Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Silo V2
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
52 → 44 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
425413511
Off-chain at
2026-06-09T21:56:14.321Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
49JgWR59bPbFaPwoL5C1GRmQDWwfqSYNaYRnUgA8jyyA
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1317 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T21:56:14.014Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"713de2c4-1c19-48fb-a807-a613b6a5386a","new_score":44,"page_slug":"silo-v2","prev_score":52,"reason":"Zero claims were outright disputed, and all core facts about the June 25 2025 exploit (224 ETH, SiloDAO test funds, LeverageUsingSiloFlashloanWithGeneralSwap contract, Tornado Cash laundering, Certora formal-verification admission) are confirmed by Tier 1 sources. Four claims are partially supported: claim_findings[10] (timeline[4]) carries a wrong roadmap date (Feb 29 not Jan 1) and an anachronistic xSILO reference; claim_findings[8] (timeline[2]) oversimplifies the IRMv2 rollout as a single-day event; and claim_findings[11] and claim_findings[15] (timeline[5] and timeline[9]) overstate the Cork Protocol attacker link as a confirmed attribution when sources only show coincident Tornado Cash activity. The most significant structural issue flagged at coverage_gaps[4] (priority: high) is that all seven section content fields are empty — the page has source citations but no written analysis, which must be corrected before the page can be considered complete.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}