Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Moby Trade
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 55 → 55 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464343427
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T03:25:51.037Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T03:26:07.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T03:26:07.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- E2FUdTxXo8aEDHC1F9XqmZRMYgRZsNW1GxRfPnc3XSDD
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1543 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"187b0f5b6d5fe3e65cec9483639a6c23","band_override":null,"blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T03:25:50.816Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.5,"investigation_id":"da9d222b-c63f-4a4a-be45-63f5cbdde79c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":55,"page_slug":"moby","prev_score":55,"reason":"Of 13 claim findings, 3 could not be checked because the source blocked the reviewer and were left out; of the remaining 10, 5 were disputed or unverifiable (50%), which falls in the significant-issues band. The core incident (January 2025 private-key compromise, about $2.5M gross loss, about $1.47M recovered) holds up, but the page's loss total does not match its own listed figures (claim_findings[0]), the 35+ wallet count is contradicted by the cited source in two places (claim_findings[3], [4]), and the summary overstates Tornado Cash and Railgun routing (claim_findings[7]). The page also gives no evidence of operating status after February 2025, which is a high-priority coverage gap, and the primary post-mortem could not be read; the penalty is kept in the middle of the band because the central allegation is sound and these are mostly correctable figures.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}