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Audit log

Every state-changing event for Orange Finance: moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

  1. #1publishby system:backfill
    2026-05-30 04:47:53Z
    Score: ? → ? (no score change)
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 423,086,625
    sig
    5rrj3ntJJi88…RUuPqaZ2explorer ↗
    hash
    7xowMsNw3itN…jWHHDn2Gsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (6970 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"553a92d2-ee3f-4280-ae05-a6e447c45f5c","kind":"publish","page_slug":"orange-finance","published_at":"2026-05-30T04:47:53.323Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Orange Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.orangefinance.io/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://mirror.xyz/0x6FA2aF9a4d6fFe654361F713780963C10412e7c3/IYCNZKmmxDL5V94ScyCZVXqoRzl7kIkhRxUIpMkUE1Y","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/orange-finance-ltipp-application-final/21664","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://blog.stryke.xyz/articles/elevating-defi-stryke-orange-finance-unite","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://rekt.news/orange-finance-rekt/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/orange-finance-hack","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/orangefinancesmartcontractprivatekeycompromised.php","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.sentnl.io/resources/explained-orange-finance-falls-to-multi-sig-exploit-january-2025","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://ashourics.medium.com/orange-finance-exploit-a-deep-technical-analysis-of-defi-security-architecture-failures-85fcf4380e62","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://crypto.news/arbitrums-largest-liquidity-manager-orange-finance-loses-840k-in-hacker-attack/","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.sentnl.io/resources/explained-orange-finance-falls-to-multi-sig-exploit-january-2025","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://ashourics.medium.com/orange-finance-exploit-a-deep-technical-analysis-of-defi-security-architecture-failures-85fcf4380e62","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://zircon.tech/blog/security-breach-at-orange-finance-a-wake-up-call-for-web3-projects/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://github.com/orange-finance/alpha-contract/blob/main/audit-report/Orange_Finance_Audit_Report_by_WatchPug.pdf","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/orange-finance-compromised-contract-arbitrum/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/orangefinancesmartcontractprivatekeycompromised.php","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://mirror.xyz/0x6FA2aF9a4d6fFe654361F713780963C10412e7c3/gN17YMrLhKKg9YT9a391U74pWr9IhqBUDWUqDyDamjE","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.mitrade.com/insights/news/live-news/article-3-559683-20250108","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://t.me/s/investigations","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/white-hat-hackers-arbitrum-orange-attack/","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/orange-finance","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/orange-finance-hack","type":"other","url":""}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/orange-finance-ltipp-application-final/21664","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://mirror.xyz/0x6FA2aF9a4d6fFe654361F713780963C10412e7c3/_lqeem2-b20xw4kFWERYtVyXHgSvvpFNiTUvyDi5irg","type":"other","url":""},{"credibility":3,"name":"https://defillama.com/protocol/orange-finance","type":"other","url":""}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Orange Finance is an Arbitrum-based automated liquidity management protocol designed for LPDfi (liquidity provider DeFi), enabling users to earn swap fees and options premiums via concentrated AMM vaults. On January 8, 2025, the protocol suffered a critical security breach in which an attacker compromised the admin private key, exploited a misconfigured multi-signature wallet that required only a single signature to execute, and drained approximately $843,556 across all active vaults. The protocol was flagged by ZachXBT and has not resumed normal operations since the incident.","timeline":[{"date":"2023-01-01","event":"Orange Finance publishes 2023 roadmap on Mirror, outlining plans for Uniswap v3 automated liquidity management vaults on Arbitrum.","source":""},{"date":"2023-06-01","event":"Orange Finance Alpha Orange Vault launches on Arbitrum, targeting the USDC.e/ETH pool with delta-hedging via Aave.","source":""},{"date":"2024-04-01","event":"Orange Finance submits LTIPP grant application to the Arbitrum Foundation requesting 150,000 ARB, reporting $1.32M TVL and 170 depositors.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-01","event":"Orange Finance and Stryke Protocol announce vault integration partnership, enabling liquidity management for Stryke's options AMM.","source":""},{"date":"2024-12-01","event":"Orange Finance expands to Berachain, launching Orange Vaults with Stryke. Protocol TVL reaches approximately $1.5M on Arbitrum.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-08","event":"Attacker compromises Orange Finance admin private key, exploits single-signature multi-sig misconfiguration, upgrades all smart contracts, and drains approximately $843,556 across all active vaults on Arbitrum. Stolen assets converted to ETH and bridged via Stargate.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-08","event":"Orange Finance posts warning on X advising users to revoke all contract approvals. Team states they are 'not sure what happened' and that contracts are no longer under their control.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-08","event":"Orange Finance sends on-chain message to attacker's address offering white-hat arrangement with 24-hour deadline and guarantee of no law enforcement involvement.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-08","event":"Stryke Protocol pauses associated vaults and disables deposits/withdrawals as a precautionary measure following the exploit.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-09","event":"Orange Finance publishes follow-up incident report on Mirror detailing loss breakdown by wallet, attack steps, and notes engagement of Seal 911 for investigation.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-09","event":"A separate Arbitrum-based protocol targeted by a copycat attack similar to Orange Finance's exploit; white-hat hackers successfully prevent fund loss.","source":""},{"date":"2025-01-09","event":"CyversAlerts and multiple on-chain security monitors publish alerts cataloguing the Orange Finance exploit. Incident flagged by ZachXBT's investigations channel.","source":""}]},"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision c7f5ec52-547b-404f-940e-1d6ad7f64ab1
  2. #2rescoreby systemsystem
    2026-10-27 06:07:05Z
    Score: 28 → 50 (+22)
    Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 28 → 50. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6.4, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.4; legitimacy credit long-running +4; no longer operating, so capped at 50.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 461,966,249
    sig
    4QtrkfYV7Ngy…a1dREwDkexplorer ↗
    hash
    F4eJAWbzQbEJ…Bqm4rxc4sha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (683 B) ▸
    {"actor":"system","decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:07:05.405Z","decision":"rescore","investigation_id":"553a92d2-ee3f-4280-ae05-a6e447c45f5c","new_score":50,"page_slug":"orange-finance","prev_score":28,"reason":"Rescored under Scoring v2, the published formula (avoid.net/scoring): 28 → 50. Problems weighed by who is responsible: incidents the subject suffered −6.4, concerns that are not fraud −3.2, problems around the subject, caused by others −2.4; legitimacy credit long-running +4; no longer operating, so capped at 50.","score_delta":22,"score_model":"v2","sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 73bb84d3-c190-4a13-b619-8bc65e3f3778
  3. #3reviewby reviewerreviewer
    2026-11-02 00:13:51Z
    Score: 50 → 50 (no score change)
    The core exploit facts (date, total loss, per-DEX breakdown, loss categories, attacker address, single-signature multisig, Stargate exit, white-hat message) are supported by Rekt and Web3 Is Going Great. The ZachXBT flagging claim, which appears in the summary and a section heading, has no supporting source and cites only a generic Telegram channel root. The Seal 911 and Stryke 50% claims were not verified. Timeline entries carry no sources.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,289,698
    sig
    bc6uBcatefAp…AND3hpDRexplorer ↗
    hash
    98ugADnPDBRY…QemA1Wzcsha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1296 B) ▸
    {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"6c69ab08c6eee7a2dd4a7ad3187c28e5","blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:13:51.892Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.375,"findings_hash":"18CKxpLbbQHcBZaSqnUWkFYPUpz3ox1yCPrBbqi6Jdu","investigation_id":"553a92d2-ee3f-4280-ae05-a6e447c45f5c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_content_hash":"edac48a0582902244e1ea6bc6c9c0267bebdcf6031cd8f490bd68101092587b9","page_slug":"orange-finance","prev_score":50,"reason":"The core exploit facts (date, total loss, per-DEX breakdown, loss categories, attacker address, single-signature multisig, Stargate exit, white-hat message) are supported by Rekt and Web3 Is Going Great. The ZachXBT flagging claim, which appears in the summary and a section heading, has no supporting source and cites only a generic Telegram channel root. The Seal 911 and Stryke 50% claims were not verified. Timeline entries carry no sources.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":3,"subject_status":"exploited","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision 7ca02431-1458-42e3-bd14-73baa47eabb2
  4. #4review reviseby judgejudge
    2026-11-02 00:13:52Z
    Score: 50 → 50 (no score change)
    The core exploit facts hold up: the date, the roughly $843,557 loss, the per-DEX breakdown, the attacker address and the single-signature multisig misconfiguration are confirmed by Rekt and Web3 Is Going Great (claim_findings[0-2], [5]). However, 3 of 8 countable claims (37.5%) could not be verified: the ZachXBT flagging claim appears in the summary, a section heading and the timeline but has no supporting source and cites only a generic Telegram channel root (claim_findings[3-4]), and the Stryke '50% of TVL retained' figure was not found (claim_findings[8]). One further claim, the Seal 911 engagement, was excluded because its source blocked the reviewer. The penalty sits at the lighter end of the band because the central allegations are confirmed, the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.6), and no omissions or status contradictions were reported.
    anchoranchored
    chain
    ●mainnet-betaslot 464,289,703
    sig
    5TdzfcKjJJNZ…kEtxpdM9explorer ↗
    hash
    GDKYof9GgSnZ…M3ou6in9sha256 → base58
    verifying row…full verify ↗
    canonical bytes (1543 B) ▸
    {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"6c69ab08c6eee7a2dd4a7ad3187c28e5","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:13:51.892Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.375,"investigation_id":"553a92d2-ee3f-4280-ae05-a6e447c45f5c","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_slug":"orange-finance","prev_score":50,"reason":"The core exploit facts hold up: the date, the roughly $843,557 loss, the per-DEX breakdown, the attacker address and the single-signature multisig misconfiguration are confirmed by Rekt and Web3 Is Going Great (claim_findings[0-2], [5]). However, 3 of 8 countable claims (37.5%) could not be verified: the ZachXBT flagging claim appears in the summary, a section heading and the timeline but has no supporting source and cites only a generic Telegram channel root (claim_findings[3-4]), and the Stryke '50% of TVL retained' figure was not found (claim_findings[8]). One further claim, the Seal 911 engagement, was excluded because its source blocked the reviewer. The penalty sits at the lighter end of the band because the central allegations are confirmed, the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.6), and no omissions or status contradictions were reported.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}
    Verify offline (run on your own machine)
    python -m src.verify_decision a8945a01-a412-4099-9e3b-4a8204c15202
How verification works. The “Row integrity” check above is computed in your browser — your machine recomputes the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes and compares against the stored hash. No avoid.net server can fake that check. The “full verify” link goes one level deeper: your browser fetches the on-chain transaction from a Solana RPC node and confirms the same hash is in the memo. If you don’t want to trust either avoid.net or the public RPC, run the CLI verifier on your own machine — python -m src.verify_decision <event_id>.