Verify a decision

{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"82dd49a0b3f0b30d709e3c94012abdef","decided_at":"2026-10-16T14:51:48.141Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3333,"findings_hash":"7veD5erjm1oRT3CZGupTPWcMitHuXRcVsUCyxGRgSfQm","investigation_id":"713de2c4-1c19-48fb-a807-a613b6a5386a","mode":"findings_only","new_score":55,"page_content_hash":"5623f2d7b6f877cebb9bfbd3fbc8e96bd990f77772bd5d42cadc91ef622b93f8","page_slug":"silo-v2","prev_score":55,"reason":"The page's central narrative — an unreleased leverage contract was mistakenly deployed to mainnet with excessive approvals and drained for ~$545,000 in SiloDAO test funds on June 25, 2025, with core markets and user deposits unaffected — is well corroborated by Silo's own post-mortem, Certora's first-party incident report, and multiple independent security writeups, as is the connected May 28, 2025 Cork Protocol exploit and its Tornado Cash laundering trail. However, the page contains several concrete errors: it misattributes a PeckShield-reported '3 minutes 20 seconds' early-detection claim to Hypernative Labs (whose own documented timeline shows its flag came 18 minutes AFTER the attack, not before); it cites a 64-character value as an attacker-funding 'address' that is the wrong byte-length for an Ethereum address and is not corroborated by any source; it cites an Immunefi bounty cap ($350,000) that has since been lowered to $100,000; and it describes the SILO community treasury as vesting over four years when available sources put that specific allocation's vesting at three years. The ZachXBT attribution section is built on a claim that none of its own cited sources support and that could not be corroborated elsewhere, making it the page's weakest-sourced section despite its built-in hedge. No accepted community submissions were present to review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}