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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Odin.fun
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#2
Score
22 → 22 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
424310053
Off-chain at
2026-06-04T19:49:41.755Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
4iJ2WpsCtUSEFf1iyyLrSTSf4xjZNdprjuCfk82dUspm
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1274 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-04T19:49:41.613Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"9cdb1d45-3ea8-4949-ae90-7c7d1b57f54d","new_score":22,"page_slug":"odin-fun","prev_score":22,"reason":"The Odin.fun investigation is well-sourced for the two core exploit events (April 2025 SIWB and August 2025 AMM), with key technical details confirmed by independent security firms (Halborn, QuillAudits) and the DFINITY developer forum. The primary areas of concern are: (1) the launch date is overstated as January 2025 when the public launch was February 3, 2025; (2) the Chinese threat actor attribution is presented as established fact when the primary security analyst (Halborn) explicitly questioned its consistency with the attack's simplicity; (3) an unverifiable claim about community TVL overstatement allegations is cited to a source that does not support it; and (4) the ckBTC custodial framing is contested by ICP's own technical documentation. The page is substantially accurate on the material security events but the investigation coverage ends in August 2025, leaving a significant gap on current platform status.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}