Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Circle Internet Financial
- Sequence
- #8
- Score
- 62 → 51 (-11)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462181136
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:00:14.888Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:00:25.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:00:25.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 2SacA6FHgihwhVqRd54Mkm9L4uECtUbSj36FcXc5g8XX
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1921 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"33c7924dd0ea33fe5c698f29611876f8","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:00:14.570Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"83786d67-bd35-49b7-bd52-5b4615943f5a","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"circle-internet-financial","prev_score":62,"reason":"Of 12 checked claims, 3 could not be verified (claim_findings[6], [10], [11]) and none were disputed, giving 25%, which falls in the minor-issues band. The most important defect is claim_findings[0]: the summary calls the OCC trust bank approval conditional, but final approval was reported on July 10, 2026, and the page does not mention it (omission_findings[0]). Core allegations about the Drift hack, the McCollum lawsuit and ZachXBT's tally were supported by fetched sources, though some detail is not backed by the cited source (claim_findings[8], the Mango $57.5M figure). The penalty is kept moderate because the reviewer's confidence is low and many claims were not checked, and the open high-priority gap on lawsuit status after April 2026 should be followed up.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-11,"score_limit":{"applied":-11,"limited":true,"proposed":-12,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":8,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The material omission (final OCC approval in July 2026, subject_status.contradicts_page) is a stale-status problem that favours the subject, not a shutdown, exploit or sanction. It is already reflected in the revise verdict and the upper part of the minor band, so the band is not escalated further."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}