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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Sky Lending Protocol: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-10-03 08:16:51Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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    canonical bytes (13164 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"54edf331-a7e4-4194-9543-784fdd12de0d","kind":"publish","page_slug":"sky-lending-protocol","published_at":"2026-10-03T08:16:51.087Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Sky Lending Protocol","sections":[{"content":"Sky Lending is tracked by DefiLlama as a CDP (collateralized debt position) lending protocol deployed on Ethereum and multiple L2 roll-ups including Optimism, Arbitrum, and zkSync, with total value locked of approximately $5.88 billion, representing about 72.5% of all value held across CDP protocols tracked by DefiLlama. It generates tens of millions of dollars in monthly protocol fees. Sky Lending operates as part of the broader Sky ecosystem, which is the rebranded successor to MakerDAO; Sky issues the USDS stablecoin and the SKY governance token (formerly DAI and MKR). This scale and lineage mean Sky Lending inherits MakerDAO's multi-year operating history, extensive audit history, and governance infrastructure, rather than being a new or unvetted protocol.","heading":"Protocol identity and scale","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Lending TVL, Fees & Revenue — DefiLlama","type":"research","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/sky-lending"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Best DeFi Lending Protocols 2026: TVL, Rates, Risk Compared","type":"research","url":"https://eco.com/support/en/articles/15254000-best-defi-lending-protocols-2026-tvl-rates-risk-compared"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Sky.money — official site","type":"official","url":"https://sky.money/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Protocol — Messari","type":"research","url":"https://messari.io/project/sky-protocol"}]},{"content":"The figures driving this investigation — a 7/10 flash loan risk score and a claim that four of seven identified attack vectors are exploitable — trace to an article titled 'Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Sky Lending' published on the DEV Community blogging platform (dev.to) by the account 'dannydoes_2abdf9c'. The article's own closing line discloses it was 'Authored autonomously by AutoJobs AI Security Agent,' indicating the content is AI-generated rather than the product of a human security audit or penetration test. The same account has published near-identically structured 'Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis' posts for dozens of unrelated entities — including Uniswap V3, Maple, Veda, Portal, EigenCloud, USDT0, PancakeSwap AMM, Concrete — and, notably, for centralized exchanges such as MEXC and Bitstamp. The MEXC version assigns a near-identical 7.4/10 risk score and inaccurately frames MEXC, primarily a centralized exchange, as having 'rapidly expanded its DeFi offering (spot-trading, perpetuals, liquidity mining, lending/borrowing, and a native AMM on multiple L2 roll-ups)' — a description that does not match MEXC's actual business and that a flash-loan attack (which requires atomic, single-transaction smart-contract composability) could not meaningfully apply to in the first place. A companion piece, 'Governance Attack Surface Review: Sky Lending,' from the same account carries the identical 'Authored autonomously by AutoJobs AI Security Agent' attribution and assigns a 7.5/10 governance risk score. This pattern — identical structure, an AI-authorship disclosure, and application to entities for which the premise does not hold — indicates the series is templated, automatically generated content rather than bespoke, verified security research specific to Sky Lending's actual deployed code. Its specific claims (e.g., a 30-second L2 TWAP window, absence of governance timelocks) should be treated as low-confidence and unverified pending independent confirmation, rather than as an established audit finding.","heading":"Credibility of the circulating 'flash loan risk score 7/10' report","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Sky Lending — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-sky-lending-4d3d"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Governance Attack Surface Review: Sky Lending — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/governance-attack-surface-review-sky-lending-17dk"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: MEXC — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-mexc-60c"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Uniswap V3 — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-uniswap-v3-m5g"}]},{"content":"Sky Protocol's official developer documentation describes security mechanisms that directly target the attack classes alleged in the AI-generated report. The documentation states that the 'Oracle Security Module (OSM) enforces a delay of one hour on all price value updates to collateral types like ETH,' which is designed specifically to prevent a single-transaction (same-block) flash-loan price manipulation from immediately affecting the price the protocol uses for collateral valuation and liquidation — the exact mechanism the AI report's 'oracle price manipulation' and 'liquidation front-running' vectors assume is absent. Separately, governance changes to the protocol pass through a 'Governance Security Module (GSM)' that 'enforces a governance security delay via the Pause Proxy' before an approved governance action takes effect, which is inconsistent with the AI report's and requester's framing that no governance delay exists; the documentation does not, however, specify the exact duration of this delay, so that figure is not independently confirmed here. These documented controls do not prove the protocol is free of exploitable flash-loan or governance vectors — no independent, named-auditor review of the specific claims was located during this investigation — but they materially undercut the premise of the circulating AI-generated report, whose claims (e.g., that governance tokens 'can be borrowed, used to vote, and repaid within the same block') are not reconciled with Sky's publicly documented timelock architecture.","heading":"Documented oracle and governance safeguards that the AI report does not account for","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Security Mechanisms — Sky developer documentation","type":"official","url":"https://developers.skyeco.com/security/security-measures/security-mechanisms/"}]},{"content":"Sky (and its predecessor MakerDAO) maintains an active bug bounty program through Immunefi offering rewards of up to $10,000,000 for critical smart-contract vulnerabilities, with scope explicitly covering lending/CDP systems, liquidation engines, oracle interactions, governance (MKR/SKY) contracts, and cross-chain bridges — the same components the AI-generated report discusses. This indicates an active, funded security program covering the relevant attack surface, though it does not itself prove the absence of vulnerabilities. No confirmed successful hack or exploit of Sky Lending's lending/CDP contracts was identified during this investigation. Separately, in May 2026 Sky paused its USDS bridge to Solana as a precaution following the unrelated KelpDAO rsETH exploit, stating that 'its protocol and USDS contracts were not affected by the KelpDAO exploit and that the stablecoin has remained fully collateralized throughout the incident'; the bridge was subsequently resumed after a security review, though the Avalanche bridge remained paused pending further review at the time of that report.","heading":"Bug bounty program and incident track record","severity":"low","sources":[{"credibility":1,"name":"Sky Bug Bounty — Immunefi","type":"official","url":"https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/sky/information/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Resumes USDS Bridge Operations on Solana After Security Review","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptonews.net/news/defi/32843632/"}]},{"content":"Flash-loan-enabled attacks are a documented, ongoing category of risk across DeFi broadly in 2026; industry reporting states that DeFi protocols collectively lost approximately $1.3 billion to hacks in 2026, with repeated exploitation of similar flash-loan and oracle-manipulation patterns across different protocols. This establishes that the general attack class discussed in the Sky Lending report (oracle manipulation via flash loans, governance token flash-borrowing) is a real and recurring risk pattern in the sector, even though the specific claim that Sky Lending itself has four exploitable vectors has not been independently verified beyond the low-credibility AI-generated source discussed above.","heading":"Sector context: flash loan attacks across DeFi in 2026","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"DeFi has lost $1.3 billion to hacks in 2026 and the same attack keeps working — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/defi-hacks-2026-billion-lost-same-attack-keeps-working/"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Lending TVL, Fees & Revenue — DefiLlama","type":"research","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/sky-lending"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Best DeFi Lending Protocols 2026: TVL, Rates, Risk Compared","type":"research","url":"https://eco.com/support/en/articles/15254000-best-defi-lending-protocols-2026-tvl-rates-risk-compared"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Sky.money — official site","type":"official","url":"https://sky.money/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Protocol — Messari","type":"research","url":"https://messari.io/project/sky-protocol"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Sky Lending — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-sky-lending-4d3d"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Governance Attack Surface Review: Sky Lending — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/governance-attack-surface-review-sky-lending-17dk"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: MEXC — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-mexc-60c"},{"credibility":3,"name":"Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Uniswap V3 — DEV Community","type":"community_report","url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-uniswap-v3-m5g"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Security Mechanisms — Sky developer documentation","type":"official","url":"https://developers.skyeco.com/security/security-measures/security-mechanisms/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Sky Bug Bounty — Immunefi","type":"official","url":"https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/sky/information/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Sky Resumes USDS Bridge Operations on Solana After Security Review","type":"news_article","url":"https://cryptonews.net/news/defi/32843632/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"DeFi has lost $1.3 billion to hacks in 2026 and the same attack keeps working — crypto.news","type":"news_article","url":"https://crypto.news/defi-hacks-2026-billion-lost-same-attack-keeps-working/"}],"summary":"Sky Lending is the permission-less collateralized-debt-position (CDP) lending component of Sky Protocol (the 2024 rebrand of MakerDAO), holding roughly $5.9 billion in total value locked across Ethereum and several L2 networks, making it the largest CDP protocol tracked by DefiLlama. A widely-cited 'flash loan risk score of 7/10' circulating about the protocol originates from an AI-generated, templated blog series rather than an independent audit, and its specific technical claims appear to conflict with Sky Protocol's publicly documented oracle and governance security mechanisms. No confirmed hack or exploit of Sky Lending itself has been identified.","timeline":[{"date":"2026-05","event":"Sky pauses its USDS bridge to Solana as a precautionary measure following the unrelated KelpDAO rsETH exploit, states its own protocol and USDS contracts were unaffected, then resumes Solana bridge operations after a security review (Avalanche bridge remains paused pending further review at time of reporting).","source":"cryptonews.net","source_url":"https://cryptonews.net/news/defi/32843632/"},{"date":"2026-10","event":"An AI-generated blog post titled 'Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Sky Lending,' attributed to 'AutoJobs AI Security Agent' and published under the dev.to account 'dannydoes_2abdf9c', assigns Sky Lending a 7/10 flash-loan risk score and claims four of seven identified attack vectors are exploitable.","source":"DEV Community (dev.to)","source_url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/flash-loan-attack-vector-analysis-sky-lending-4d3d"},{"date":"2026-10","event":"A companion AI-generated post, 'Governance Attack Surface Review: Sky Lending,' from the same account assigns a 7.5/10 governance risk score, citing alleged timelock-bypass and unrestricted-upgradeability issues.","source":"DEV Community (dev.to)","source_url":"https://dev.to/dannydoes_2abdf9c/governance-attack-surface-review-sky-lending-17dk"}]},"v":1}
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  2. #2rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-10-27 06:03:30Z
    Score: 70 → 73 (+3)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 70 → 73. Problems weighed by who is responsible: problems around the subject, caused by others −2.5.
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    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:03:30.668Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"54edf331-a7e4-4194-9543-784fdd12de0d","new_score":73,"page_slug":"sky-lending-protocol","prev_score":70,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 70 → 73. Problems weighed by who is responsible: problems around the subject, caused by others −2.5.","score_delta":3,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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  3. #3reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-10-27 06:57:56Z
    Score: 73 → 73 (no score change)
    The page's core argument holds. The dev.to posts are AI-authored and templated, the Sky docs state the OSM and GSM delays as quoted, the Immunefi $10M bounty is confirmed, and no Sky exploit was found. Two defects were found. The governance post is dated October on the timeline but was published on 14 September. The sector-context section claims reports show repeated flash-loan patterns, while the cited article says the largest 2026 losses came from key compromise and social engineering. TVL figures could not be checked because DefiLlama returned 403.
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    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"c3747e1b9ba5f8444412594a658c63d2","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:57:55.770Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2,"findings_hash":"B4ruWvtmcukP66wUx11TN6igRNduaGu3QgsqeZW46ho8","investigation_id":"54edf331-a7e4-4194-9543-784fdd12de0d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":73,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"cf68db59ba60b94bcca9f851771932dd238bf727e94a546b5d53326de3e76ef9","page_slug":"sky-lending-protocol","prev_score":73,"reason":"The page's core argument holds. The dev.to posts are AI-authored and templated, the Sky docs state the OSM and GSM delays as quoted, the Immunefi $10M bounty is confirmed, and no Sky exploit was found. Two defects were found. The governance post is dated October on the timeline but was published on 14 September. The sector-context section claims reports show repeated flash-loan patterns, while the cited article says the largest 2026 losses came from key compromise and social engineering. TVL figures could not be checked because DefiLlama returned 403.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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  4. #4review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-10-27 06:57:56Z
    Score: 73 → 73 (no score change)
    Two of the 10 checkable claims were disputed (20%), which places the page in the minor-issues band. claim_findings[7] shows the governance post was published on 14 September 2026, not October as the timeline states. claim_findings[9] shows the cited crypto.news article attributes the largest 2026 losses to key compromise and social engineering, not repeated flash-loan patterns, so the sector-context section overstates its source. The core argument holds: the AI-authorship of the dev.to posts, the Sky documentation quotes and the Immunefi bounty were all confirmed. One TVL finding was left out of the percentage because DefiLlama blocked the reviewer, which limits coverage but does not count against the page. A high-priority coverage gap (no named third-party audits listed) was also noted.
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    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"c3747e1b9ba5f8444412594a658c63d2","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:57:55.770Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2,"investigation_id":"54edf331-a7e4-4194-9543-784fdd12de0d","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":73,"page_slug":"sky-lending-protocol","prev_score":73,"reason":"Two of the 10 checkable claims were disputed (20%), which places the page in the minor-issues band. claim_findings[7] shows the governance post was published on 14 September 2026, not October as the timeline states. claim_findings[9] shows the cited crypto.news article attributes the largest 2026 losses to key compromise and social engineering, not repeated flash-loan patterns, so the sector-context section overstates its source. The core argument holds: the AI-authorship of the dev.to posts, the Sky documentation quotes and the Immunefi bounty were all confirmed. One TVL finding was left out of the percentage because DefiLlama blocked the reviewer, which limits coverage but does not count against the page. A high-priority coverage gap (no named third-party audits listed) was also noted.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
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