Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · MoonHacker
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 48 → 48 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465082240
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-03T23:22:32.915Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-03T23:24:03.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-03T23:24:03.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GGW61RJX4SYq2J3GfhvN2JXZnUk9XT844aorWyg3yCn3
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1269 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"4de737a2c534224724ae7f61ff167ccf","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-03T23:22:32.845Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4444,"findings_hash":"AXV54j7h6hZWNvJHt36By89McM1d7Ba4v6ZzR8uxQvSr","investigation_id":"0b5775ae-4d7b-40c9-b388-53a4f8c826e1","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":48,"page_content_hash":"fe6adcd95ca5248f932d068a3682a390ecc1806bea6b30be320fad2a5b79a689","page_slug":"moonhacker","prev_score":48,"reason":"Core facts (date, ~$320K USDC loss, executeOperation validation flaw, addresses, Moonwell non-affiliation) hold up. The summary wrongly says stolen funds were routed through Tornado Cash; sources say only the attacker's funding came from it. The Dedaub, ZachXBT and deployer-contact claims could not be verified, and the timeline entries carry no sources. I did not fetch SolidityScan, ChainCatcher or BlockThreat in full.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":9,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"unknown","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}