Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Wasabi Protocol
- Sequence
- #8
- Score
- 3 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462905631
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-29T13:55:49.944Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-29T13:56:04.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-29T13:56:04.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5UdvYY9mxNj1V5HhRcc1RyGLozT3Ebu2K7TsbSyCDqwF
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1704 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"e2cd4956d7bdad4c01b74bbb67cf2578","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T13:55:49.624Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"994d3e0f-b60a-4242-965c-5a18d3a83a5d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"wasabi-protocol","prev_score":3,"reason":"The core account of the April 30, 2026 exploit (compromised sole admin key, UUPS upgrades, a loss range of $4.5M to $5.9M) is confirmed by Coindesk, Rekt, TechFlow and Forklog (claim_findings[2], [4], [5], [6]). Of 12 scorable claims, none were disputed and 2 could not be verified (about 17%): the 20x leverage figure, which the cited Block article does not support (claim_findings[1]), and the ZeroShadow attribution, which was not found in TechFlow (claim_findings[7]). Smaller issues are the unsourced CertiK 'initial $2.9M' estimate (claim_findings[3]) and the inference of continued operations from residual TVL (claim_findings[11]). The reviewer also flagged a high-priority gap, because the page does not cite Wasabi's own incident updates or the Halborn explainer. Two blocked sources (DefiLlama, CryptoTimes) were left out of the percentage and limit what could be checked, but they are not counted against the page. The review found no material omission, and the page already says the protocol was exploited.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-8,"scored_claims":12,"sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}