Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Odin.fun
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 22 → 10 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424310056
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-04T19:49:41.842Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 21n4v8vLtLz1DPtNukL4PHpDvmajtXQ7HJXQ4vEv3g51
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1587 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T19:49:41.613Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"9cdb1d45-3ea8-4949-ae90-7c7d1b57f54d","new_score":10,"page_slug":"odin-fun","prev_score":22,"reason":"The reviewer found no hard-disputed claims across 28 checked items, and the two core exploit events ($7M AMM attack, $178K SIWB authentication breach) are well-corroborated by Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources including CoinDesk, Halborn, QuillAudits, and the DFINITY developer forum. However, three issues require correction before the page should stand as-is: (1) claim_findings[5] states a January 2025 launch date that two sources contradict — the public launch was February 3, 2025, not January; (2) claim_findings[28] makes a specific claim about community TVL overstatement allegations and cites two sources that do not mention this at all, constituting an unsupported factual assertion; (3) claim_findings[15] presents the Chinese-coordination attribution as established fact, while Halborn's independent analysis explicitly questioned whether that attribution is consistent with the simplicity of the exploit. Additionally, three high-priority coverage gaps exist — the page has no information on platform status, compensation outcomes, or audit completion for the ~10 months since late August 2025, which is materially stale for a risk page about a platform that halted trading and publicly acknowledged it could not cover user losses.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}