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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · BNB Chain Bridge
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#2
Score
28 → 28 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426269092
Off-chain at
2026-06-13T20:13:02.858Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
4c6uZXzT9HUccofebXLeuZCKRyL4uVCX61ySQu8YDEsX
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1202 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-13T20:13:02.703Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"1880498b-a15d-46c2-aedf-3c9922c021d9","new_score":28,"page_slug":"bnb-chain-bridge","prev_score":28,"reason":"The core narrative of the BNB Chain bridge exploit is well-supported: the IAVL Merkle proof forgery mechanism, the 2M BNB minted, the ~$566–570M face value, the $137M moved before chain halt, and the $33.5M frozen by Tether/Circle are all confirmed. Three claims are disputed: the timeline erroneously labels the October 12 hard fork as using client v1.1.15 (the actual hard fork used v1.1.16; v1.1.15 was the October 7 hotfix); the Cosmos SDK security disclosure event is dated October 13 but the relevant advisories were published October 8 and October 14; and the Planck hard fork is dated February 6, 2023 when it actually occurred April 12, 2023. Additionally, the page describes '44 active validators' when the correct characterization is 44 total validators with 26 active. All five section content fields are empty, which is a structural gap.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}