Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Echo Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 20 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 422977699
- Off-chain at
- 2026-05-29T16:48:20.124Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- G49vMMEHRCL7NiX7DpdeD3FarCYBVx6MmPjTQsMNBbHV
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1439 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-05-29T16:48:19.881Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"18db584f-6b3a-4ef2-a844-64a016882229","new_score":20,"page_slug":"echo-protocol","prev_score":28,"reason":"The core factual record for the Echo Protocol exploit — mechanism, financial figures, timeline, and protocol response — is well-supported by multiple Tier 1 sources and confirmed across 21 of 29 claims. However, the review identified two disputed claims that require correction: claim_findings[24] incorrectly places Drift Protocol and KelpDAO exploits in May 2026 when both occurred in April 2026, and claim_findings[26] incorrectly states the Hacken audit scope and findings were not publicly disclosed when a full public audit report is available on Hacken's website. Additionally, claim_findings[4] in the summary conflates the WBTC borrow amount ($867,700) with the collateral value ($3.45M), which is corrected in body sections but remains inaccurate at the summary level. Two high-priority coverage gaps — the unverified attacker wallet address and the absence of any confirmed audit specific to the Monad deployment — should be addressed before the page is considered complete. The page should not be delisted; the primary investigation findings are accurate and substantiated.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}