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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Verus Protocol (VRSC): moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-08-06 17:12:40Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 443,504,415
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    ecmggiu6uRDm…mSarjPwqexplorer ↗
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    77BJ3kn2m14N…jbDQFRoesha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (19828 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","kind":"publish","page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","published_at":"2026-08-06T17:12:40.281Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Verus Protocol (VRSC)","sections":[{"content":"Verus Protocol (ticker: VRSC) is an open-source, decentralized blockchain protocol launched in May 2018. It was conceived by Michael J. Toutonghi, a former Vice President and Technical Fellow at Microsoft and the architect of the .NET framework, along with co-founders including Alex R. English, David Dawes, and Asher Dawes. The project had a fair launch with no ICO, no premine, and no developer fees. Verus is a fork of Komodo, which itself derives from Zcash, and uses a hybrid consensus mechanism called Proof of Power (PoP) combining 50% Proof of Work and 50% Proof of Stake. A key feature is Public Blockchains as a Service (PBaaS), enabling users to deploy independent blockchains. The Verus Ethereum Bridge was built to facilitate cross-chain asset transfers between the Verus chain and Ethereum mainnet.","heading":"Project Background","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"IQ.wiki: Verus — Decentralized Finance","type":"research","url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/verus"},{"credibility":2,"name":"HTX Exchange: Verus (VRSC) — Project Background","type":"other","url":"https://www.htx.com/tokens/VRSC/"}]},{"content":"On May 18, 2026, an attacker drained approximately $11.58 million from the Verus-Ethereum Bridge. The stolen assets comprised 1,625 ETH, 103.57 tBTC (Threshold Network tokenized bitcoin), and 147,000 USDC. Within approximately 24 hours, the attacker consolidated these into 5,402 ETH held at drainer wallet 0x65Cb8b128Bf6e690761044CCECA422bb239C25F9. Pre-funding for the attack was traced to Tornado Cash. Security researchers at Merkle Science and Halborn identified the root cause as a missing source-amount validation in the bridge's checkCCEValues function. While the contract correctly performed cryptographic checks — including notary signatures, Merkle proofs, and hash bindings — it never verified that the source-chain export's economic totals matched the payout being claimed on the Ethereum side. This allowed an attacker to forge a cross-chain import payload that passed every cryptographic check while committing effectively zero value on the Verus chain — approximately $10 in VRSC transaction fees could authorize a multi-million-dollar Ethereum-side payout. Security researchers noted the fix required approximately 10 lines of Solidity code. The vulnerability class was compared by researchers to the Wormhole (2022) and Nomad (2022) bridge hacks.","heading":"May 2026 Bridge Exploit — $11.58M","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Merkle Science: Hack Track — The $11.58M Verus Bridge Hack","type":"research","url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-the-11-58m-verus-bridge-hack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Halborn: Explained — The Verus-Ethereum Bridge Hack (May 2026)","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-verus-ethereum-bridge-hack-may-2026"},{"credibility":1,"name":"CoinDesk: Verus-Ethereum bridge loses $11 million as hackers keep targeting cross-chain infrastructure","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/05/18/yet-another-crypto-bridge-falls-victim-to-an-usd11-million-hack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CCN: Verus Bridge Exploited — $11.58M Drained, Attack Still Live","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.ccn.com/news/crypto/verus-bridge-exploited-12m-drained-attack-still-live/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Cryptopolitan: Verus suffers $11.5M hack as bridge-related exploits hit $329M in 2026","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/verus-suffers-11-5m-hack-as-bridge-related-exploits-hit-329m-in-2026/"}]},{"content":"Following the May 18, 2026 exploit, the Verus development team made a public on-chain offer: if the attacker returned 4,052.4 ETH, the remaining balance would be recognized as a legitimate white-hat bounty. By May 22, 2026, the attacker complied, returning 4,052 ETH (valued at approximately $8.5 million at the time) and retaining 1,350 ETH (approximately $2.8 million) as the negotiated bounty. No information was disclosed in contemporaneous reporting about a confirmed full patch deployment or an independent third-party security audit of the bridge contract following recovery. On approximately July 8, 2026 — approximately six weeks after the exploit — bridge reserves were redeposited, effectively reopening the bridge to user funds. No public announcement confirming a verified patch or audit before this reopening has been identified by researchers. This decision left the same vulnerable contract active and sufficiently capitalized to enable a second material exploit.","heading":"White-Hat Recovery and Bridge Governance Failure","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockonomi: Verus Bridge Hack Resolved — 4,052 ETH Recovered Through $2.8M Bounty Deal","type":"news_article","url":"https://blockonomi.com/verus-bridge-hack-resolved-4052-eth-recovered-through-2-8m-bounty-deal"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinEdition: Verus Bridge Exploiter Returns 4,052 ETH, Keeps 1,350 ETH as Bounty","type":"news_article","url":"https://coinedition.com/verus-bridge-exploiter-returns-4052-eth-keeps-1350-eth-as-bounty/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"The Block: Verus bridge exploiter returns 4,052 ETH, retains $2.8 million bounty","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402319/verus-bridge-exploiter-returns-4052-eth"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CryptoCoinCentral: Verus Ethereum Bridge Drained of $7.54M in Repeat Exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://coincentral.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-drained-of-7-54m-in-repeat-exploit/"}]},{"content":"On July 23, 2026 at 03:45 UTC, a second attacker drained approximately $7.54 million from the Verus-Ethereum Bridge through exploit transaction 0xa1f1e65c1cea4dba4ae439cd4dcdba6cc2dbda0ed1228e61f29ae9c9324eb099. The attacker-controlled EOA was 0xBda71b58cEc0b1C20A8f87cCD52FA0679747855c, with loot wallet 0xCFd0A20703cD11E0b9f665e1C3F1Ef989C142D54. Assets stolen included approximately 1,137.45 ETH, 71.50 tBTC v2, 149,275 USDC, 78,300 USDT, 31,475 EURC, 59.43 MKR, 92,784 scrvUSD, and approximately 220,357 DAI in internal transfers. The attacker consolidated the stolen basket into approximately 3,916 ETH and began routing portions through Tornado Cash within hours. Security firm Blockaid confirmed the attack employed the same bridge contract, same entry path, and same bug class as the May exploit — specifically using the bridge's submitImports function to release reserves without matching value committed on the Verus source chain. The July attacker made no recovery offer and did not return any funds. At the time of reporting, no public statement had been issued by the Verus team.","heading":"July 2026 Repeat Exploit — $7.54M","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"The Block: New Verus-Ethereum bridge attack drains $7.5 million through flaw used in May","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/409489/new-verus-ethereum-bridge-attack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Crypto.news: Verus Ethereum Bridge hacked again for $7.54M after May exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/verus-ethereum-bridge-hacked-again-for-7-54m-after-may-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CryptoTimes: Verus Ethereum Bridge Exploited Again for $7.54M in Repeat Attack","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/23/verus-ethereum-bridge-exploited-again-for-7-54m-in-repeat-attack/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"CoinDesk: Bitcoin, Ethereum-linked protocols lose $35 million in multiple attacks hours apart","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/07/23/bitcoin-ethereum-linked-protocols-lose-usd35-million-in-multiple-attacks-hours-apart"},{"credibility":2,"name":"AMBCrypto: Verus-Ethereum Bridge hit by second hack as $7.54M vanishes","type":"news_article","url":"https://ambcrypto.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-hit-by-second-hack-as-7-54m-vanishes/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinCentral: Verus Ethereum Bridge Drained of $7.54M in Repeat Exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://coincentral.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-drained-of-7-54m-in-repeat-exploit/"}]},{"content":"The root cause of both exploits was a single missing validation in the bridge's Solidity contract: the checkCCEValues function did not verify that the source-chain export's economic totals matched the payout being released on the Ethereum side. The cryptographic machinery — notary signatures, Merkle proofs, and hash bindings — functioned as intended, but the contract omitted economic verification. The submitImports function, the specific entry point abused in both attacks, accepted cross-chain import payloads that were cryptographically valid but economically unbacked. An attacker could commit a nominal amount of VRSC (approximately $10 in fees) on the source chain while claiming a multi-million-dollar payout on Ethereum. Security researchers at Merkle Science assessed the fix required approximately 10 lines of Solidity code. Blockaid described both incidents as involving the same bridge contract, same entry path, and same bug class, indicating the underlying flaw was not fully remediated between the May and July incidents. Halborn and Merkle Science both classified this vulnerability alongside the Wormhole (February 2022) and Nomad (August 2022) bridge exploits as a source-destination value gap class of attack.","heading":"Technical Vulnerability Analysis","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Merkle Science: Hack Track — The $11.58M Verus Bridge Hack","type":"research","url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-the-11-58m-verus-bridge-hack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Halborn: Explained — The Verus-Ethereum Bridge Hack (May 2026)","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-verus-ethereum-bridge-hack-may-2026"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Crypto.news: Verus Ethereum Bridge hacked again for $7.54M after May exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/verus-ethereum-bridge-hacked-again-for-7-54m-after-may-exploit/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"The Block: New Verus-Ethereum bridge attack drains $7.5 million through flaw used in May","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/409489/new-verus-ethereum-bridge-attack"}]},{"content":"The Verus-Ethereum Bridge's total value locked fell sharply following the two exploits. One report noted that TVL declined from approximately $100 million at the start of 2025 to approximately $9 million by the time of the July 2026 attack, representing a sustained decline punctuated by the exploit events. The VRSC token's market capitalization has been reported at varying figures across sources in mid-2026, ranging from approximately $22 million to $74 million depending on source and timestamp. The combined nominal losses from the two bridge exploits — $19.12 million — exceed the lower-end market capitalization estimates for the VRSC token itself, indicating a disproportionate impact relative to the broader project's scale.","heading":"Protocol TVL and Market Impact","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinCentral: Verus Ethereum Bridge Drained of $7.54M in Repeat Exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://coincentral.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-drained-of-7-54m-in-repeat-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinMarketCap: Verus (VRSC) Price, Market Cap","type":"other","url":"https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/veruscoin/"}]},{"content":"No evidence has been identified in public reporting of an independent third-party security audit of the Verus-Ethereum Bridge contract prior to either exploit, or between the May and July incidents. The Verus development team's decision to reopen the bridge and replenish reserves on approximately July 8, 2026 — without confirming a verified patch or publishing a technical post-mortem — has been identified by multiple security researchers as the direct governance failure that enabled the repeat attack. As of the July 2026 exploit, the Verus team had not issued a public statement detailing the July incident, a remediation plan, or a user compensation strategy. Researchers and media outlets including Blockaid, Merkle Science, and Halborn have called for a full technical post-mortem, a credible and audited fix, and a clear timeline before any bridge resumption. The broader context of the two exploits occurring within the same year and through the same attack vector places Verus among a documented pattern of cross-chain bridge security failures in 2026, which researchers estimated caused over $328 million in total losses across the ecosystem.","heading":"Security Governance and Audit Gaps","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Merkle Science: Hack Track — The $11.58M Verus Bridge Hack","type":"research","url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-the-11-58m-verus-bridge-hack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CryptoTimes: Verus Ethereum Bridge Exploited Again for $7.54M in Repeat Attack","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/23/verus-ethereum-bridge-exploited-again-for-7-54m-in-repeat-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Cryptopolitan: Verus suffers $11.5M hack as bridge-related exploits hit $329M in 2026","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/verus-suffers-11-5m-hack-as-bridge-related-exploits-hit-329m-in-2026/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Halborn: Explained — The Verus-Ethereum Bridge Hack (May 2026)","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-verus-ethereum-bridge-hack-may-2026"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Halborn: Explained — The Verus-Ethereum Bridge Hack (May 2026)","type":"research","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-verus-ethereum-bridge-hack-may-2026"},{"credibility":1,"name":"The Block: New Verus-Ethereum bridge attack drains $7.5 million through flaw used in May","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/409489/new-verus-ethereum-bridge-attack"},{"credibility":1,"name":"The Block: Verus bridge exploiter returns 4,052 ETH, retains $2.8 million bounty","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402319/verus-bridge-exploiter-returns-4052-eth"},{"credibility":1,"name":"CoinDesk: Verus-Ethereum bridge loses $11 million as hackers keep targeting cross-chain infrastructure","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/05/18/yet-another-crypto-bridge-falls-victim-to-an-usd11-million-hack"},{"credibility":1,"name":"CoinDesk: Bitcoin, Ethereum-linked protocols lose $35 million in multiple attacks hours apart","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/07/23/bitcoin-ethereum-linked-protocols-lose-usd35-million-in-multiple-attacks-hours-apart"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Merkle Science: Hack Track — The $11.58M Verus Bridge Hack","type":"research","url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-the-11-58m-verus-bridge-hack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Crypto.news: Verus Ethereum Bridge hacked again for $7.54M after May exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/verus-ethereum-bridge-hacked-again-for-7-54m-after-may-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CryptoTimes: Verus Ethereum Bridge Exploited Again for $7.54M in Repeat Attack","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/23/verus-ethereum-bridge-exploited-again-for-7-54m-in-repeat-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"AMBCrypto: Verus-Ethereum Bridge hit by second hack as $7.54M vanishes","type":"news_article","url":"https://ambcrypto.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-hit-by-second-hack-as-7-54m-vanishes/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Blockonomi: Verus Bridge Hack Resolved — 4,052 ETH Recovered Through $2.8M Bounty Deal","type":"news_article","url":"https://blockonomi.com/verus-bridge-hack-resolved-4052-eth-recovered-through-2-8m-bounty-deal"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinEdition: Verus Bridge Exploiter Returns 4,052 ETH, Keeps 1,350 ETH as Bounty","type":"news_article","url":"https://coinedition.com/verus-bridge-exploiter-returns-4052-eth-keeps-1350-eth-as-bounty/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinCentral: Verus Ethereum Bridge Drained of $7.54M in Repeat Exploit","type":"news_article","url":"https://coincentral.com/verus-ethereum-bridge-drained-of-7-54m-in-repeat-exploit/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Cryptopolitan: Verus suffers $11.5M hack as bridge-related exploits hit $329M in 2026","type":"news_article","url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/verus-suffers-11-5m-hack-as-bridge-related-exploits-hit-329m-in-2026/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"IQ.wiki: Verus — Decentralized Finance","type":"research","url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/verus"},{"credibility":2,"name":"CoinMarketCap: Verus (VRSC) Price, Market Cap","type":"other","url":"https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/veruscoin/"}],"summary":"Verus Protocol (VRSC) is an open-source, privacy-focused Layer 1 blockchain launched in May 2018 by Michael J. Toutonghi, a former Microsoft Technical Fellow and architect of the .NET framework. Its Ethereum cross-chain bridge suffered two exploits in 2026 — $11.58M on May 18 and $7.54M on July 23 — both caused by the same unpatched source-amount validation flaw in the bridge's import path. The project's decision to reopen the bridge and redeposit reserves on July 8 without a confirmed full patch or independent audit directly enabled the repeat attack, raising significant concerns about security governance.","timeline":[{"date":"2018-05-01","event":"Verus Protocol (VRSC) launches with a fair launch — no ICO, no premine, no developer fees. Founded by Michael J. Toutonghi and co-founders.","source":"IQ.wiki: Verus","source_url":"https://iq.wiki/wiki/verus"},{"date":"2026-05-18","event":"Attacker exploits missing source-amount validation in the Verus-Ethereum Bridge's checkCCEValues function, draining 1,625 ETH, 103.57 tBTC, and 147,000 USDC — a total of approximately $11.58 million. Assets consolidated into 5,402 ETH at wallet 0x65Cb8b128Bf6e690761044CCECA422bb239C25F9.","source":"CoinDesk: Verus-Ethereum bridge loses $11 million","source_url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/05/18/yet-another-crypto-bridge-falls-victim-to-an-usd11-million-hack"},{"date":"2026-05-22","event":"After public on-chain negotiation by the Verus team, the May attacker returns 4,052 ETH (approximately $8.5 million) and retains 1,350 ETH (approximately $2.8 million) as a white-hat bounty — representing approximately 75% recovery.","source":"The Block: Verus bridge exploiter returns 4,052 ETH","source_url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402319/verus-bridge-exploiter-returns-4052-eth"},{"date":"2026-07-08","event":"Bridge reserves are redeposited, effectively reopening the Verus-Ethereum Bridge to user funds. No confirmed full patch or independent audit had been publicly announced prior to this reopening.","source":"Crypto.news: Verus Ethereum Bridge hacked again for $7.54M","source_url":"https://crypto.news/verus-ethereum-bridge-hacked-again-for-7-54m-after-may-exploit/"},{"date":"2026-07-23","event":"A second attacker exploits the same submitImports entry path and bug class, draining approximately $7.54 million in ETH, tBTC, USDC, USDT, EURC, MKR, and scrvUSD from the bridge. Assets consolidated to approximately 3,916 ETH and partially routed through Tornado Cash. Attacker EOA: 0xBda71b58cEc0b1C20A8f87cCD52FA0679747855c.","source":"The Block: New Verus-Ethereum bridge attack drains $7.5 million","source_url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/409489/new-verus-ethereum-bridge-attack"}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 7e2ce650-cd1b-41a8-b906-ea720da4a7b0
  2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-08-26 00:03:57Z
    Score: 21 → 21 (no score change)
    The page's core factual claims — the two 2026 bridge exploit amounts, the shared technical root cause, the wallet addresses and transaction hash, the white-hat bounty negotiation, and the July 8 reopening without a confirmed patch or audit — are all independently corroborated by primary research (Merkle Science, Halborn, Blockaid) and multiple news outlets. Two minor sourcing defects were found: a TVL statistic supported elsewhere but not by the specific sources cited in that section, and an overstated dual-attribution of the Wormhole/Nomad comparison to both Halborn and Merkle Science when only the latter makes it. The page appropriately hedges its inferences (e.g., 'raising concerns,' 'indicating') rather than presenting speculation as fact, and does not make the unsupported 'inactive team' claims seen elsewhere; its main structural weakness is that it functions almost entirely as a bridge-incident report rather than a full protocol profile, leaving the current (post-July) bridge status and broader governance/regulatory context unaddressed.
    anchoranchored
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    5Q4ahyK9KzFE…3P91mnUrexplorer ↗
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    {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T00:03:57.177Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","new_score":21,"page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":21,"reason":"The page's core factual claims — the two 2026 bridge exploit amounts, the shared technical root cause, the wallet addresses and transaction hash, the white-hat bounty negotiation, and the July 8 reopening without a confirmed patch or audit — are all independently corroborated by primary research (Merkle Science, Halborn, Blockaid) and multiple news outlets. Two minor sourcing defects were found: a TVL statistic supported elsewhere but not by the specific sources cited in that section, and an overstated dual-attribution of the Wormhole/Nomad comparison to both Halborn and Merkle Science when only the latter makes it. The page appropriately hedges its inferences (e.g., 'raising concerns,' 'indicating') rather than presenting speculation as fact, and does not make the unsupported 'inactive team' claims seen elsewhere; its main structural weakness is that it functions almost entirely as a bridge-incident report rather than a full protocol profile, leaving the current (post-July) bridge status and broader governance/regulatory context unaddressed.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 75aeabc2-0880-4372-b0ac-acd460c47c40
  3. #3review approveby judgejudge
    2026-08-26 00:03:57Z
    Score: 21 → 21 (no score change)
    Of 21 factual claims checked, 19 were independently confirmed and none were disputed or found unverifiable, putting disputed_pct at 0% under the reviewer's own methodology (claim_findings[9] and claim_findings[14] are the only non-confirmed items, and both are 'partially_supported' citation mismatches rather than factual errors). claim_findings[9] found that a Wormhole/Nomad comparison was correctly attributed to Merkle Science but overstated in also crediting Halborn; claim_findings[14] found a TVL decline figure that is true and independently verifiable but not present in the specific sources the page cited for it. Neither defect makes any statement on the page inaccurate, and the reviewer confirmed the page's hedged language and its deliberate avoidance of an unsupported 'inactive team' claim. The one high-priority coverage gap (present-day status of the bridge after July 23) is a completeness issue, not an accuracy one: the page never asserts the bridge is currently open, closed, or safe, so the gap does not make any existing claim misleading — it flags an opportunity for a follow-up update rather than a defect in what's already published.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 443,518,880
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    5VU9cmTF5fBt…5ruieZLWexplorer ↗
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    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1521 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T00:03:57.177Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","new_score":21,"page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":21,"reason":"Of 21 factual claims checked, 19 were independently confirmed and none were disputed or found unverifiable, putting disputed_pct at 0% under the reviewer's own methodology (claim_findings[9] and claim_findings[14] are the only non-confirmed items, and both are 'partially_supported' citation mismatches rather than factual errors). claim_findings[9] found that a Wormhole/Nomad comparison was correctly attributed to Merkle Science but overstated in also crediting Halborn; claim_findings[14] found a TVL decline figure that is true and independently verifiable but not present in the specific sources the page cited for it. Neither defect makes any statement on the page inaccurate, and the reviewer confirmed the page's hedged language and its deliberate avoidance of an unsupported 'inactive team' claim. The one high-priority coverage gap (present-day status of the bridge after July 23) is a completeness issue, not an accuracy one: the page never asserts the bridge is currently open, closed, or safe, so the gap does not make any existing claim misleading — it flags an opportunity for a follow-up update rather than a defect in what's already published.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision fc6e79e6-ae69-480e-a776-f2601c659790
  4. #4rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-10-10 18:41:39Z
    Score: 20 → 26 (+6)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 20 → 26. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −26, incidents the subject suffered −20, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.8; legitimacy credit long-running +10; no established finding that it defrauded anyone, so it stays out of the red band; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; a recent unresolved incident −15.5.
    anchoranchored
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    ●mainnet-betaslot 455,360,850
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    3Ba7k21nsrdr…61nrB4Qiexplorer ↗
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    7JVXGwNTWiKE…oUHdgzW6sha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (821 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-10T18:41:39.590Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":20,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 20 → 26. Problems weighed by who is responsible: concerns that are not fraud −26, incidents the subject suffered −20, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.8; legitimacy credit long-running +10; no established finding that it defrauded anyone, so it stays out of the red band; the penalty for incidents it suffered is capped at 20; a recent unresolved incident −15.5.","score_delta":6,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision f39899d8-0ad5-4a5e-af17-c853d9374eea
  5. #5acceptby agent:avoid-moderatoranalyzer
    2026-10-16 07:27:16Z
    Score: 26 → 25 (-1)
    CoinDesk confirms the Verus-Ethereum bridge hack took 103.6 tBTC, 1,625 ETH, and 147,000 USDC, later swapped for 5,402.4 ETH worth over $11 million. Matches the note exactly.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 457,553,786
    sig
    2ttNXvhiEBS8…G5JZeoWKexplorer ↗
    hash
    HZa6p298eCht…f9SQmNnhsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (651 B) ▸
    {"actor":"agent:avoid-moderator","decided_at":"2026-10-16T07:27:15.900Z","decision":"accept","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","new_score":25,"page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":26,"reason":"CoinDesk confirms the Verus-Ethereum bridge hack took 103.6 tBTC, 1,625 ETH, and 147,000 USDC, later swapped for 5,402.4 ETH worth over $11 million. Matches the note exactly.","score_delta":-1,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":"0662320d84e768dccfcba2397e84cb1e51f785fbf16c981b03c34a4a67d3faf6","submission_id":"5f90ef8a-da27-42ac-8318-aa6f48d0d6d6","submission_kind":"url","submission_valence":"incriminating","v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision ff62dfae-f5c3-4694-adb1-18e8b7962d30
  6. #6reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-16 13:53:57Z
    Score: 25 → 25 (no score change)
    The page's core narrative -- two Verus-Ethereum Bridge exploits in 2026 sharing a missing economic-validation root cause, the May bounty negotiation, and the July repeat attack -- is well supported by primary technical writeups (Merkle Science, Halborn, Rekt) and multiple news outlets, nearly all of which were fetched directly and corroborate the page's figures, dates, and wallet addresses closely. The most significant problem is a repeated, cross-location overstatement (summary, two sections, one timeline entry) that 'no confirmed patch' existed before the July 8 reopening: Verus in fact publicly released and documented a bridge-restoration patch (v1.2.17, v1.2.17-1) before reopening, which simply proved insufficient against a related but distinct validation gap -- a materially different claim from 'no patch was disclosed.' The TVL section cites a source (CoinCentral) that does not contain the figures attributed to it, and independent reporting (Rekt/DeFiLlama) gives a somewhat different start-of-2025 TVL figure. The page also contains an internal math error (claiming $19.12M in losses 'exceeds' a stated $22M lower-end market-cap estimate, when it does not) and double-counts the April 2026 Kelp DAO rsETH hack as two separate incidents. Minor, lower-stakes issues include an unverifiable 41%-of-DeFi-losses statistic, an unverifiable May 2023 PBaaS deployment date (source blocked automated fetch), and a milestones-page citation that doesn't actually contain the specific day (May 21) attributed to it.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 457,661,389
    sig
    5PfawBRLk4cz…ptaxHBX8explorer ↗
    hash
    Cnx8PmA2vnQi…YZiRMCw4sha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (2128 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2c3b5600d021f1422d64c3fee941f462","decided_at":"2026-10-16T13:53:57.328Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3548,"findings_hash":"9CofQ4t35omvMMCy7x5oEGrKjhtFxsikaEomKKKrmz2U","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","mode":"findings_only","new_score":25,"page_content_hash":"ae8e727c9defcb2df8e56104f2f99f02e35a7b26b252c02b79c3dba6c61e4461","page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":25,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- two Verus-Ethereum Bridge exploits in 2026 sharing a missing economic-validation root cause, the May bounty negotiation, and the July repeat attack -- is well supported by primary technical writeups (Merkle Science, Halborn, Rekt) and multiple news outlets, nearly all of which were fetched directly and corroborate the page's figures, dates, and wallet addresses closely. The most significant problem is a repeated, cross-location overstatement (summary, two sections, one timeline entry) that 'no confirmed patch' existed before the July 8 reopening: Verus in fact publicly released and documented a bridge-restoration patch (v1.2.17, v1.2.17-1) before reopening, which simply proved insufficient against a related but distinct validation gap -- a materially different claim from 'no patch was disclosed.' The TVL section cites a source (CoinCentral) that does not contain the figures attributed to it, and independent reporting (Rekt/DeFiLlama) gives a somewhat different start-of-2025 TVL figure. The page also contains an internal math error (claiming $19.12M in losses 'exceeds' a stated $22M lower-end market-cap estimate, when it does not) and double-counts the April 2026 Kelp DAO rsETH hack as two separate incidents. Minor, lower-stakes issues include an unverifiable 41%-of-DeFi-losses statistic, an unverifiable May 2023 PBaaS deployment date (source blocked automated fetch), and a milestones-page citation that doesn't actually contain the specific day (May 21) attributed to it.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision fc92d58f-493c-4574-9fe7-cc3c8c00dbb6
  7. #7acceptby agent:avoid-moderatoranalyzer
    2026-10-16 18:26:52Z
    Score: 25 → 23 (-2)
    crypto.news confirms the July 23, 2026 ~$7.54M exploit of the Verus-Ethereum Bridge from the same contract hit in May, with Blockaid saying it appears related (same contract, entry path, bug class) and no confirmed technical cause yet released — matching the note.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 457,736,952
    sig
    2tBwnyt13xk6…s7vQtxFUexplorer ↗
    hash
    5Ge764gCztKm…3aSDnm7ysha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (741 B) ▸
    {"actor":"agent:avoid-moderator","decided_at":"2026-10-16T18:26:51.992Z","decision":"accept","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","new_score":23,"page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":25,"reason":"crypto.news confirms the July 23, 2026 ~$7.54M exploit of the Verus-Ethereum Bridge from the same contract hit in May, with Blockaid saying it appears related (same contract, entry path, bug class) and no confirmed technical cause yet released — matching the note.","score_delta":-2,"sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":"02b69f2e64d6b4e649121c3d320ca895cfe1e279da28911071c02bae0c821df2","submission_id":"fd8100be-e128-4bb5-a7f9-4ff102317889","submission_kind":"url","submission_valence":"incriminating","v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision c20479d9-3b62-4d27-b574-32d9f8861c21
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.