Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Echo Protocol
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 30 → 30 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457719236
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T17:22:51.761Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T17:23:06.042Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3gf3qhxyYAxKnyvCDmhuQwVMBtApVFu9J3ZpKE3BAYRn
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2050 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"95c4bc8f9911c71d9174383dcb2300b4","decided_at":"2026-10-16T17:22:51.575Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1,"findings_hash":"DS5wK4YYmW2SYA2hEKgU5KhTCWoAuv9WozSGAzXfB7TH","investigation_id":"18db584f-6b3a-4ef2-a844-64a016882229","mode":"findings_only","new_score":30,"page_content_hash":"abbaf7718b577453267dbc12b9cde9ccd9304407ed8734bcc1ea004f3978f59c","page_slug":"echo-protocol","prev_score":30,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a May 2026 admin-key compromise on Echo Protocol's Monad eBTC deployment, ~1,000 eBTC minted (~$76.7M notional), ~$867,700 WBTC borrowed via Curvance, ~384-385 ETH (~$816K-822K) laundered through Tornado Cash, Echo's recovery of keys and burn of the remaining 955 eBTC, and Monad's own network being unaffected — is well-supported by multiple independently fetched and searched tier-1/tier-2 outlets (CoinTelegraph, The Block, CoinDesk, Decrypt, BeInCrypto, CoinJournal). Two factual problems were found: the summary conflates the $3.45M eBTC collateral deposit with the WBTC amount actually borrowed (which was ~$867,700, not $3.45M) — an error that appears to trace back to an equivalent conflation in the cited CoinDesk article, though the page's own section 2 gets this right; and the 'Broader DeFi Security Context' section misdates the Drift Protocol and KelpDAO exploits to 'earlier in May 2026' when they in fact occurred in April 2026 (April 1 and April 18 respectively, per Drift's own incident report and The Block). Two source-hygiene issues were also found: the ETHNews source is fully dead (HTTP 410, no archive), and the CoinJournal source's stored archive_url points to an unrelated BingX article rather than the cited ECHO-token piece. Coverage gaps include the later user claims process, the still-undetermined root cause of the key compromise itself, and limited independent access to the Hacken audit page.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}