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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Ankr
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
58 → 58 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457513790
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T05:03:38.104Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T05:04:00.302Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
ADQj1tKKh7hVctzBNhvXr9E6cFa64f9jSjJ6wwJey6ge
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2267 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"26e07a6474bd9e75d3d1ee61d43a4cb8","decided_at":"2026-10-16T05:03:37.902Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2857,"findings_hash":"2BrZiDCaDk98edVrv27FHnE4mpUVPqCvCdvAHoNDrkSX","investigation_id":"7a1254db-5cf5-448b-99b9-e773bf1ae9ee","mode":"findings_only","new_score":58,"page_content_hash":"2e9b47d678202e7b2707f7974fca4ba86fc56c5d0ea0c48903dd588da21681da","page_slug":"ankr","prev_score":58,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- the December 2022 insider-driven supply chain attack on Ankr's deployer key, the resulting aBNBc hyperinflation and ~$5M direct loss, the cascading Helio/HAY depeg exploit (~$19M additional), Tornado Cash laundering, and the subsequent compensation dispute with Stader/pStake users -- is well supported by multiple independent, credible sources (Ankr's own after-action report, rekt.news, Cointelegraph, CoinDesk, Merkle Science) and the on-chain addresses and function selector check out exactly against independent analyses. The most significant problems are in the Background section: the ICO date and platform claim (March 2019 Binance Launchpad) does not match any source found, including the page's own citations -- independent sources place Ankr's token sale in 2018 as a direct Ethereum ICO, with Binance Launchpad not yet in a position to have hosted it. The blockchain-count claim ('over 75') is also unsupported by either of the page's own two cited sources (70+ and 40+ respectively). A more consequential error is in the Helio section: the claim that Helio 'repurchased and burned approximately 15 million HAY to restore the peg to near $0.99' conflates the $15 million (USD) buyback commitment with an actual 15-million-token burn, and overstates the recovery price; contemporaneous sources (including one of the page's own citations) show recovery to roughly $0.96 and documented repurchase volumes in the single digits of millions of HAY. The ZachXBT flagging section is honestly hedged by the page itself as unverified, which this review confirms remains the case. No accepted community submissions existed to independently assess.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}