Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Agave
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 18 → 52 (+34)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426687963
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-15T18:24:08.580Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6ifAyZEugtFTtfDobrmVGT9G4zhPQg63Gy6AK6wApRJG
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1462 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-15T18:24:08.163Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"81f77d2a-2c49-4e61-9298-d94c9922ddbc","new_score":52,"page_slug":"agave","prev_score":18,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 11 of 13 claims outright and partially supported the remaining 2 — both minor (an imprecise launch date in the timeline, and a nuance around hack-victim vs. governance-token redemption). Disputed claims stand at 0%. The two primary incidents (claim_findings[2] and claim_findings[5]) are both attribution type (b) 'suffered': Agave was exploited by an external attacker through a chain-level token behaviour it did not introduce, and its subsequent closure was an orderly wind-down with no evidence of fraudulent intent. Under the platform's fraud-likelihood scoring rubric, CRITICAL (0–19) is reserved for entities whose own conduct constitutes confirmed fraud, exit scams, or Ponzi schemes. Placing a hack victim at score 18 violates the anti-conflation rule. The reviewer's recommended score of 52 (CAUTIONARY) correctly reflects that the protocol is defunct, users received no hack restitution, and there is a minor unresolved audit-scope gap — without over-penalising for harm the entity suffered rather than caused. A positive delta of +34 is applied to correct this mis-classification.","score_delta":34,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}