Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · FlashLoopAdapter (Aave v3 Safe Module Exploit)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 10 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462279351
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T00:48:43.325Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T00:49:21.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T00:49:21.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8grqvs1SGmpQv9UMZaGuUfxjzZLX2yNeh58jeufoG1h8
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1839 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"d5413c4775c66245c9b7fe674d5050dc","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:48:43.085Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2308,"investigation_id":"b4f97d31-3bf4-4118-aae4-ecc0c1826a1e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"flashloopadapter-aave-v3-safe-module-exploit","prev_score":10,"reason":"Of 13 checked claims, 1 was disputed and 2 could not be verified (none were blocked by their source), giving about 23% disputed or unverifiable. The core incident facts hold up: date, amounts, addresses, attack mechanism, the Aave statement and the bounty terms. Problems are the 'reentrancy-adjacent' root-cause label, which conflicts with the cited access-control analysis (claim_findings[5]), a transaction hash found in no source (claim_findings[7]), and a claim that both Safes disabled the module that the cited article does not make (claim_findings[8]). The page also omits a reported, unconfirmed Tornado Cash fund movement, and its bounty status is out of date. The reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.6) and about half the cited sources were not fetched, so the penalty is moderate.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The Tornado Cash omission is rated material, but it rests on a single KuCoin brief with no second source and the reviewer could not confirm it. The page already sits in the minor revise band and the omission can be added as hedged text, so it does not justify moving to a harsher band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}