Skip to main content
AVOID.NET

FlashLoopAdapter (Aave v3 Safe Module Exploit)

avoid.net/flashloopadapter-aave-v3-safe-module-exploit→0/100·82% conf.
[AI-DRAFTED · AWAITING FACT-CHECK]

Last changed 2026-11-03 · Community evidence — A moderator accepted a piece of community-submitted evidence: Cryptonomist reports the 1 Oct 2026 access-control flaw in the FlashLoopAdapter Safe module hitting two Safe wallets, losses of $305k-$310k per Defimon Alerts and SlowMist, and SlowMist's forged-Safe-wallet authentication bypass. Matches the note. Trust score now 0. Version history →

Provisional: this score is the AI investigator's judgment, not yet calculated by our published formula. Treat it as indicative. How scoring works →

anchored·5psDYv…Wr4q

Latest developments

last 45 days
  1. 2 October 2026Multiple crypto news outlets publish full coverage. Incident is categorized as a third-party module exploit, not an Aave v3 or Safe infrastructure breach.
  2. 2 October 2026Wallet owner aavechan.eth sends on-chain message to attacker offering a 10% whitehat bounty: attacker may retain 11.41 ETH and must return 102.69 ETH before October 3 at 18:00 UTC.
  3. 2 October 2026Aave founder Stani Kulechov publicly clarifies that Aave v3 core contracts were unaffected and describes the FlashLoopAdapter as a third-party external adapter.
All 5 events in the timeline →

Summary

FlashLoopAdapter is a third-party Safe module designed to automate the opening and closing of leveraged positions on Aave v3. On October 1, 2026, an attacker exploited a critical access control vulnerability in the module's open() and close() functions, draining approximately 114.09 ETH (estimated at $305,000–$310,000) from two Safe multisig wallets on Ethereum. Neither Aave v3 nor Safe's core infrastructure was compromised; the flaw resided entirely within the third-party adapter.

Connected Entities

1 entity

No connected entities recorded yet — this investigation is not currently linked to any other page in the index.

Have evidence about FlashLoopAdapter (Aave v3 Safe Module Exploit)?
1
Accepted
1
Under review
0
Rejected / revoked

Community submissions

  • Acceptedincriminating[WAYBACK]10/6/2026, 11:09:23 AMReport

    “Cryptonomist reports that on 1 October 2026 an access-control flaw in the FlashLoopAdapter Safe module affected two Safe wallets, with losses put by Defimon Alerts and SlowMist at between $305,000 and $310,000; SlowMist said the attacker used a forged Safe wallet to get past authentication.”

    — avoid-scout(unverified)

1 submission awaiting moderator review.

Timeline(5 events)

1 October 2026

Attack executed at approximately 15:08:57 UTC. Attacker (0x42c2633438609881c8fBAb82414eb9A0c45F9353) deployed a fake Safe contract, obtained a Morpho WETH flash loan, repaid approximately 1,335 WETH of Aave v3 debt across two victim Safes, and withdrew approximately 1,306.48 weETH and 6.4 weETH, retaining ~114.09 ETH as net profit. Both victim Safes disabled the FlashLoopAdapter module after the attack.

crypto.news / SlowMist

1 October 2026

SlowMist issues public alert identifying the access control vulnerability and publishing attacker and contract addresses.

mpost.io

2 October 2026

Aave founder Stani Kulechov publicly clarifies that Aave v3 core contracts were unaffected and describes the FlashLoopAdapter as a third-party external adapter.

KuCoin News

2 October 2026

Wallet owner aavechan.eth sends on-chain message to attacker offering a 10% whitehat bounty: attacker may retain 11.41 ETH and must return 102.69 ETH before October 3 at 18:00 UTC.

Blockfence / Crypto Briefing

2 October 2026

Multiple crypto news outlets publish full coverage. Incident is categorized as a third-party module exploit, not an Aave v3 or Safe infrastructure breach.

CryptoTimes / Blockonomi / crypto.news / Crypto Briefing
Provenance & Audit Trail

Decision Log

  • #4acceptRecorded on Solana ✓11/3/2026, 10:30:52 PM
    slot 465067497 · hash EY2GA6bisRitr7kYTGZbxSUymAYPNrSt9V612JUw3DJx
  • #3review revise-12Recorded on Solana ✓10/28/2026, 12:48:43 AM
    slot 462279351 · hash 8grqvs1SGmpQv9UMZaGuUfxjzZLX2yNeh58jeufoG1h8
  • #2reviewRecorded on Solana ✓10/28/2026, 12:48:43 AM
    slot 462279346 · hash 5YQtaXVahdZooe73gncpGBLyK4ce5FBJ7SjAdty87o3p
  • #1publishRecorded on Solana ✓10/2/2026, 5:05:37 PM
    slot 452672540 · hash ELC6Ls4mDGzis5csqhaj13EvMi2sFQCft24yJSUWhShA

This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain (4 decisions). 17 of 18 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.

Fact-checked 2026-10-2813 claims checked1 correction pending0 applied⛓ anchoredSee findings →

model: claude-sonnet-4-6

generated: 10/2/2026, 5:05:28 PM

last updated: 11/3/2026, 10:30:53 PM

4 views

avoid.net — verified advice for a post-truth world