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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
3224 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443521480
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T15:13:38.514Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AiSPQorEz1SnfKTC1pLHyRbcywChdrsrQ1bPmj4LfFZ8
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2089 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T15:13:38.251Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"5f3c2907-8e30-4d82-a4a7-875cd9bc7d2c","new_score":24,"page_slug":"hyperbridge-polkadot-ethereum-bridge-april-2026-exploit","prev_score":32,"reason":"I checked the reviewer's arithmetic: 26 confirmed, 7 partially_supported, 1 disputed, 2 unverifiable, 0 stale, 0 link_rot across 36 claims gives disputed_pct = (1+2)/36 = 8.3%, matching the reviewer's own figure and the reviewer.md formula (partially_supported excluded from the numerator). On the raw table this sits inside the 0-10% approve band, and the page's central facts hold up well: the exploit date, target, root cause, and the loss revision from $237,000 to $2.5 million were all confirmed by directly fetching Hyperbridge's own post-mortem (claim_findings[1], [3], [7], [15]). I am escalating one band anyway, on a single named mechanism: coverage_gaps[0] (priority: high) is not an ordinary expansion suggestion but a structural omission directly tied to claim_findings[27] — Hyperbridge's own April 23, 2026 'First Returns' post documents a partial voluntary fund recovery that the page's Recovery Efforts section omits entirely, leaving that section reading as more unresolved than the record supports. That, combined with a compounding misattribution to named security firms (claim_findings[9]: CertiK is credited with confirming mechanics it only confirmed occurred, and 'Blocksec Falcon' appears to be a garbled, superseded-theory rendering of BlockSec Phalcon) in a section the page marks critical severity, is enough to warrant a light, unbannered-status revision rather than a bare approval. None of the remaining partially_supported findings (slug simplification, bio citation mismatches, Hypernative mischaracterization, Q1 figure sourcing) rise to the level of factual inaccuracy — they are citation-hygiene and precision issues on facts independently verified as true.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}