Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 32 → 32 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521475
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T15:13:38.429Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7MVWdm7p16E84jM9azJnpkZpKJzqB7C9RjwQrXLxeBTU
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2038 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T15:13:38.251Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"5f3c2907-8e30-4d82-a4a7-875cd9bc7d2c","new_score":32,"page_slug":"hyperbridge-polkadot-ethereum-bridge-april-2026-exploit","prev_score":32,"reason":"The page's core slug assertions are well-supported: Hyperbridge is correctly attributed to Polytope Labs, a real exploit occurred on April 13, 2026 against the Token Gateway/HandlerV1 contract with losses revised from $237,000 to $2.5 million across four EVM chains, and an unusually detailed official post-mortem exists that explicitly confirms the root cause (an out-of-bounds MMR leaf-index bug), which the page reproduces accurately. However, describing Hyperbridge as simply 'the Polkadot-Ethereum bridge' is a simplification not used by Hyperbridge's own documentation or independent sources, which describe it as a multi-chain interoperability protocol. The most significant defects found are a security-firm attribution problem (the page credits 'CertiK and Blocksec Falcon' with confirming attack mechanics that these sources either do not corroborate at that level of detail or describe differently, and the firm name appears to be a garbling of 'BlockSec Phalcon'), an omitted remediation development (a documented partial voluntary fund return in April 2026), a citation/source mismatch for the Q1 2026 vs. Q1 2025 hack-loss comparison, and a mischaracterization of Hypernative's 'three compounding failures' as being uniformly located 'at the proof-validation boundary' when two of the three actually concern governance timing and mint-cap design. No genuine link rot was found across the 27 sources; several 403/429 responses were confirmed as bot-blocking on otherwise live, independently indexed articles rather than dead links, and the one archive_url with a differing path was confirmed to redirect to the same canonical article.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}