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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Echo Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
2820 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
422977699
Off-chain at
2026-05-29T16:48:20.124Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
G49vMMEHRCL7NiX7DpdeD3FarCYBVx6MmPjTQsMNBbHV
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1439 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-05-29T16:48:19.881Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"18db584f-6b3a-4ef2-a844-64a016882229","new_score":20,"page_slug":"echo-protocol","prev_score":28,"reason":"The core factual record for the Echo Protocol exploit — mechanism, financial figures, timeline, and protocol response — is well-supported by multiple Tier 1 sources and confirmed across 21 of 29 claims. However, the review identified two disputed claims that require correction: claim_findings[24] incorrectly places Drift Protocol and KelpDAO exploits in May 2026 when both occurred in April 2026, and claim_findings[26] incorrectly states the Hacken audit scope and findings were not publicly disclosed when a full public audit report is available on Hacken's website. Additionally, claim_findings[4] in the summary conflates the WBTC borrow amount ($867,700) with the collateral value ($3.45M), which is corrected in body sections but remains inaccurate at the summary level. Two high-priority coverage gaps — the unverified attacker wallet address and the absence of any confirmed audit specific to the Monad deployment — should be addressed before the page is considered complete. The page should not be delisted; the primary investigation findings are accurate and substantiated.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}