Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443518085
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:47:35.870Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CB1pT8K25m8HPXov39HcRK333SsRAUcz53HPLy8XJ1AZ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1387 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:47:35.604Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"8f995061-a7d5-44c2-b533-3d550f96d862","new_score":18,"page_slug":"garden-finance-cross-chain-bridge-july-2026-solver-database-exploit","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's core factual scaffolding — the $450K July 2026 solver-database incident, the $11.4M October 2025 DPRK-attributed solver breach, and the ZachXBT/Taylor Monahan illicit-flow allegations — is well corroborated by multiple independent outlets and is presented with generally fair attribution of disputed points (e.g., ZachXBT vs. Gulati, ZachXBT vs. Garden on solver independence). The most significant issue is that the page treats Garden Finance's own self-reported root cause for the July 2026 incident ('solver database exploit, contracts untouched') as confirmed fact, when no independent forensic report has been published for that incident and at least one of the page's own cited sources contemporaneously suggested the contracts may have been targeted directly. The page is also stale on current operating status, still implying an open-ended offline/under-review state as of its latest timeline entry despite the live site appearing operational as of the review date.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}