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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Odin.fun
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
2210 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
424310056
Off-chain at
2026-06-04T19:49:41.842Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
21n4v8vLtLz1DPtNukL4PHpDvmajtXQ7HJXQ4vEv3g51
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1587 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T19:49:41.613Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"9cdb1d45-3ea8-4949-ae90-7c7d1b57f54d","new_score":10,"page_slug":"odin-fun","prev_score":22,"reason":"The reviewer found no hard-disputed claims across 28 checked items, and the two core exploit events ($7M AMM attack, $178K SIWB authentication breach) are well-corroborated by Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources including CoinDesk, Halborn, QuillAudits, and the DFINITY developer forum. However, three issues require correction before the page should stand as-is: (1) claim_findings[5] states a January 2025 launch date that two sources contradict — the public launch was February 3, 2025, not January; (2) claim_findings[28] makes a specific claim about community TVL overstatement allegations and cites two sources that do not mention this at all, constituting an unsupported factual assertion; (3) claim_findings[15] presents the Chinese-coordination attribution as established fact, while Halborn's independent analysis explicitly questioned whether that attribution is consistent with the simplicity of the exploit. Additionally, three high-priority coverage gaps exist — the page has no information on platform status, compensation outcomes, or audit completion for the ~10 months since late August 2025, which is materially stale for a risk page about a platform that halted trading and publicly acknowledged it could not cover user losses.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}