Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Light Protocol
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 69 → 69 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425201757
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-08T22:32:22.736Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2LXhF39d2gDXZkLMJY5dgYN7ZGKxtJWAQVsE7UzTtouy
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1151 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-08T22:32:22.635Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"fa89a22c-e13a-4966-93ed-efd15257403c","new_score":69,"page_slug":"light-protocol","prev_score":69,"reason":"The Light Protocol investigation page is largely well-sourced and accurate. Core claims about the company entity, team, funding, launch date, and security audit program are confirmed by independent sources. The main issues found are: one link rot instance (Immunefi /information/ path returning 404), three unverifiable claims (unaudited SDK caveat, Mert Mumtaz counter-argument, Immunefi program specifics), and five partially-supported claims where the page uses precision not fully backed by cited sources (specific Zellic audit date, pre-seed breakdown, pivot timing). No claims were found to be directly disputed by more credible sources. The most significant coverage gap is the lack of detail on the Groth16 trusted setup ceremony, which is a high-priority risk dimension for ZK infrastructure.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}