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Silo V2

avoid.net/silo-v2→55/100·78% conf.
[AI-DRAFTED · AWAITING FACT-CHECK][src:defillama]

Last changed 2026-10-10 · Score recalculated — Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 44 → 55. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −12.8, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −1.6; legitimacy credit long-running +8; fact-check adjustments (−8) now shown as page reliability, not in the score. Version history →

Why this score
Every page starts at65
Concerns that are not fraud-3.2
Incidents it suffered (e.g. hacks)-12.8
Problems around it, caused by others-1.6
Long-running+8
Sum55

Score: 55/100 (kept between 0 and 100)

How scoring works →
anchored·2EBcdK…2c7J
last updated 2026-10-10

Summary

Silo V2 is a non-custodial, permissionless isolated lending market protocol operating across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, and Sonic. On June 25, 2025, an unreleased peripheral leverage contract was exploited for approximately $545,000 (224 ETH) belonging to SiloDAO test funds; the team confirmed that all core markets and user deposits were unaffected. The incident revealed inadequate input validation and absent formal verification on pre-release code that had been deployed to mainnet, and the attacker subsequently laundered the stolen ETH through Tornado Cash.

Connected Entities

7 entities · 60 linked investigations
Organizations
□Ethereum90□Arbitrum□Silo V2□ZachXBT□Optimism
Protocols
⌂Cork Protocol54⌂Silo Finance
Relationships
  • Cork Protocol→mentioned with→Ethereum(80%)
  • Optimism→mentioned with→Arbitrum(65%)
  • ZachXBT→mentioned with→Ethereum(70%)
  • Optimism→mentioned with→Ethereum(80%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→Cork Protocol(80%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→Silo Finance(80%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→Arbitrum(75%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→ZachXBT(70%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→Optimism(65%)
  • Silo V2→mentioned with→Ethereum(80%)
  • + 6 more
Have evidence about Silo V2?

Timeline(12 events)

2021

Silo Finance founded and initial protocol design work begun on isolated lending market architecture.

27 April 2023

Whitehat submits critical vulnerability report via Immunefi disclosing interest rate model (IRMV1) flaw that could have exposed approximately $3 million in Ethereum-market deposits.

Silo Finance vulnerability disclosure (Medium)

May 2023

Silo deploys patched interest rate model (IRMv2), fixing the utilization ratio calculation vulnerability.

Certora Silo Finance Post-Mortem

6 June 2023

Silo Finance publicly discloses the 2023 vulnerability and awards 100,000 USDC bug bounty to the whitehat reporter.

Silo Finance Medium vulnerability disclosure

2024

Silo V2 announced with expanded architecture: multichain deployment, programmable markets, Silo Vaults, and xSILO revenue token.

Silo Finance 2024 Roadmap (Medium)

28 May 2025

Cork Protocol exploited for approximately $12 million (3,761 wstETH); attacker address later linked to Silo Finance exploit.

Bitget News / PeckShield

25 June 2025

Silo Finance leverage contract exploit occurs at 14:11:23 UTC; 224 ETH (~$545,000 in SiloDAO test funds) drained via improper input validation in unreleased LeverageUsingSiloFlashloanWithGeneralSwap contract.

Silo Finance post-mortem (Medium)

25 June 2025

Silo Finance pauses the affected contract on Ethereum and Sonic networks; confirms core markets and user funds unaffected.

Silo Finance post-mortem (Medium)

25 June 2025

SILO token price drops approximately 11% following public disclosure of the exploit.

Ainvest

25 June 2025

PeckShield flags attacker wallet as linked to the Cork Protocol exploit; both incidents involve Tornado Cash fund laundering.

Cryptopolitan

25 June 2025

Attacker routes stolen 224 ETH through Tornado Cash in multiple transactions to obfuscate fund trail.

QuillAudits hack analysis

26 June 2025

Certora publishes incident post-mortem acknowledging that Certora Prover was not applied to the exploited leverage contract, and that formal verification would have detected the user-controlled external call vulnerability.

Certora incident report
Provenance & Audit Trail

Decision Log

  • #4rescore+11Recorded on Solana ✓10/10/2026, 6:46:09 PM
    slot 455365960 · hash 8vPdm68CPCfNyUnz2y3N5kDAj12BTf8ZSXWk2Uk2K2cy
  • #3review revise-8Recorded on Solana ✓6/9/2026, 9:56:14 PM
    slot 425413511 · hash 49JgWR59bPbFaPwoL5C1GRmQDWwfqSYNaYRnUgA8jyyA
  • #2reviewRecorded on Solana ✓6/9/2026, 9:56:14 PM
    slot 425413507 · hash H1p64D153v55Fa2StwX93c3k7dRtvJDBuTCW9wp6XQ7M
  • #1publishRecorded on Solana ✓5/29/2026, 2:28:29 AM
    slot 422847472 · hash DxKZVdHhWAshMwEPte31ze5FDeZTxA8u8crACpTnWgqW

This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain (4 decisions). 18 of 20 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.

model: claude-sonnet-4-6

generated: 5/4/2026, 2:54:17 AM

last updated: 10/10/2026, 6:46:09 PM

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