Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Zoth Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 18 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423871405
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-02T19:18:13.400Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Cv4rUrtPexs21uRN2nNgLFrQj63QnP1tERELNBRzaEte
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1641 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-02T19:18:13.235Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"4a736de8-81d9-4b63-944d-32ddd8b0ff17","new_score":18,"page_slug":"zoth-protocol","prev_score":28,"reason":"The core technical record of the March 21 exploit — addresses, token amounts, timestamps, and swap routes — is well-supported by multiple independent Tier 2 security research sources and does not require correction. However, the review identified four issues requiring revision: (1) claim_findings[25] (timeline[10]) is directly disputed — the PR Newswire 'Next Chapter' press release is dated May 9, 2025, not April 1, 2025 as stated in the timeline; (2) claim_findings[15] asserts that the March 1 LTV vulnerability was flagged in a prior audit, but no cited or independently discoverable source supports this claim — the page's own cited source (Verichains) does not say this, making it unverifiable and potentially false; (3) three cited URLs are inaccessible due to link rot (CoinTelegraph 404, Bitget 403, BitcoinEthereumNews 403), including a Tier 2 source in the critical exploit section; and (4) regulatory jurisdiction claims (Panama registration, Luxembourg SPV, UAE license) in the business model section lack any third-party confirmation. Two high-priority coverage gaps — absent on-chain transaction links and unconfirmed audit history — further support a revision rather than approval. Reviewer confidence of 0.78 supports a measured penalty within the minor-issues band.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}