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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_approve · Ankr
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
3858 (+20)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426514528
Off-chain at
2026-06-14T23:16:00.665Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9e9TDMXKDRbn5ePghK8eBMPG1ZWigzGZsjPMPbW1hKVp
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1430 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:00.536Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"7a1254db-5cf5-448b-99b9-e773bf1ae9ee","new_score":58,"page_slug":"ankr","prev_score":38,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration adjudication. The reviewer found zero disputed claims (disputed_pct = 0%) and confirmed all six claim_findings as supported. Ankr suffered an insider supply chain attack by a former employee in December 2022 — it was not a fraudulent operator. The current score of 38 (WARNING band) over-penalizes the entity by attributing Helio Protocol's separate oracle vulnerability (claim_findings[2], ~$15–15.5M in Helio losses) as Ankr's direct culpability, and by understating that 17 of 19 affected protocols received 100% compensation (claim_findings[1]). The remaining caveats — a narrow 50% partial-reimbursement dispute with Stader/pStake LP users and no confirmed prosecution — are real but do not rise to WARNING severity for a company with no regulatory enforcement (claim_findings[4]) and active legitimate operations serving 80+ blockchains (claim_findings[5]). A score of 58 in the CAUTIONARY band correctly reflects the serious-but-resolved nature of the incident. Reviewer confidence was 0.82; this verdict is consistent with that confidence level.","score_delta":20,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}