16/crypto-investor-scam-agave-defi/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://wiki.1hive.org/projects/agave","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://medium.com/honeyswap/1hive-introduction-to-agave-agve-100e36fe3560","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/agave-token","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/agave-hundred-rekt","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://cryptopotato.com/defi-protocols-agave-hundred-finance-hacked-attacker-steals-11m-worth-of-crypto/","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Agave was a decentralized lending protocol on Gnosis Chain forked from Aave v2, developed by members of the 1Hive community. On March 15, 2022, the protocol suffered a reentrancy exploit that drained approximately $5.5 million in user funds, part of a coordinated $11.7 million attack that simultaneously hit Hundred Finance. The protocol paused operations following the hack and formally closed down in March 2024 with no documented user compensation.","timeline":[{"date":"2021-01-01","event":"Agave protocol launched on xDAI (Gnosis Chain) by the 1Hive community as a fork of Aave v2","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"Reentrancy exploit drains approximately $5.5 million from Agave and $6.2 million from Hundred Finance simultaneously; total losses $11.7 million. Attacker address: 0x0a16a85be44627c10cee75db06b169c7bc76de2c","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"Agave pauses all contracts and announces investigation via Twitter","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"Stolen funds transferred to Tornado Cash within hours of exploit; approximately 4,479 ETH laundered in total across both protocols","source":""},{"date":"2022-03-15","event":"AGVE token price drops more than 20% following public disclosure of exploit","source":""},{"date":"2024-03-25","event":"Agave DAO formally announces closure; redemption portal opened at agavefinance.eth.limo/redeem/ for AGVE token holders","source":""}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 80a55b0c-8e61-4aac-80f5-a72619318ed4
  2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-06-15 18:24:08Z
    Score: 1818 (no score change)
    The factual core of this investigation is accurate and well-supported: the March 15, 2022 reentrancy exploit, the $5.5M Agave / $6.2M Hundred Finance / $11.7M total figures, the Tornado Cash laundering of ~4,479 ETH, the AGVE price drop, and the March 2024 closure are all confirmed by multiple credible sources. The two partially-supported findings are (1) the protocol launch date is listed as 2021-01-01 in the timeline when documented sources confirm a September 1, 2021 launch, and (2) the 'no compensation' assertion is accurate for hack victims but conflates the absence of hack restitution with the AGVE governance-token redemption portal that was opened. No disputed or fabricated claims were found.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    mainnet-betaslot 426,687,961
    sig
    31ja7G4FMZ8y…uXNomgrGexplorer ↗
    hash
    5n3u9ioPp2my…jYkdo15xsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1049 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-15T18:24:08.163Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"81f77d2a-2c49-4e61-9298-d94c9922ddbc","new_score":18,"page_slug":"agave","prev_score":18,"reason":"The factual core of this investigation is accurate and well-supported: the March 15, 2022 reentrancy exploit, the $5.5M Agave / $6.2M Hundred Finance / $11.7M total figures, the Tornado Cash laundering of ~4,479 ETH, the AGVE price drop, and the March 2024 closure are all confirmed by multiple credible sources. The two partially-supported findings are (1) the protocol launch date is listed as 2021-01-01 in the timeline when documented sources confirm a September 1, 2021 launch, and (2) the 'no compensation' assertion is accurate for hack victims but conflates the absence of hack restitution with the AGVE governance-token redemption portal that was opened. No disputed or fabricated claims were found.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 7b15d573-8405-4227-9b2d-d6bed52a4d88
  3. #3review approveby judgejudge
    2026-06-15 18:24:08Z
    Score: 1852 (+34)
    The reviewer confirmed 11 of 13 claims outright and partially supported the remaining 2 — both minor (an imprecise launch date in the timeline, and a nuance around hack-victim vs. governance-token redemption). Disputed claims stand at 0%. The two primary incidents (claim_findings[2] and claim_findings[5]) are both attribution type (b) 'suffered': Agave was exploited by an external attacker through a chain-level token behaviour it did not introduce, and its subsequent closure was an orderly wind-down with no evidence of fraudulent intent. Under the platform's fraud-likelihood scoring rubric, CRITICAL (0–19) is reserved for entities whose own conduct constitutes confirmed fraud, exit scams, or Ponzi schemes. Placing a hack victim at score 18 violates the anti-conflation rule. The reviewer's recommended score of 52 (CAUTIONARY) correctly reflects that the protocol is defunct, users received no hack restitution, and there is a minor unresolved audit-scope gap — without over-penalising for harm the entity suffered rather than caused. A positive delta of +34 is applied to correct this mis-classification.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    mainnet-betaslot 426,687,963
    sig
    5K797shu1zRk…Nh5DBh1Rexplorer ↗
    hash
    6ifAyZEugtFT…K6wApRJGsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1462 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-15T18:24:08.163Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"81f77d2a-2c49-4e61-9298-d94c9922ddbc","new_score":52,"page_slug":"agave","prev_score":18,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 11 of 13 claims outright and partially supported the remaining 2 — both minor (an imprecise launch date in the timeline, and a nuance around hack-victim vs. governance-token redemption). Disputed claims stand at 0%. The two primary incidents (claim_findings[2] and claim_findings[5]) are both attribution type (b) 'suffered': Agave was exploited by an external attacker through a chain-level token behaviour it did not introduce, and its subsequent closure was an orderly wind-down with no evidence of fraudulent intent. Under the platform's fraud-likelihood scoring rubric, CRITICAL (0–19) is reserved for entities whose own conduct constitutes confirmed fraud, exit scams, or Ponzi schemes. Placing a hack victim at score 18 violates the anti-conflation rule. The reviewer's recommended score of 52 (CAUTIONARY) correctly reflects that the protocol is defunct, users received no hack restitution, and there is a minor unresolved audit-scope gap — without over-penalising for harm the entity suffered rather than caused. A positive delta of +34 is applied to correct this mis-classification.","score_delta":34,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision e863f2be-a74d-481c-9828-f21ee77df2b1
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.