Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:47:35.604Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"8f995061-a7d5-44c2-b533-3d550f96d862","new_score":3,"page_slug":"garden-finance-cross-chain-bridge-july-2026-solver-database-exploit","prev_score":18,"reason":"The reviewer found 0 of 15 claims disputed and 2 unverifiable (13.3% under the disputed+unverifiable formula), which sits at the low end of the review-revise band on its own. However, the review surfaces a substantive framing problem at the core of this page: the stated root cause of the July 2026 incident (a solver-database exploit that left Garden's HTLC contracts untouched) is Garden Finance's own self-reported account, presented on the page as settled fact, with no independent forensic report backing it — unlike the October 2025 incident, which does have a published EY/zeroShadow report (claim_findings[2]). One of the page's own cited sources reportedly stated the opposite at the time, that the exploit 'appears to target the contracts themselves,' and a related synthesis claim reuses that same source in a way inconsistent with its plain meaning (claim_findings[13]). This is reinforced by a high-priority coverage gap calling for exactly this caveat (coverage_gaps[1]). The page is also stale on operating status, still describing restoration as pending when the app appears live as of the review date (claim_findings[3]), and overstates certainty on the loss total, which a cited source described as still being confirmed (claim_findings[2]). None of this rises to a disputed core allegation under the reviewer's formula, and reviewer confidence (0.75) is reasonably high, so the page remains in the review-revise band rather than escalating to a status change or denial — but the delta is set at the top of that band given how central the unverified self-report issue is to the page's main claim.","score_delta":-15,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}