← PiggyBank Protocolreviewed 2026-10-16 · 25 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read PiggyBank Protocol against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed 2unverifiable 2stale 3link rot 2partially supported 2confirmed 147 corrections pending · 0 applied
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“The protocol's smart contracts were audited by Formal Land, the formal-verification team associated with Tezos and Nomadic Labs; an audit report PDF is linked from the protocol's website.”
reviewerPiggyBank's smart contracts were audited by Formal Land and an audit report PDF is linked from the protocol's website.The page states an 'audit report PDF' is linked, stated as settled fact in this section (contrast with the appropriately hedged Smart Contract Audit section). The actual linked file is not an audit document at all; it is an unrelated flyer graphic. This does not prove no audit exists, only that this specific linked file does not substantiate one.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The protocol states its smart contracts were audited by Formal Land, the formal-verification team it describes as associated with Tezos and Nomadic Labs; a PDF labeled as an audit report is linked from the protocol's website, but the linked file is a Canva-generated image flyer with no audit content, not a technical audit document. - #20[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Smart Contract Audit
“The independent verification of the scope, date, and findings of this audit — including whether any critical or high-severity issues were identified and remediated — could not be confirmed from available public sources at the time of this investigation, as the audit document is a binary PDF that was not processable in text form.”
reviewerA PDF audit report is linked from the protocol's official website; independent verification of its scope, date, and findings could not be confirmed because the audit document is a binary PDF that was not processable in text form.This is the same underlying defect as the sections[0] finding: the linked 'audit PDF' is not an audit document at all. The page's framing ('not processable in text form') understates the issue and should be corrected to reflect that the content itself does not relate to a smart-contract audit.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The independent verification of the scope, date, and findings of this audit — including whether any critical or high-severity issues were identified and remediated — could not be confirmed, because the file linked from the site under an audit-report label is in fact a Canva-generated image flyer unrelated to a smart-contract audit, not a technical audit document in any processable or unprocessable form.
unverifiable
2 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #2[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“with over 2,500 users and a cumulative net performance figure of $188K stated on the protocol's homepage”
reviewerPiggyBank's homepage states over 2,500 users and a cumulative net performance figure of $188K.The site's user-facing numbers are dynamic and may have changed since the page was written; this reviewer could not access the archived snapshot to confirm the figures were accurate as of the investigation date. Not disputed, but not independently confirmable.citedwww.piggybank.fi/ - #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Disclosure, Transparency, and NAV Accounting Concerns
“No regulatory action had been initiated against PiggyBank in connection with these concerns as of the investigation date.”
reviewerNo regulatory action had been initiated against PiggyBank in connection with the LAB incident as of the investigation date.No reporting found either confirming or denying regulatory activity; this is a reasonable but unverifiable negative claim.
stale
3 claimsThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #8[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: LAB Basis-Trade Loss and Vault NAV Drawdowns
“as of the investigation date that report had not been publicly released”
reviewerAs of the investigation date, PiggyBank's promised post-mortem report (trade records, risk thresholds, loss calculations, unlock management plans) had not been publicly released.The page's own cited sources_used were archived in late July 2026, well after the post-mortem was published on June 10, so the claim that the report 'had not been publicly released' as of the investigation date is outdated/incorrect. This same error recurs in sections[3] and timeline[8].Proposed correction (not yet applied)a drawdown/post-mortem report was published on or around June 10, 2026, disclosing a trade loss of approximately $476,400 and a net value decline of approximately $578,900 on June 6, attributing the forced close to funding rates reaching an estimated -17,000% annualized, and outlining a plan to gradually sell the locked LAB holdings between the August 14 and October 14, 2026 unlock windows - #15[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Disclosure, Transparency, and NAV Accounting Concerns
“the post-mortem report promised by the protocol in its initial disclosure had not been published as of the investigation date”
reviewerThe post-mortem report promised by PiggyBank had not been published as of the investigation date, per the Disclosure/Transparency section.Same underlying error as the finding in sections[1] and timeline[8]; grouped together.Proposed correction (not yet applied)the drawdown/post-mortem report promised by the protocol in its initial disclosure was published on or around June 10, 2026 - #23[stale][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“TokenPost and CoinCu publish coverage of the incident. PiggyBank's detailed post-mortem report, promised for 'the following week,' has not yet been published.”
reviewerPiggyBank's detailed post-mortem report, promised for 'the following week,' had not yet been published as of June 7, 2026 coverage.As of June 7 the report genuinely had not yet appeared, so the statement was accurate for that date, but the page frames this as the still-current state as of the investigation date (with sources_used archived in late July 2026), which is stale. Same defect group as the sections[1] and sections[3] findings.Proposed correction (not yet applied)TokenPost and CoinCu publish coverage of the incident. PiggyBank's detailed post-mortem report, promised for 'the following week,' was published a few days later, on or around June 10, 2026, disclosing a trade loss of approximately $476,400.
link rot
2 claimsA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #24[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: LAB Basis-Trade Loss and Vault NAV Drawdowns
“https://coincu.com/piggybank-15-drawdown-usdc-vault-lab-basis-trading-error/”
reviewerPiggyBank's LAB hedge-failure coverage is sourced in part to coincu.com, a currently reachable news article.Low confidence this is genuine link rot versus a transient server error or bot-blocking; flagged for moderator attention rather than certain. The page's claims are independently corroborated by its other three cited sources for this section regardless.Proposed correction (not yet applied)https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/piggybanks-lab-hedge-fails-cutting-usdc-vault-nav-by-15-percent - #25[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://coincu.com/piggybank-15-drawdown-usdc-vault-lab-basis-trading-error/”
reviewerThe same URL (coincu.com) is also cited in sources_used.Grouped with the sections[1] occurrence of the same dead/erroring link.Proposed correction (not yet applied)https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/piggybanks-lab-hedge-fails-cutting-usdc-vault-nav-by-15-percent
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“both Dubai-based”
reviewerZachXBT's May 2026 investigation alleged insiders controlled over 95% of LAB's total supply of one billion tokens, and identified co-founders as Vova Sadkov (@vsadkovv) and 'Mark' (@tokensaler), both Dubai-based.1B total supply, 95%+ insider control, and the two co-founder names/handles are all independently confirmed. The specific claim that both are 'Dubai-based' is only confirmed for Mark; Sadkov is described in the cited reporting as UAE-based generally, not Dubai specifically. Dubai is in the UAE so this may be accurate but is not independently verified. - #17[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Prior Incident: Drift Protocol Hack Exposure (April 2026)
“PiggyBank reported that it had approximately $106,000 in exposure through its delta-neutral strategies deployed on or through Drift. Notably, PiggyBank reimbursed its affected users in full from the protocol's own team treasury rather than passing losses to depositors.”
reviewerPiggyBank had approximately $106,000 in exposure to the April 2026 Drift Protocol hack and reimbursed affected users in full from the protocol's own team treasury.The $106,000 figure and full reimbursement are confirmed by multiple outlets; those outlets describe the funding source simply as 'the team,' not specifically 'team treasury' — a plausible but not independently itemized detail.
confirmed
14 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“The protocol operates three live vaults: a USDC stablecoin vault ($3.06M TVL), a SPYx tokenized-stock vault ($823K TVL), and a JitoSOL liquid-staking vault ($639K TVL), with additional vaults for TSLAx and NVDAx listed as coming soon.”
reviewerPiggyBank operates three live vaults with specific TVL figures (USDC $3.06M, SPYx $823K, JitoSOL $639K), with TSLAx and NVDAx coming soon.Figures match the live site exactly, though TVL is a live/dynamic figure that could drift over time.citedwww.piggybank.fi/ - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“Vault deposits return pb-tokens representing proportional ownership; withdrawals are processed on a 48-to-96-hour epoch cycle. The core yield strategy for the USDC vault is described as a delta-neutral approach based on funding-rate arbitrage across approximately ten perpetual decentralized exchanges, with up to 5x leverage.”
reviewerWithdrawals are processed on a 48-to-96-hour epoch cycle; USDC vault uses funding-rate arbitrage across ~10 perpetual DEXs with up to 5x leverage.Matches the live official site description closely. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview
“The team describes itself as having backgrounds in blockchain engineering, financial engineering, and quantitative research, but no individual team members are publicly named on the protocol's website or documentation.”
reviewerPiggyBank does not publicly name any individual team members; team described only by generic background.Confirmed directly on the live site. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: LAB Basis-Trade Loss and Vault NAV Drawdowns
“The protocol stated it had entered the position approximately one month prior by purchasing locked LAB tokens at a discount through an OTC desk, representing an initial outlay of roughly $100,000 and approximately 2% of total portfolio value at the time of entry.”
reviewerPiggyBank entered a ~$100,000 OTC position in locked LAB tokens roughly one month before the June 6, 2026 disclosure, representing ~2% of portfolio value, hedged with perpetual shorts.Multiple outlets agree on amount, timing, and structure. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: LAB Basis-Trade Loss and Vault NAV Drawdowns
“PiggyBank characterized this exclusion as 'the fairest and most transparent way to let users manage their liquidity' and committed to publishing a detailed post-mortem report including trade records, risk thresholds, loss calculations, and unlock management plans”
reviewerThe hedge was unwound after the protocol described conditions as 'violent manipulation,' thin liquidity, and deeply negative funding rates; locked LAB valued ~$1.35M at disclosure and excluded from NAV until Aug 14 unlock; NAV declines of USDC -15%, SPYx -12%, JitoSOL -9%; PiggyBank called the exclusion 'the fairest and most transparent way to let users manage their liquidity.'All sub-facts independently verified across multiple outlets, including the exact quote. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“On-chain investigator ZachXBT publicly criticized PiggyBank following the June 2026 disclosure, stating the protocol had 'lost user assets gambling on blatant scam coins.'”
reviewerOn-chain investigator ZachXBT stated PiggyBank 'lost user assets gambling on blatant scam coins.'Exact quote confirmed, correctly presented as a partial excerpt. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“ran OTC loan schemes at 7.5% monthly interest rates with 60–80% discounts to market price, unilaterally extended vesting cliffs for retail participants from three months to nine months without buyer consent, and coordinated with a market maker and Bitget insiders to engineer a 350%+ price pump to a $6 billion fully diluted valuation in early May 2026 before a 65%+ crash within hours”
reviewerLAB co-founders ran OTC loan schemes at 7.5% monthly interest with 60-80% discounts to market price, unilaterally extended vesting cliffs from three to nine months without consent, and coordinated with a market maker and Bitget insiders to pump the token 350%+ to a $6B FDV before a 65%+ crash within hours.All figures independently verified, though these remain ZachXBT's allegations rather than adjudicated findings, as the page itself notes. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“ZachXBT further alleged that 226 million LAB tokens were deposited into Bitget accounts by insider-linked wallets between March and April 2026.”
reviewer226 million LAB tokens were deposited into Bitget accounts by insider-linked wallets between March and April 2026.Confirmed by both sources. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“ZachXBT also posted a $10,000 bounty for documents relating to LAB co-founder Vova Sadkov and called for Binance, Bitget, and Gate.io to freeze insider profits or delist LAB immediately.”
reviewerZachXBT posted a $10,000 bounty for documents relating to LAB co-founder Vova Sadkov and called for Binance, Bitget, and Gate.io to freeze insider profits or delist LAB immediately.Confirmed. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Allegations: Risk Management and LAB Token Quality
“discrepancies in circulating supply figures across CoinGecko, CoinMarketCap, and RootData — are independently reported”
reviewerUnderlying data points on circulating supply figures across CoinGecko, CoinMarketCap, and RootData are independently reported as inconsistent.Confirmed via independent secondary research. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Prior Incident: Drift Protocol Hack Exposure (April 2026)
“In April 2026, PiggyBank was among more than twenty protocols affected by the Drift Protocol hack, in which attackers drained approximately $285 million from Drift on April 1, 2026 using fake collateral and pre-signed administrative transactions.”
reviewerThe April 2026 Drift Protocol hack drained approximately $285 million using fake collateral and pre-signed administrative transactions, affecting more than twenty protocols, and was attributed by Elliptic and TRM Labs to DPRK-linked threat actors.Confirmed via primary security-firm reporting (TRM Labs) in addition to the cited news outlets; Elliptic's DPRK attribution also independently found. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team Anonymity and Governance
“PiggyBank Protocol does not publicly identify any individual team members on its website, documentation, or social media profiles as of the investigation date. The protocol lists a contact email (hi@piggybank.fi) and maintains a presence on X/Twitter (@piggybank_fi) and Discord.”
reviewerPiggyBank does not publicly identify any individual team members and lists a contact email and social presence; no legal entity has been identified.Confirmed. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“LAB token launches its token generation event, positioning as an AI-powered trading terminal.”
reviewerLAB token launched its token generation event in approximately October 2025, positioning as an AI-powered trading terminal.Confirmed. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Approximately 100 million LAB tokens are moved to ten newly created wallets. LAB surges over 350% within 72 hours to a $6 billion FDV before crashing 65%+.”
reviewerAround May 11, 2026, approximately 100 million LAB tokens were moved to ten newly created wallets, and LAB surged over 350% within 72 hours to a $6 billion FDV before crashing 65%+.Note that some other secondary outlets (Tangem, Pluang) report different pump/crash percentages (500%/84%, 70%/24hr), so figures vary by source; the page's figures match at least two of its own cited/related sources.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.