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← StablR — Multisig Exploit and EURR/USDR Depegreviewed 2026-11-02 · 9 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read StablR — Multisig Exploit and EURR/USDR Depeg against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

unverifiable 3partially supported 2confirmed 40 corrections pending · 0 applied

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The May 2026 Multisig Exploit
    “destroying about 2.7 million EURR (roughly $2.4 million) that belonged to a third party”
    reviewerAttacker blacklisted and burned about 2.7M EURR (~$2.4M) belonging to a third partyNot found in the fetched The Block text; the likely source was blocked.
  2. #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Pre-Existing Governance Concerns: Management's Payvision History
    “FinTelegram, an outlet that has run a sustained critical campaign against StablR and Payvision's legacy, attributes the fines as €180,000 to Rudolf Booker and €150,000 to Cheng Liem Li”
    reviewerDutch Public Prosecution Service settled AML cases against two former Payvision directors in April 2024; fine attribution (Booker EUR 180,000, Li EUR 150,000)I did not fetch the Vixio or FinTelegram pages, so I could not check this. The page already hedges it appropriately as single-source.
  3. #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Institutional Backing Context
    “Tether announced an equity investment in StablR on December 17, 2024”
    reviewerTether announced an equity investment in StablR on Dec 17, 2024Not fetched in this pass. Consistent with my prior knowledge but not verified.

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Regulatory Notification and Ongoing Suspension
    “approximately 6.41 million EURR and 14.33 million USDR of unauthorized tokens (more than 20 million units combined) remained in circulation”
    reviewerStablR notification disclosed ~6.41M EURR and 14.33M USDR unauthorized tokens in circulation (>20M combined)Figures match EFRI, which is an advocacy source relaying StablR's notification. They exceed the ~12.85M minted in the May attack (USDR 14.33M vs 8.35M minted). The page does not reconcile this, and I did not see the primary notification.
  2. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
    “confirmed in a regulatory notification that more than 20 million unbacked token units remained in circulation with no redemption timetable”
    reviewerSummary states unbacked tokens 'confirmed in a regulatory notification' three months laterThe only source is EFRI's characterization. The recipient of the notification was not verified.

confirmed

4 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The May 2026 Multisig Exploit
    “minted approximately 8.35 million USDR and 4.5 million EURR, together valued at roughly $13.5 million at face value”
    reviewerAttacker compromised one signer of a 1-of-3 minting multisig and minted about 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR (~$13.5M)The Block confirms figures and the key-compromise attribution.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The May 2026 Multisig Exploit
    “StablR itself acknowledged the exploit on X at about 8:10 AM ET, roughly eight hours after on-chain activity on the affected contracts had stopped.”
    reviewerAbout $10.4M face value swapped to ETH; ~$2.8M initial proceeds; Exploiter 2 wallet held 1,488 ETH (~$3.15M); ZachXBT times; StablR acknowledgement 8:10 AM ETConsistent with The Block. The 'on X' venue and the 2.7M EURR blacklist-and-burn claim were not checked (Crowdfund Insider returned 403).
  3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: EURR/USDR Depeg and Market Impact
    “The Block reported EURR fell to a low of $0.85, which it described as a roughly 26% decline from an expected value near $1.15”
    reviewerEURR fell to $0.85, about 26% below an expected ~$1.15; USDR low figures inconsistentAccurately reported, and the page flags the USDR inconsistency itself. The page also contains an editorial aside about a 'prior version of this page', which is odd in published prose.
  4. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Notification and Ongoing Suspension
    “As of EFRI's reporting (August 28, 2026), StablR's website still described EURR and USDR as "fully collateralized" and redeemable at par”
    reviewerEFRI submitted renewed request to MFSA on 24 Aug 2026; website still said 'fully collateralized' on Aug 28Supported by EFRI.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.