Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Ankr
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 58 (+20)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514528
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:16:00.665Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9e9TDMXKDRbn5ePghK8eBMPG1ZWigzGZsjPMPbW1hKVp
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1430 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:00.536Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"7a1254db-5cf5-448b-99b9-e773bf1ae9ee","new_score":58,"page_slug":"ankr","prev_score":38,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration adjudication. The reviewer found zero disputed claims (disputed_pct = 0%) and confirmed all six claim_findings as supported. Ankr suffered an insider supply chain attack by a former employee in December 2022 — it was not a fraudulent operator. The current score of 38 (WARNING band) over-penalizes the entity by attributing Helio Protocol's separate oracle vulnerability (claim_findings[2], ~$15–15.5M in Helio losses) as Ankr's direct culpability, and by understating that 17 of 19 affected protocols received 100% compensation (claim_findings[1]). The remaining caveats — a narrow 50% partial-reimbursement dispute with Stader/pStake LP users and no confirmed prosecution — are real but do not rise to WARNING severity for a company with no regulatory enforcement (claim_findings[4]) and active legitimate operations serving 80+ blockchains (claim_findings[5]). A score of 58 in the CAUTIONARY band correctly reflects the serious-but-resolved nature of the incident. Reviewer confidence was 0.82; this verdict is consistent with that confidence level.","score_delta":20,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}