Audit log

Every state-changing event for Mastra AI npm Supply Chain Attack (June 2026): moderation decisions on community submissions, plus corrections and updates from the news pipeline. URL-based decisions are designed to carry three independent witnesses — the original source, an Internet Archive snapshot, and a Solana memo signed by our publicly-disclosed publisher key. Archive coverage is still being backfilled, so each decision below reports its own snapshot status rather than assuming one exists.

1. #1publishby system:backfill

   2026-06-19 12:21:09Z
   Score: ? → ? (no score change)
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   ●mainnet-betaslot 427,504,832

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   2qURjXT2QKzE…dRanWz5gcopyexplorer ↗

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   GDUcSUD2NG6q…5Lt7U69jcopysha256 → base58

   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (24005 B) ▸

   {"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","kind":"publish","page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","published_at":"2026-06-19T12:21:09.096Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Mastra AI npm Supply Chain Attack (June 2026)","sections":[{"content":"The Mastra AI npm supply chain attack was discovered on June 17, 2026. Attackers exploited a stale, never-revoked npm contributor account ('ehindero') that had legitimate publishing rights to the entire @mastra package scope, acquired during early alpha development in late 2024 and early 2025. Using this account, the attacker executed an automated campaign between 01:12 and 02:39 UTC on June 17, republishing 140+ packages across the @mastra namespace — each injected with a single new dependency: 'easy-day-js', a typosquatted impersonator of the widely used 'dayjs' date utility library. The @mastra packages themselves were not modified; only a dependency line was added, making the change difficult to detect through routine code review. Because the injected dependency was pinned as '^1.11.21', npm's semantic versioning resolution automatically pulled the malicious 'easy-day-js@1.11.22' at fresh install time without requiring any changes to the downstream package.json files.","heading":"Attack Overview","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"OX Security: easy-day-js Supply Chain Attack Hits Mastra AI in npm","type":"research","url":"https://www.ox.security/blog/easy-day-js-supply-chain-attack-hits-mastra-ai-in-npm/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Snyk: A forgotten contributor account compromised the entire Mastra npm package scope","type":"research","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: 145 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Hijacked Contributor Account","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/144-mastra-npm-packages-compromised-via.html"}]},{"content":"The root cause of the compromise was npm's lack of scope permission expiry on inactivity. The 'ehindero' account had legitimately published early alpha versions of @mastra/core in late 2024 and early 2025, then went dormant. Because npm does not expire scope publish permissions based on account inactivity, a single stale maintainer credential was sufficient to publish to every package in the @mastra scope. Evidence of the account compromise included an email address change to 'ehindero2016@tutamail.com', indicating the original contributor's credentials were stolen rather than the contributor acting maliciously. A current Mastra employee's machine is also alleged to have been compromised via social engineering: a compromised LinkedIn account contacted a maintainer with a suspicious link, exposing credentials used to access internal tooling. The malicious publisher account 'sergey2016' (sergey2016@tutamail.com) first published the clean decoy 'easy-day-js@1.11.21' on June 16 before introducing the weaponized version.","heading":"Initial Access: Stale Maintainer Credential","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Snyk: A forgotten contributor account compromised the entire Mastra npm package scope","type":"research","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: 145 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Hijacked Contributor Account","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/144-mastra-npm-packages-compromised-via.html"}]},{"content":"The weaponized 'easy-day-js@1.11.22' contained an obfuscated postinstall dropper in 'setup.cjs' (4,572 bytes), executed via the hook 'postinstall: node setup.cjs --no-warnings'. The dropper employed three obfuscation layers: a custom-alphabet Base64 encoding scheme, array rotation requiring an exact 34-position shift for integrity validation, and XOR-encoded beacon markers. During execution, Stage 1 of the dropper disabled TLS certificate validation by setting NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0, wrote installation path beacons to '<tmpdir>/.pkg_history' and '~/.pkg_logs', fetched a second-stage payload from the command-and-control server at 'https://23.254.164.92:8000/update/49890878' (Hostwinds, ASN AS54290), spawned a detached background process communicating with a secondary C2 at '23.254.164.123:443', and then self-deleted using 'fs.rmSync(__filename)' to remove forensic evidence. The Stage 2 payload functioned as a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) capable of: harvesting browser history and stored credentials from Chrome, Brave, and Edge; inventorying and exfiltrating data from 166 cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions (including MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, and Binance); stealing LLM API keys, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD tokens, and database connection strings; and installing OS-level persistence mechanisms on Windows, macOS, and Linux. The easy-day-js package bundled a byte-identical copy of dayjs.min.js to pass superficial inspection.","heading":"Malicious Payload: Multi-Stage RAT","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Microsoft Security Blog: From package to postinstall payload — Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise","type":"research","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Phoenix Security: easy-day-js / EASY_DAY_JS_MASTRA_2026","type":"research","url":"https://phoenix.security/easy-day-js-mastra-npm-supply-chain-typosquat-rat-2026/"}]},{"content":"The attack affected a minimum of 140 packages (various researchers cite 141 to 145 depending on counting methodology) within the @mastra npm scope. @mastra/core alone recorded over 918,000 weekly downloads at the time of the attack; combined weekly downloads across all affected packages exceeded 1.1 million, with combined monthly downloads reported by some researchers at over 28 million. The most heavily downloaded packages affected included @mastra/schema-compat (5.3M monthly), @mastra/core (4M monthly), mastra (2.1M monthly), @mastra/memory (2M monthly), and @mastra/server (1.8M monthly). Any developer workstation, CI runner, or build environment that executed 'npm install' on any @mastra package after June 16, 2026 was potentially exposed. Mastra packages are routinely installed in environments holding LLM API keys, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD tokens, and database connection strings — making the breadth of credential exposure particularly severe for AI toolchain developers. All republished compromised versions lacked SLSA provenance attestations, a distinguishing indicator.","heading":"Scale and Exposure","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Orca Security: 144 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Supply Chain Attack","type":"research","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: 145 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Hijacked Contributor Account","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/144-mastra-npm-packages-compromised-via.html"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"}]},{"content":"The second-stage RAT payload explicitly targeted cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions, with researchers identifying 166 distinct extensions in the malware's enumeration list. Named targets confirmed by multiple security researchers include MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, and Binance wallet extensions. The payload harvested wallet extension data, stored credentials, and browser session information at installation time, before any user interaction. Mastra AI is widely used in AI agent and automation pipelines that interact with blockchain infrastructure, including DeFi protocols, wallet management systems, and on-chain tooling — amplifying the risk that compromised developer environments would yield access to operational crypto assets rather than solely developer-owned personal wallets.","heading":"Cryptocurrency Wallet Targeting","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Orca Security: 144 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Supply Chain Attack","type":"research","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Phoenix Security: easy-day-js / EASY_DAY_JS_MASTRA_2026","type":"research","url":"https://phoenix.security/easy-day-js-mastra-npm-supply-chain-typosquat-rat-2026/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"}]},{"content":"Multiple security firms have noted tradecraft overlaps between this attack and prior campaigns attributed to Sapphire Sleet (also known as BlueNoroff), a North Korean advanced persistent threat group known for targeting developer supply chains to steal cryptocurrency. Snyk, Orca Security, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence have each noted that the attack pattern — including the clean-then-armed typosquat staging, the postinstall dropper using TLS disablement and detached spawning with self-deletion, and the focus on cryptocurrency wallet extension harvesting — closely mirrors the April 2026 Axios npm compromise that Microsoft formally attributed to Sapphire Sleet. However, Snyk explicitly stated: 'Attribution for this incident specifically is not confirmed, and we will not speculate further.' No government agency or law enforcement body had confirmed attribution as of the available reporting. The C2 infrastructure used Hostwinds (ASN AS54290), a US-based hosting provider. The malicious publisher accounts ('sergey2016', 'ehindero') used tutamail.com addresses, an encrypted email provider.","heading":"Threat Actor Attribution","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Snyk: A forgotten contributor account compromised the entire Mastra npm package scope","type":"research","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Orca Security: 144 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Supply Chain Attack","type":"research","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Microsoft Security Blog: From package to postinstall payload — Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise","type":"research","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: N. Korean Hackers Spread 1,700 Malicious Packages Across npm, PyPI, Go, Rust (April 2026 Axios context)","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/n-korean-hackers-spread-1700-malicious.html"}]},{"content":"Endor Labs detected the malicious republish within approximately 2 minutes and 18 seconds of the first affected package appearing on the registry. npm removed the 'easy-day-js' package from the registry and flagged all malicious versions under advisory SNYK-JS-EASYDAYJS-17353313. The 'ehindero' account was removed as a scope owner. Mastra responded by forward-rolling 142 publishable packages to clean versions in a coordinated pull request (#18056), moving the 'latest' dist-tag past all compromised releases, and disabling token bypass authentication on all packages. The clean 'latest' version was restored to @mastra/core 1.42.0. Security firms including StepSecurity, Endor Labs, Snyk, and Kodem published detailed incident response runbooks. Recommended user actions included: auditing npm install logs for any @mastra/* packages installed after June 16, 2026; rotating all secrets, LLM API keys, cloud credentials, and cryptocurrency wallet keys from potentially affected environments; reviewing network egress logs for connections to 23.254.164.92 or 23.254.164.123; removing persistence mechanisms installed by the RAT; and considering reimaging affected developer machines and CI runners.","heading":"Response and Remediation","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"Snyk: A forgotten contributor account compromised the entire Mastra npm package scope","type":"research","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Kodem: Mastra npm Compromise — easy-day-js Attack & Response Runbook","type":"research","url":"https://www.kodemsecurity.com/resources/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-easy-day-js-supply-chain-attack-iocs-and-response-runbook"},{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"}]},{"content":"Known indicators of compromise associated with this attack include: the npm packages 'easy-day-js@1.11.22' (malicious) and 'easy-day-js@1.11.21' (clean decoy); publisher account 'sergey2016' with email sergey2016@tutamail.com; compromised maintainer account 'ehindero' with email ehindero2016@tutamail.com; the postinstall dropper file 'setup.cjs'; C2 primary endpoint 'https://23.254.164.92:8000/update/49890878' (Hostwinds, ASN AS54290); C2 secondary endpoint '23.254.164.123:443'; beacon files '~/.pkg_history' and '~/.pkg_logs' written to the system home directory; any @mastra/* npm package versions published between June 17, 2026 01:01 UTC and approximately 02:39 UTC that include 'easy-day-js' as a dependency. The Snyk advisory identifier is SNYK-JS-EASYDAYJS-17353313.","heading":"Indicators of Compromise","severity":"critical","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Phoenix Security: easy-day-js / EASY_DAY_JS_MASTRA_2026","type":"research","url":"https://phoenix.security/easy-day-js-mastra-npm-supply-chain-typosquat-rat-2026/"}]},{"content":"The Mastra AI incident is one in a series of npm supply chain attacks in 2026 targeting AI and developer tooling ecosystems. Security researchers noted similarities with an April 2026 attack distributing approximately 1,700 malicious packages across npm, PyPI, Go, and Rust repositories, which Microsoft attributed to North Korean-linked actors in the Sapphire Sleet cluster. The recurring pattern — staging a clean package, arming it with a postinstall hook after building trust, then leveraging stale maintainer credentials to inject it broadly — represents a systematic approach to developer-environment compromise that yields high-value credential harvests given the density of API keys and secrets held in software development environments. The Mastra case highlights two systemic weaknesses in the npm ecosystem: the absence of publish-permission expiry for inactive accounts, and semantic versioning's default of resolving to the newest matching version at install time.","heading":"Broader Context: Developer Supply Chain Targeting","severity":"high","sources":[{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: N. Korean Hackers Spread 1,700 Malicious Packages Across npm, PyPI, Go, Rust","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/n-korean-hackers-spread-1700-malicious.html"},{"credibility":2,"name":"SafeDep: Mastra npm Scope Takeover — 141 Packages Drop a RAT","type":"research","url":"https://safedep.io/mastra-npm-scope-takeover-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Cloudsmith: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain attack","type":"research","url":"https://cloudsmith.com/blog/inside-the-mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack"}]}],"sources_used":[{"credibility":2,"name":"OX Security: easy-day-js Supply Chain Attack Hits Mastra AI in npm","type":"research","url":"https://www.ox.security/blog/easy-day-js-supply-chain-attack-hits-mastra-ai-in-npm/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Phoenix Security: easy-day-js / EASY_DAY_JS_MASTRA_2026","type":"research","url":"https://phoenix.security/easy-day-js-mastra-npm-supply-chain-typosquat-rat-2026/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"StepSecurity: Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack — 140+ Packages Backdoored via easy-day-js","type":"research","url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: 145 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Hijacked Contributor Account","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/144-mastra-npm-packages-compromised-via.html"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Orca Security: 144 Mastra npm Packages Compromised via Supply Chain Attack","type":"research","url":"https://orca.security/resources/blog/mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Snyk: A forgotten contributor account compromised the entire Mastra npm package scope","type":"research","url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Endor Labs: Mastra npm Org Compromised — Multiple Packages Trojanized","type":"research","url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"credibility":1,"name":"Microsoft Security Blog: From package to postinstall payload — Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise","type":"research","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"SafeDep: Mastra npm Scope Takeover — 141 Packages Drop a RAT","type":"research","url":"https://safedep.io/mastra-npm-scope-takeover-supply-chain-attack/"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Cloudsmith: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain attack","type":"research","url":"https://cloudsmith.com/blog/inside-the-mastra-npm-supply-chain-attack"},{"credibility":2,"name":"Kodem: Mastra npm Compromise — easy-day-js Attack & Response Runbook","type":"research","url":"https://www.kodemsecurity.com/resources/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-easy-day-js-supply-chain-attack-iocs-and-response-runbook"},{"credibility":2,"name":"The Hacker News: N. Korean Hackers Spread 1,700 Malicious Packages Across npm, PyPI, Go, Rust","type":"news_article","url":"https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/n-korean-hackers-spread-1700-malicious.html"}],"summary":"On June 17, 2026, attackers hijacked a dormant npm contributor account ('ehindero') to inject a malicious dependency ('easy-day-js') into 140+ packages across the @mastra npm scope, affecting an estimated 1.1 million+ weekly downloads. The trojanized dependency contained a multi-stage remote access trojan targeting developer credentials, LLM API keys, cloud secrets, and cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Mastra and npm responded within hours by revoking the compromised account, unpublishing malicious versions, and forward-rolling clean releases.","timeline":[{"date":"2024-01-01","event":"npm account 'ehindero' published legitimate alpha versions of @mastra/core, acquiring org-wide scope publish rights that were never subsequently revoked.","source":"Snyk","source_url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"date":"2026-06-16","event":"Account 'sergey2016' published 'easy-day-js@1.11.21' to npm — a clean, byte-identical copy of the legitimate dayjs library, seeding the attack infrastructure without triggering alerts.","source":"StepSecurity","source_url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"At 01:01 UTC, 'easy-day-js@1.11.22' was published with an obfuscated postinstall dropper ('setup.cjs') and tagged as 'latest', arming the previously clean package.","source":"StepSecurity / Endor Labs","source_url":"https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mastra-npm-packages-compromised-using-easy-day-js"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"Between 01:12 and 02:39 UTC, hijacked account 'ehindero' executed an automated 88-minute campaign republishing 140+ @mastra/* packages each injected with the 'easy-day-js' dependency, exposing a combined 1.1 million+ weekly downloads.","source":"StepSecurity / Snyk / Endor Labs","source_url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"Endor Labs detected the first malicious republish approximately 2 minutes and 18 seconds after it appeared on the npm registry.","source":"Endor Labs","source_url":"https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/mastra-npm-org-compromised-multiple-packages-trojanized-to-drop-a-remote-payload-via-easy-day-js"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"Microsoft Defender Security Research Team published a blog post detailing the attack mechanics and threat hunting guidance.","source":"Microsoft Security Blog","source_url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"npm removed the 'easy-day-js' package from the registry and flagged malicious versions under advisory SNYK-JS-EASYDAYJS-17353313. The 'ehindero' account was removed as scope owner.","source":"Snyk","source_url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"date":"2026-06-17","event":"Mastra forward-rolled 142 packages to clean versions, moved the 'latest' dist-tag past all compromised releases, restoring @mastra/core latest to version 1.42.0, and disabled token bypass authentication on all packages.","source":"Snyk / The Hacker News","source_url":"https://snyk.io/blog/a-forgotten-contributor-account-compromised-the-entire-mastra-npm-package-scope/"},{"date":"2026-06-18","event":"Multiple security firms including OX Security, Orca Security, Phoenix Security, SafeDep, Cloudsmith, and Kodem published detailed technical analyses and incident response runbooks.","source":"OX Security","source_url":"https://www.ox.security/blog/easy-day-js-supply-chain-attack-hits-mastra-ai-in-npm/"}]},"v":1}

   Verify offline (run on your own machine)

   python -m src.verify_decision e04d1d73-b4aa-416b-80f9-794dc66a76a4copy
2. #2reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-08-25 22:39:18Z
   Score: 0 → 0 (no score change)
   The page's factual core -- the account-takeover mechanism, malicious package/timeline details, technical payload behavior, scale, and remediation -- is well corroborated across independent vendor sources and Mastra's own incident report, and it correctly frames Mastra and its maintainers as victims of a credential-theft compromise rather than as wrongdoers. The principal defect found is in the opposite direction from typical overclaiming: the Threat Actor Attribution section materially understates the confidence of the page's own highest-credibility cited source (Microsoft), which explicitly attributed this specific incident to Sapphire Sleet with high confidence, while the page instead frames attribution as an unconfirmed pattern overlap. A secondary, minor issue is an unsupported editorial claim tying Mastra's user base to DeFi/blockchain infrastructure that is not present in any cited source.
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   {"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:39:18.561Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's factual core -- the account-takeover mechanism, malicious package/timeline details, technical payload behavior, scale, and remediation -- is well corroborated across independent vendor sources and Mastra's own incident report, and it correctly frames Mastra and its maintainers as victims of a credential-theft compromise rather than as wrongdoers. The principal defect found is in the opposite direction from typical overclaiming: the Threat Actor Attribution section materially understates the confidence of the page's own highest-credibility cited source (Microsoft), which explicitly attributed this specific incident to Sapphire Sleet with high confidence, while the page instead frames attribution as an unconfirmed pattern overlap. A secondary, minor issue is an unsupported editorial claim tying Mastra's user base to DeFi/blockchain infrastructure that is not present in any cited source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

   Verify offline (run on your own machine)

   python -m src.verify_decision 06450d91-2d9b-408f-8bd8-af23836d2dbecopy
3. #3review reviseby judgejudge

   2026-08-25 22:39:18Z
   Score: 0 → 0 (-10)
   Of the 24 claims the reviewer actually checked (the reviewer's own summary totals are miscounted and were disregarded), 19 were confirmed, 2 partially supported, 1 disputed, and 2 unverifiable, putting disputed+unverifiable at 12.5% of claims -- solidly in the minor-issues band. The one disputed finding (claim_findings[13], Threat Actor Attribution) is notable because it runs opposite to the typical failure mode on this platform: the page hedges on North Korea-linked group Sapphire Sleet/BlueNoroff as only an unconfirmed 'tradecraft overlap,' even though the page's own highest-credibility cited source -- a Microsoft security blog post titled specifically for this incident -- states high-confidence attribution, echoed without hedging by other outlets the page also cites. This is a real accuracy defect (the page should reconcile its framing with its own sourcing) but it understates rather than overstates a risk factor and does not shift blame onto or away from Mastra or its maintainers, who are accurately and consistently described as victims of credential theft throughout (verified). The two unverifiable items -- an uncited claim that Mastra is 'widely used' in DeFi/blockchain pipelines, and a precise but unsupported 2024-01-01 timeline date that even conflicts with the page's own body text -- are minor and additive rather than central. No link rot was found across ten sampled citations, and the page correctly avoids conflating this incident with the separate April 2026 campaign.
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   canonical bytes (1886 B) ▸

   {"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:39:18.561Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of the 24 claims the reviewer actually checked (the reviewer's own summary totals are miscounted and were disregarded), 19 were confirmed, 2 partially supported, 1 disputed, and 2 unverifiable, putting disputed+unverifiable at 12.5% of claims -- solidly in the minor-issues band. The one disputed finding (claim_findings[13], Threat Actor Attribution) is notable because it runs opposite to the typical failure mode on this platform: the page hedges on North Korea-linked group Sapphire Sleet/BlueNoroff as only an unconfirmed 'tradecraft overlap,' even though the page's own highest-credibility cited source -- a Microsoft security blog post titled specifically for this incident -- states high-confidence attribution, echoed without hedging by other outlets the page also cites. This is a real accuracy defect (the page should reconcile its framing with its own sourcing) but it understates rather than overstates a risk factor and does not shift blame onto or away from Mastra or its maintainers, who are accurately and consistently described as victims of credential theft throughout (verified). The two unverifiable items -- an uncited claim that Mastra is 'widely used' in DeFi/blockchain pipelines, and a precise but unsupported 2024-01-01 timeline date that even conflicts with the page's own body text -- are minor and additive rather than central. No link rot was found across ten sampled citations, and the page correctly avoids conflating this incident with the separate April 2026 campaign.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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   python -m src.verify_decision 5cff9723-ea3a-4345-858c-4ce3cf5477d2copy
4. #4reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-10-16 09:33:41Z
   Score: 0 → 0 (no score change)
   The page's core narrative — a hijacked dormant 'ehindero' npm account republishing 140+ @mastra packages with a typosquatted 'easy-day-js' dependency carrying a multi-stage credential-stealing RAT between 01:12 and 02:39 UTC on June 17, 2026 — is well supported by the cited vendor blogs (StepSecurity, Snyk, Endor Labs, Phoenix Security, Orca Security), down to granular technical details like dropper byte size, obfuscation parameters, and the 166-extension wallet target list. The most significant problem is in the Threat Actor Attribution section: it frames attribution as unconfirmed by quoting Snyk, but omits that Microsoft's own cited blog post was updated on June 19, 2026 to assess with high confidence that the campaign is attributable to Sapphire Sleet (BlueNoroff) — a material omission from a source already in the page's citation list. There is also an internal contradiction between two sections over where the malware's beacon marker files were written (temp directory vs. home directory), and the page juxtaposes a weekly download figure and a monthly download figure in the same sentence that are not mathematically consistent with one another, suggesting they were drawn from different methodologies without disclosure. A handful of remediation details (the 'token bypass authentication' fix, the Hostwinds/AS54290 attribution for the C2 IP) could not be verified against the specific sources cited. The page has no coverage of actual victim losses or on-chain fund tracing, which is a notable gap for a crypto-focused investigation.
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   2f8JGABm26PF…R8sW56JFcopyexplorer ↗

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   98AgtJJABQFc…SPaBZ4aJcopysha256 → base58

   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (2181 B) ▸

   {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"8337df2d80ab4d9de00effdebdca84c0","decided_at":"2026-10-16T09:33:41.658Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"13CRhMNsspt5sLKAHb2u6SrLCZ9Hd4ou7vrgKW1j1Z9u","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"be36ac3310704a52faa77b6aca4c90750dc4d753f7b1210120fc6bd071af783c","page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a hijacked dormant 'ehindero' npm account republishing 140+ @mastra packages with a typosquatted 'easy-day-js' dependency carrying a multi-stage credential-stealing RAT between 01:12 and 02:39 UTC on June 17, 2026 — is well supported by the cited vendor blogs (StepSecurity, Snyk, Endor Labs, Phoenix Security, Orca Security), down to granular technical details like dropper byte size, obfuscation parameters, and the 166-extension wallet target list. The most significant problem is in the Threat Actor Attribution section: it frames attribution as unconfirmed by quoting Snyk, but omits that Microsoft's own cited blog post was updated on June 19, 2026 to assess with high confidence that the campaign is attributable to Sapphire Sleet (BlueNoroff) — a material omission from a source already in the page's citation list. There is also an internal contradiction between two sections over where the malware's beacon marker files were written (temp directory vs. home directory), and the page juxtaposes a weekly download figure and a monthly download figure in the same sentence that are not mathematically consistent with one another, suggesting they were drawn from different methodologies without disclosure. A handful of remediation details (the 'token bypass authentication' fix, the Hostwinds/AS54290 attribution for the C2 IP) could not be verified against the specific sources cited. The page has no coverage of actual victim losses or on-chain fund tracing, which is a notable gap for a crypto-focused investigation.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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   python -m src.verify_decision a1214e71-a9ab-403d-84ec-c537043f4f41copy
5. #5reviewby reviewerreviewer

   2026-11-01 22:40:25Z
   Score: 0 → 0 (no score change)
   Core technical facts (timeline, package counts, account takeover, payload, response) match StepSecurity, Snyk, Microsoft and Mastra's official issue. The main defect is stale attribution: Microsoft assessed with high confidence on June 19, 2026 that the attack is Sapphire Sleet activity, yet the page says attribution is unconfirmed and that no threat-intelligence firm has attributed it. One timing claim (26 minutes) contradicts the page's own 01:01 and 01:12 UTC times. Some IOC directory paths differ from Microsoft's report.
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   ●mainnet-betaslot 464,263,453

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   49sgvCZa9HqT…VZBqTJnWcopyexplorer ↗

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   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (1408 B) ▸

   {"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"543006dbd5aba276e103bb6463b06282","decided_at":"2026-11-01T22:40:25.345Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3,"findings_hash":"CBNUs351XTZ8Pb38WWF2qhdbMNRmWAqqz6ZdMBFk7wiK","investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"omissions":{"material":2,"total":3},"page_content_hash":"dfc489edf997087fa039bf7b29401ef62e8a76132981667c2a77fa53bec54b75","page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Core technical facts (timeline, package counts, account takeover, payload, response) match StepSecurity, Snyk, Microsoft and Mastra's official issue. The main defect is stale attribution: Microsoft assessed with high confidence on June 19, 2026 that the attack is Sapphire Sleet activity, yet the page says attribution is unconfirmed and that no threat-intelligence firm has attributed it. One timing claim (26 minutes) contradicts the page's own 01:01 and 01:12 UTC times. Some IOC directory paths differ from Microsoft's report.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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   python -m src.verify_decision f02f0541-8150-4683-b851-7b1767b0bbe9copy
6. #6review reviseby judgejudge

   2026-11-01 22:40:25Z
   Score: 0 → 0 (-20)
   Most of the page's technical record (account takeover, payload, response timeline, package counts) matches Microsoft, StepSecurity, Snyk and Mastra's official incident report. However, the page says attribution is unconfirmed and that no threat-intelligence firm has attributed the attack (claim_findings[0] stale, claim_findings[1] disputed), while Microsoft, a cited Tier 1 source, assessed with high confidence on June 19, 2026 that it is Sapphire Sleet activity; omission_findings[0] records that this is missing. A timing claim of 26 minutes conflicts with the page's own times of 01:01 and 01:12 UTC, which give 11 minutes (claim_findings[2]), and one version detail could not be confirmed (claim_findings[6]). A second material omission, Microsoft's reported Windows follow-on compromise (omission_findings[1]), is also missing from the remediation and IOC sections. Mastra continues to operate and the incident was remediated, so the page needs correction rather than delisting.
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   ●mainnet-betaslot 464,263,458

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   39iVrv28bVuu…G5vza8WUcopyexplorer ↗

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   A7rW71PHxrLg…5zK5Xz4ocopysha256 → base58

   verifying row…full verify ↗

   canonical bytes (2165 B) ▸

   {"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"543006dbd5aba276e103bb6463b06282","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T22:40:25.345Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3,"investigation_id":"e46c6ad3-be50-48db-a6a5-50ede5b6a7ef","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Most of the page's technical record (account takeover, payload, response timeline, package counts) matches Microsoft, StepSecurity, Snyk and Mastra's official incident report. However, the page says attribution is unconfirmed and that no threat-intelligence firm has attributed the attack (claim_findings[0] stale, claim_findings[1] disputed), while Microsoft, a cited Tier 1 source, assessed with high confidence on June 19, 2026 that it is Sapphire Sleet activity; omission_findings[0] records that this is missing. A timing claim of 26 minutes conflicts with the page's own times of 01:01 and 01:12 UTC, which give 11 minutes (claim_findings[2]), and one version detail could not be confirmed (claim_findings[6]). A second material omission, Microsoft's reported Windows follow-on compromise (omission_findings[1]), is also missing from the remediation and IOC sections. Mastra continues to operate and the incident was remediated, so the page needs correction rather than delisting.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-20,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The raw percentage (3 of 10 findings disputed or unverifiable, 30%) sits at the minor/significant boundary, and the disputed findings concern the page's core attribution question. A material omission (Microsoft's high-confidence Sapphire Sleet attribution of June 19, 2026) and a stale summary claim on the same point mean the percentage understates the problem, so the page is judged in the significant band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}

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   python -m src.verify_decision 8d6a3847-c191-492b-9ba8-334c8d4f991acopy